

## THE CONTROVERSIES OF HARDLINE ISLAM IN INDONESIA: A CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACH

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### Abstract

The existence of hardline Islam in Indonesia has changed the shocking Islamic culture without violence and has presented an attitude of extreme and radical actions. This research is studied through a qualitative approach with library research. The purpose of this research is to suggest Indonesian hardliner Islam and the government respond to every hardliner maneuver not equated with handling terrorists with a pattern of shot to kill. Therefore, the problem – solving of Indonesian hardliner Islam is resolved by Galtung – style conflict resolution with a “positive peace” step. The results of the research reveal that Indonesian hardline Islam cannot be equated with hardline Islamic movements in other Muslim countries that are similar to the Taliban style or terrorist movements. Most Indonesian hardline Islam is treason, extortion, and undermining against Pancasila by imposing the value of sharia as an effort in “shariatization” so that their movements contradict the highest state regulations that they fall into actions in the criminal category.

*Keberadaan Islam garis keras di Indonesia telah mengubah budaya Islam yang mengejutkan tanpa kekerasan menjadi sikap yang ekstrim dan radikal. Penelitian ini dikaji melalui pendekatan kualitatif dengan jenis penelitian kepustakaan. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk memberikan saran kepada Islam garis keras Indonesia dan pemerintah untuk menyikapi setiap manuver kelompok garis keras tidak disamakan dengan penanganan teroris dengan pola diintai kemudian tembak mati. Oleh karena itu, penyelesaian masalah Islam garis keras Indonesia diselesaikan dengan resolusi konflik ala Galtung dengan langkah “perdamaian positif”. Hasil penelitian mengungkapkan bahwa Islam garis keras Indonesia tidak bisa disamakan dengan gerakan Islam garis keras di negara-negara Muslim lainnya yang mirip dengan gaya Taliban atau gerakan teroris. Sebagian besar Islam garis keras Indonesia bersifat makar dan merusak pemahaman terhadap Pancasila dengan memaksakan nilai syariatisasi sehingga gerakan mereka bertentangan dengan peraturan tertinggi negara sehingga masuk ke dalam tindakan yang dapat diklasifikasikan dalam kategori kriminal.*

## Background

The fall of Soeharto in 1998, the start of Indonesia's reformation era, saw the emergence of new hardliners that created new tendencies among fellow Muslims, including Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).<sup>1</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur) stated they were caused by contact with transnational Islamic movement groups in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Elza Peldi Thaher, *Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama: Bunga Rampai Menyambut 70 Tahun Djohan Effendi* (Jakarta: ICRP, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009).



Zada ensured that Hardline Islam intersects with figures in the Middle East, such as Hasan al-Banna, Hasan Turabi, Sayid Quth, al-Mawdudi, and Taqiuddin al-Nabahani.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, Ma'arif strengthened Gusdur's statement, recognizing that Islam was hardline aimed at upholding the "illusion of an Islamic State," which was originally only the expansion of the transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia.<sup>4</sup> Azra calls Hardline Islam the rise of radicalism to uphold sharia, Islamic positive law, and the Islamic State.<sup>5</sup> Said Aqil Siradj stated that hardline Islam in Indonesia, especially Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), which states that non-Muslims must be killed, churches must be torn down such as Abu Bakar Bashir, Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, Mukhlas, Imam Samudra while Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) which believes that people who accept Pancasila must be killed because they are considered *thaghut* (infidelity to God).<sup>6</sup> Indonesian hardline Islam tends to transfer the model of hard understanding of Islam from the outside into the literacy of understanding Islam in the frame of Pancasila and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, according to the founding fathers as the successor of Indonesian natives. The diversity of Indonesia was chosen by the founding fathers to be united in the ideology and doctrine inside Pancasila itself. Therefore, movements such as FPI and HTI will experience a biased situation, which is then disqualified or dissolved by the law because the Government will find it difficult to control their maneuvers to keep the integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Government's intervention against hardline Islam is introspective and reconstructive of a new order of Indonesianness Islam, making the Government insist on removing the Arabic language curriculum in all madrasas, sorting out preachers (*mubaligh/orator*) with proper certification, supervising the licensing of non-formal education establishments including *pesantren* (traditional education), even suspecting teenagers who are fluent in memorizing the Qur'an, fluent in Arabic, and "good looking boys" teenagers in the mosque. This effort is in anticipation of a hardline Islamic rebellion to destroy the doctrine of "treason" against Pancasila.<sup>7</sup> Bakrie evokes the Government what is said to be a hardline ideology in Indonesia's political dimension is all anti-Pancasila organizations, new-style Communists, terrorism, groups on behalf of SARA, and separatism.<sup>8</sup> The conflict in Indonesia was not initiated by outsiders' interpretation of Pancasila values, despite the fact that The Reformation Era in Indonesia opened the way for hardline Islam to make adjustments to the shariatization of Pancasila. This condition has led to confusion between 'Pancasila treason' or 'Pancasila extortion' and even 'undermining Pancasila' to become a new paradigm in Indonesia today.

Munawar-Rahman characterized Hardline Islam as a trigger for instability in raids on Christian worship places so they must be closed, giving the impression of removing *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (principles of unity in diversity) so far as calling Pancasila a

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<sup>3</sup> Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> Ahmad Stafe'i Ma'arif, "Garis Keras Memperparah Keadaan," *Tabloid Reformata*, Edisi 110, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Azyumardi Azra, *Jejak-Jejak Jaringan Kaum Muslim* (Jakarta Selatan: Hikmah, 2007).

<sup>6</sup> Said Aqil Siradj, "Radikal Ada Tiga," n.d.

<sup>7</sup> Putu Widhi Iswari et.al., "Proceeding of The Ist International Seminar on Sharia, Law, and Moral Society (ISSLAM 2022)" (France: The Atlantis Press, 2022), 292.

<sup>8</sup> Connie Rahakundidi Bakrie, *Pertahanan Negara Dan Postur TNI Ideal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007).

"noble compromise".<sup>9</sup> Zada explained who is ensured by Hardline Islam, namely FPI, which is very intolerant of prostitution, gambling, pornography, and even the liquor sellers and people who drink alcoholic drinking.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, Munawar – Rahman claimed that hardline Islam included Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), and Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI)<sup>11</sup>. The characteristic of hardline Islam is that it imposes a single legal and living system that is uniform and monotonous.<sup>12</sup> Hardline Islam demands positive sharia law and follows the flow of political developments in the Middle East.<sup>13</sup>

Hardline Islam was once accused of Abu Bakr Baashir, then in the Central Jakarta District Court, it was not proven that he was the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, and even there was no attempt to commit treason against the government.<sup>14</sup> Azra clarified Hardline Islam's statement that there are identical dimensions to conspiracy theories that consider the West and America a threat to Muslims and Islam. Conspiracy theories strongly influence Hardline Islam psychology to run sweeping against Western and American expatriates in Indonesia, boycott American products, and undertake demonstrations to cut diplomatic relations with America.<sup>15</sup>

### The Actions of Islamic Hardliners in Indonesia

Historical records show that formulations of conflict resolution have been made, such as unsuccessful conflict resolution in the Malino I agreement. However, the management under conflict analysis can formulate further conflict resolution by giving birth to the Malino II Agreement in Ambon which later created Islamic and Christian zones. The form of conflict reconciliation in Palu Poso (Central Sulawesi), Ambon Masohi (Maluku), Ternate Tidore Tobelo Jailolo (North Maluku) as a basis for conflict resolution based on management and conflict analysis.<sup>16</sup> Likewise, the conflict in Aceh, which has reached 32 years, has caused losses and claimed thousands of people. Then in 2005, there was a peace that can only be achieved based on *tit for tat* (kindness for kindness). President Jokowi's administration in the 2014 era conducted a psycho war with hardline Islam, namely FPI, by conducting a criss – crossed relationship between politics and religion. They occurred at the action of *Bela Islam* (The Defence Islam Action) on December 2, 2016, so hundreds of thousands of mass mobilization of Islamic groups against Jokowi.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Budhy Munawar – Rahman, *Sekularisme, Liberalisme Dan Pluralisme* (Jakarta: Grasindo, n.d.).

<sup>10</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam Dan Negara: Transformasi Gagasan Dan Praktik Islam Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Demokrasi Project, 2011).

<sup>11</sup> Al – Khanif, *Religious Minorities, Islam and The Law: International Human Rights and Islamic Law in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2020).

<sup>12</sup> Budhy Munawar – Rahman, *Sekularisme, Liberalisme Dan Pluralisme* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Yon Machmudi, *Timur Tengah Dalam Sorotan; Dinamika Timur Tengah Dalam Perspektif Indonesia* (Jakarta Timur: Bumi Aksara, 2020).

<sup>14</sup> Denny J.A, *Membangun Demokrasi Sehari-Hari* (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2006).

<sup>15</sup> Azyumardi Azra, *Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context* (Jakarta: Solstice Publishing, 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Syafuan Rozi, *Anatomi Dan Resolusi Konflik Di Indonesia: Kekerasan Komunal* (Jakarta: P2P – LIP, 2006).

<sup>17</sup> Ari Ganjar Hardiansah et. al. Hardiansyah, "The Defence Islam Action: A Challenge of Islamic Movement to Democratic Transition in The Post 2014 Indonesia," *Wacana: Indonesian Journal of Social and Humanity Study* 20, no. 2 (2017): 61 – 63.

FPI is insistent on reinterpreting Pancasila and replacing it with the superior law of Allah. FPI cleanses the country of non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims who can more easily be considered infidels and framed as criminals by FPI.<sup>18</sup> FPI considers un-Islamic the existence of brothels, bars, gambling establishments, and massage parlors. In addition, FPI is also violent against Muslim minorities such as the Ahmadiyah and Shiah.<sup>19</sup> FPI warns Muslim people about the revival of communism; even FPI guards and forces the closure of churches that operate without a license from the government.<sup>20</sup> President Jokowi banned FPI in December 2020. FPI disbanded and banned from activities and attributes in 2020. FPI was the prime mover behind the predecessor to Jokowi's resignation. FPI, as Prabowo's fiercest supporter, is most determined to fight incumbent President Jokowi in the 2019 election.<sup>21</sup> All of these things were then associated with hardline Islam. At its peak, Jokowi banned FPI after violated the covid 19 ban by holding mass. Jokowi considers FPI as an Islamist populist to be dangerous ideas (horror) with soldiers behind 212 movements.<sup>22</sup> Jokowi accused FPI of being hardline Islam and state-backed violence. FPI is confirmed as an anti-government movement.<sup>23</sup> FPI rejects liberalism, LGBT, prostitution, pluralism, secularism, shamanism, corruption, apostasy, heresy, khamr, drugs, gambling, adultery, pornoaction, pornography, tyranny, immorality, injustice, and leadership of infidel over Muslims.<sup>24</sup> On December 30, 2020, FPI was legally banned with the decision of a joint decree of six ministers.

HTI is known among the Indonesian people, but only 35% understand the objectives of HTI movement. HTI is identical to the caliphate movements in each orator, so their movements weaken the principles of Pancasila labeled with Pancasila de-ideology.<sup>25</sup> HTI makes a flag *mashirah* agenda icon with a black and white shahada inscribe.<sup>26</sup> Their movement tends to be inconsistent with Indonesia's national conditions, so it does not agree with the tolerant NU ideology to retain Islam Nusantara.<sup>27</sup> HTI

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<sup>18</sup> Nicholas Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, *Religion and The Global Rise Civilizational Populism* (Singapore: Springer, 2023).

<sup>19</sup> Elise M. Day, Katie and Edwards, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Cities* (New York: Routledge, 2021).

<sup>20</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam* (New York: Routledge, 2021).

<sup>21</sup> Yang Razali Kassim, ed., *Jokowi Second Term: Emerging Issues* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2022).

<sup>22</sup> Nazrina Vanderberg, Andrew and Suryani, ed., *Security, Democracy and Society in Bali: Trouble with Protection* (Singapore: Springer, 2021).

<sup>23</sup> Sana Jeffrey, "Indonesia in 2021: In The Eye of The Storm," *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute* 2022, no. 1 (2022): 146.

<sup>24</sup> Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, *Religion and The Global Rise Civilizational Populism*.

<sup>25</sup> Saiful Mujani, R.William Liddle, and Deni Irvani, "Islamism and Muslim Support for Islamist Movement Organizations: Evidence from Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 30, no. 1 (April 2023): 49 – 55, <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v30i1.33369>.

<sup>26</sup> Ahmad Irfan Fauzi and Meidi Kosandi, "Kepentingan Ideologis Negara Dan Nahdlatul Ulama Dalam Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," *Jurnal Inovasi Ilmu Sosial Dan Politik (JISoP)* 4, no. 1 (June 2022): 97 – 101, <https://doi.org/10.33474/jisop.v4i1.15896>.

<sup>27</sup> Moh. Dulkihah, Paelani Setia, and Muhammad Ikhlas Rosele, "Religious Movements and the Adoption of New Media: The Internet Used by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia After Disbanded," *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Lintas Budaya* 7, no. 1 (April 2023): 21, <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v7i1.21409>.

guides as a qabilah that has the aqidah NKRI bersyariah championing khilafah (national frame) in every action or seminar.<sup>28</sup>

The Front *Hizbullah* declares all outside Islam to be infidels, including China. Their blood is halal. Halal is defined as lawful or permissible. At another time, the Front *Hizbullah* gathered 200 pastors in Solo and warned churches that did not allow worship.<sup>29</sup> The Front *Hizbullah* (its leader) stopped with the shooting of Gus Cecep Bustami by an unknown person, so all Front *Hizbullah* activities were abandoned.<sup>30</sup> Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia implemented the action of *amar makruf nahi munkar* in the holy month of Ramadan, sweeping hotels or places of prostitution, distrusted the church in Cirebon, and supported the draft pornography law. Lastly they operate three Bali bomb executions.<sup>31</sup>

The founder of JAD, namely Aman Abdurahmman (Bahrum Naim's teacher), was prohibited "amaliyah" (terror) before participating in the war training agenda.<sup>32</sup> In 2014, JAT was formed after the Indonesian Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) led by Abu Bakar Baasyir was rift apart in 2006 because many of its followers were terrorists. Haris Amir Falah and Moch. Achwan followed Baasyir to the JAT organization. Abubakar Baashir led JAT did not wish to affiliate with ISIS. JAT is against democracy, nationalism, Pancasila, and capitalism.<sup>33</sup> JAD broke away from JAT to select the ISIS Network, which was led by Abu Bakar al – Baghdadi. Henceforth, JAD was formed to follow up Baghdadi's mission in Indonesia. Aman chose Zainal Anshori as a field operator to accomplish the *manhaj* tauhid to eradicate taghut.<sup>34</sup> JAD involved women and children in its actions. JAD executed the terror through lone wolf (outsiders of active members of its organization) such as suicide bombings that happened in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta in 2017 as well as in Sibolga in 2019, three church bombings in Surabaya in 2018, a pot bomb in Cicendo Bandung in 2017.

Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) was established in 2008. JAT once infidelized Said Aqil Siradj (great jurist) by putting *al-kazzab* (liar) at the end of said Aqil's name. Previously, Abu Bakar Baasyir (their leader) was infidelized because he used a lawyer in his defense in court. JAT only existed in a few districts and still concentrated in Java.<sup>35</sup> Two JAT followers once attacked Indonesia's incumbent defense minister, Wiranto, on October 10, 2019. Meanwhile, Laskar Jihad was not disbanded by the government but

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<sup>28</sup> & Irfandi Rohayana, A. D. ., Sofi, M. J., "Ibn Ashur's Concept of Maqasid Sharia – Finding Method," *Jurnal Penelitian* 17, no. 1 (2024): 75.

<sup>29</sup> Lisa Shcirch, ed., *The Ecology of Violent Extremism; Perspective on Peacebuilding and Human Security* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

<sup>30</sup> Liputan6.com, Mengenang Cecep Bustomi, Front hizbullah Keliling Jakarta (n.d.).

<sup>31</sup> Anwar Kurniawan and Ahmad Aminuddin, "Muhammad Thalib, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Dan Tafsir Ayat – Ayat Penegakan Syariat Islam Di Indonesia," *TEOSOFI: Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam* 8, no. 1 (June 2018): 130, <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2018.8.1.82-112>.

<sup>32</sup> Pia Khoirotun Nisa et al., "Ex – Terrorist Motivation in Reeducation Program: Case Study of Terrorism Convicts in Indonesia," *TARBIYA: Journal of Education in Muslim Society* 10, no. 1 (June 2023): 70, <https://doi.org/10.15408/tjems.v10i1.35047>.

<sup>33</sup> International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)," Crisis Group Asia Briefing, 2010.

<sup>34</sup> Muhammad Habibullah, "Extremism Counter – Narration of the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah within the Perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein Language Games Theory," *International Journal of Islamic Social Studies* 1, no. 1 (2023): 47.

<sup>35</sup> Bambang Karsono, *Jejak Aktifis JAT: Studi Kasus JAT Dan Jaringan Aceh-Pamulang* (Jakarta: Ubhara Jaya Press, 2018).

by themselves after some of them sought a fatwa from Saudi Arabian jurists in October 2002.<sup>36</sup> Laskar Jihad, led by Jafar Umar Talib was considered a hardline Islamist who attacked the Petra church in Ahuru, Ambon. Eventually, Laskar Jihad was expelled from Ambon, and civil emergency status changed to civil order.<sup>37</sup> all of the Laskar Jihad were driven out of Poso to make the Malino agreement heard by people on the ground<sup>38</sup>.

The escalation of hardline Islamic conflict takes two forms: first, The escalation of conflict that is raised the militants or terrorists execution by JAT through lone wolf and suiciders, which resulted in the government establishing the Special Detachment 88 unit whose task was to eradicate terrorists. JAD was selected to fight against the "near enemy," including *taghut* (anti Islam), *takfiri* (infidel) and *kafirun* (westerner).<sup>39</sup> JAT and JAD followers who drop in recidivists or alumni of the "university of war" should be separated to a place far from their group for more psychological training to change takfiri ideology to sympathetic and empathetic thinking. Second, conflict escalation can occur in the form of soft radicalism, such as the FPI and HTI movements. Soft radicalism does not cause casualties or loss of life. This includes criminal areas that are suitable for court and not worth shooting to kill. The implementation of deradicalization requires the collaboration of the National Agency for Terrorism Prevention (BNPT) in collaboration with academics or social agencies to redesign the mindset of militants who are wild emotion to be cozy gathering with touching patterns such as re – discussion of Islamic teachings through religious experts, shifted exposure to business/economic empowerment, and adaptation neurophilia (brain exposure evaluation) with socialhood.

Hardline Islam's push for conflict escalation is calculated by policies that generate pressure against their opponents, albeit gradually and even violently.<sup>40</sup> Freud assessed human conflict as a result of power competition scenarios that do not solve problems due to ego – loss (loss of personality) due to psychological trauma (Freud's term 'Studien') due to the pathogenic influence of conflict, namely entering other goals and awakening other souls in the personality due to symptoms of the urge of satisfaction or replacement for new satisfaction.<sup>41</sup> Jung stated that the development of personality due to the urge to cultivate (training and upbringing) to become a great force that must not be weakened and even have to awaken the psychic totality to create deep seriousness and responsibility that guides individual development in cultivating ideas, this is the full value. The pathogenic effect of neurotic influences without proper friction will fall into conflict due to their primitive perfection, which always depends on upbringing or training through tribal teaching as an absolute rule<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> Muhammad McRae, Dave & Haripin, *Poso, Sejarah Komprehensif Kekerasan Antar Agama Terpanjang Di Indonesia Pasca Reformasi* (Tangerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri, 2016).

<sup>37</sup> Syamsul et. al Hadi, *Disintegrasi Pasca Orde Baru, Negara, Konflik Lokal Dan Dinamika Internasional* (Jakarta: Cires, 2007).

<sup>38</sup> Sutiono Sinansari Ecip, *Rusuh Poso Rujuk Malino* (Jakarta: Cahaya Timur, 2002).

<sup>39</sup> Muhammad Habibullah, "Extremism Counter – Narration of the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah within the Perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein Language Games Theory," *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ISLAMICATE SOCIAL STUDIES* 1, no. 1 (2023): 49.

<sup>40</sup> Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflict: From Escalation to Resolution* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2007).

<sup>41</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Collected Works of Sigmund Freud* (USA: The Library of Alexandria, t.t), 36: The Library of Alexandr, n.d.).

<sup>42</sup> Carl Gustav Jung, *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung: The Practice of Psychotherapy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954).

All the maneuvers of hardline Islam have led to the loss of self – policing of clear thinking between worship and murderous tragedy. There is an inverted logic to achieve pride without emotional navigation through happy ways of working. Hardline Islam's weaknesses in theological mastery and legal literacy is easily ignited by the fire of worsening emotion.

### **The Characteristics of Islamic Hardliners in The World**

Pseudo – Islamic hardliners take physical and verbal actions in an attempt to gain influence in the name of Islam in the sense of hard jihad rather than soft jihad. The world's hardline Islamic groups include the *al-Da'wah ila at-Tauhid* Movement in Saudi Arabia. Second, the Uthman bin Fodio Movement in Nigeria. Third, the *Faraidli Mujahideen* Movement in India. Fourth, the *Sanusiah* Movement in Nigeria. Fifth, the *Jema'ah Islamiyah* Movement in Pakistan. Sixth, the Al – Qaeda movement in Pakistan. Seventh is the ISIS movement in Baghdad <sup>43</sup>.

The Taliban movement became the hardline Islam in Pakistan in 1996. The Taliban banned music, movies, dancing, televisions, the enforcement of *hudud* law, and the cutting of hands. The Taliban proposed the elimination of the conservative gender of women in the public sphere, where women must be treated by female doctors and female – only schools. The Taliban forced the wearing of burqas for women, and no schools for women were allowed. <sup>44</sup>. The tragedy of Malala Yosafzai, at the age of 15 in 2012, was shot by the Taliban, who did not allow women in public spaces. During the Taliban era, they were against girls' school talk everywhere. The Taliban stopped music, movies, and dancing. Even all music and electronic stores were closed. So, parents took the alternative of taking their daughters to school through radio channels. The Taliban instructed all women to stay at home and not allow innovative fashion, vaccines and Western haircuts. Everyone was afraid of the threat of the Taliban. In 2008, the Taliban bombed up to 100 schools <sup>45</sup>.

In Nigeria, the rise of Boko haram once sent young men to training camps with al – Qaeda in Mauritania. Boko Haram is referred to as the Taliban followers in Nigeria, but they are not highly educated people. Boko Haram claims that Western influence is required to impose sharia on Nigerian society. Boko Haram calls for a return to the truth of Islamic law. Boko Haram is affiliated with the ISIS group. It became ISWA (Islamic State Fighters in Africa). In 2009, Boko Haram was subjected to the use of police force. Boko haram attacked a church in Maiduguri and targeted the police, church, and government, as well as schools and colleges. Boko Haram declared Western education illegal. There was a siege by the police in 2009 against Boko Haram, which led to the death of Boko Haram leader Muhammad Yusuf into a bloody conflict. Boko banned police from sweeping motorized helmets, anti – Western, kidnapping schoolgirls, and bombing car park areas <sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> Mas'an Hamid, "The Emergence of Hard – Line Islamic Ideology: Impact of Differences Understanding Discourse on the Qur'an," *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 22, no. 05 (May 2017): 93 – 99, <https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2205049399>.

<sup>44</sup> Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2020).

<sup>45</sup> Patricia Yosafzai, Malala and McComick, *I Am Malala: How One Girl Stood Up for Education and Changed TheWorld* (UK: Huchette, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> Andrew Walker, *What Is Boko Haram?* (Washington: The United State Institute of Peace, 2012).

Boko Haram often denounces the government's poverty, misrule, and poor economy and evokes emotional rhetoric. They are an alumnus of the Afghan and Taliban wars so their movement is suicide attacks, bomb – making, and fighting.<sup>47</sup> Boko Haram is also known as a society splinter. Boko Haram recruits and radicalizes youth by echoing the failure of the state.<sup>48</sup> The core problem of Boko Haram is lower intellect than every interpretation they are interested in jihad.<sup>49</sup> Boko Haram is labeled with brutish fundamentalists and labeled as a terrorist group<sup>50</sup>. Boko Haram supports government genocide against Christians<sup>51</sup>.

In Kashmir, there are hardline Islamic organizations such as al – Umar *Mujahideen*, *Tehrik ul-Mujahideen* and *Jamiat ul-Mujahideen* that recruit Muslim youth in rural areas and poor settlements.<sup>52</sup> Hardline Islamist *Hizb ul-Mujahideen* in Kashmir part of Pakistan have killed Hindus and Sikhs.<sup>53</sup> Hardline Islam in India conducts "cultural cleaning" away from Hindu culture. In Bangladesh, especially *Jemaad-e-Islami* is seen as hardline Islam produced from conservative Suni Islamic organizations. Their Deobandi and *Ahli-e-Hadith* networks indoctrinate themselves with the philosophy of Jihad. Hence the emergence of The *Hizb-Tahrir* (HuT), *Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen* Bangladesh (JMB), and *Ansarullah* Bangla Team (ABT), whose ideology is linked to al – Qaeda and ISIS. *Hat-ul-Jihal-al-Islam* Bangladesh is seen as the Taliban of Bangladesh, where the government banned all seminars conducted by them<sup>54</sup>.

The type of recruits ISIS generally has in its background will lead to Islam for dummies giving birth to volunteer suicide bombers. Islamic hardliners are building their empires in Syria and Iraq. The experience of war with the Afghan Mujahideen has inspired the birth of holy warriors such as the Taliban, al – Qaeda, and ISIS. ISIS builds the character of "manhood" (*rujulah*) or "normative Arab sense of self" (*urubah*) as their icon as hardline Islamists.<sup>55</sup> ISIS movement in Baghdad massacred 500 members of the Yazidi sect in Iraq.<sup>56</sup> Characteristics of hardline Islam ISIS instilled hatred of non – Muslims to decide to *takfir* (halal blood) against non – Muslims, for ISIS taking the wealth of polytheists as *ghanimah* (spoil of war) appears very clear hostility to the West.

On the other hand, Hardline Islam was born out of the Afghan war, the Bosnia Herzegovina jihad field, and the Moro in the Southern Philippines. Genealogically, the religious movements developed by those who studied at the "university of war" are

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<sup>47</sup> Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Blood Sacrifices Violent No-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious Activities* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2016).

<sup>48</sup> Latizia et.al Paoli, ed., *Nexus Between Organized Crime and Terrorism: Types Responses* (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022).

<sup>49</sup> Bunker, *Blood Sacrifices Violent No-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious Activities*.

<sup>50</sup> Farooq A. Kperogi, *Digital Dissidence and Social Media Cenchorship in Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2023).

<sup>51</sup> Kperogi.

<sup>52</sup> Robert G. Limaye, Satu P., Malik, Mohan dan Wirshing, *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Hawai: Asia – Pacific Center for Security Studie, 2004).

<sup>53</sup> Limaye, Satu P., Malik, Mohan dan Wirshing.

<sup>54</sup> Narender Kumar, *Rise of Islamic Terror in Bangladesh and Impact on North-East India* (India: Spring, 2017).

<sup>55</sup> Juan Cole, ed., *Peace Movement in Islam: History, Religion and Politics* (UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022).

<sup>56</sup> Taslim Syahlan, "Menangkal Gerakan Radikalisme Islam Melalui Sekolah," *Magistra* 6, no. 2 (2015): 2.



automatically militant.<sup>57</sup> President Jokowi has warned to be careful with Syrian, Yemeni, and Iraqi immigrants (returnees) who may be exposed to Jihadi hardliners. Hardline Islam in the world has a strong hostility to the government, which is different from the actions of hardline Islam in Indonesia, which tends to want to uphold social dignity, but these ways fall into sabotage of social forces and government infrastructure. Neurophilia (brain affective receiver) of hardline Islam must be self-intervention and self-therapy in the nuances of the Islamic path, not the Islam clash.

### The Conflict Resolution For Islamic Hardliner

The government must verify that hardline Islam basically has good intentions, but it is seen as a misconception in the state. Therefore, the government made peacemaking offers so as not to create a prolonged conflict or avoid the massacre of natives by natives. Peacemaking is more important, but conflict sometimes leads to the choice of negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace is only produced by decisions by people who do not understand peaceful thinking, the absence of hostility in general, but quietly contradict other elements. There is an absence of proactive and reactive hostility between confronting each other, but war forces are always prepared<sup>58</sup>.

Conflict resolution is by way of peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. In the conflict escalation stage, starting with cultural peacebuilding, it is only limited to differences; structural peacebuilding has started to have contradictions, while peacemaking includes polarization of forms of action and peacekeeping where violence is created. In the stage of de-escalation of the conflict, namely a cease-fire applies peacekeeping (pause conflict), peace-making like making an appointment, peacebuilding structural normalization, and the stages of the creation of cultural peacebuilding reconciliation<sup>59</sup>.

De-escalation commences from the internal processes (social psychology), and the interaction process (reciprocal interactions, growing issues and harmony of differences) even require a quick settlement process and changing conditions.<sup>60</sup> Johan Galtung inspired the stages of stopping conflict intervention. First, peace building is overcoming the contradiction at the root of the conflict. Second, peacemaking, which influences actors into new offers. The third is peacekeeping, namely the supervision of actors to stop subsequent conflicts<sup>61</sup>.

In the peacebuilding dimension, a conflict resolution process can be performed in several stages according to the conflict, namely the de-escalation stage (stopping violence), negotiation (political orientation), problem-solving (social and cultural nuances) and cultural or structural agreements.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, structural peacebuilding is used to develop politics, economic reconstruction, rule of law programs, security sector reform, etc. People with strong peacebuilding skills always consider resilience, which can strengthen politics, economy, law, and security so that no party violates the law.

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<sup>57</sup> Eka Ar Hendry, "Pola Gerakan Islam Garis Keras Di Indonesia," *Khatulistiwa* 3, no. 2 (2013): 164.

<sup>58</sup> Dennis J. D. Sandole, *Peacebuilding* (UK: Polity Press, 2010).

<sup>59</sup> Oliver et. al. Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Angagemnt and Transformation of Deadly Conflict* (Cambridg: Polity Press, 2011).

<sup>60</sup> Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflict: From Escalation to Resolution*.

<sup>61</sup> Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage Publication, 1996).

<sup>62</sup> Abdul Jamil Wahab, *Manajemen Konflik Keagamaan (Analisa Latar Belakang Konflik)* (Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo, 2014).

Obedience to law causes the nation is journey to always be in peace and always be in a participatory solution.

*Shuluh* (*ishlah*) is a justice restoration of extraordinary criminals as long as they are not recidivists. They must be build in bad vision to the enlightenment by Trainer of Trainer through preaching deradicalization, measuring the level of engagement to be granted abolition and reconciliation.<sup>63</sup> Based on Surah An – Nisa verse 128 "al – Sulhu Khair" that this applies within the framework of a positive peace between the leaders and the *bughah*/rebels (nation integrity conflict), Muslims – disbelievers, sellers – buyers (*mu'amalah*), and husband – wife (marriage) *Shuluh* is divided into three shades: first, *shuluh ibra'* means being ready to make peace by demanding the rights that can be fulfilled even a little. Second, *Shuluh mu'awadhah*, which means replacing goods in the market that are equivalent in price. Third, *shuluh al-khathithah* (*hibah*) means giving just enough as a reconciling solidarity.<sup>64</sup> State violence against the people with any argument becomes irrelevant, considering the modern situation of people's solidarity determines the progress of a nation. Conflict resolutions in a pluralistic society may be able to use conflict resolution theory with the Islamic *shuluh* principles approach that states that the concept of peace by prioritizing Islamic interests can change the discourse of hostility into friendship. *Shuluh* involves a portfolio that includes acknowledgment of wrongdoing, reparation, forgiveness, and settlement rituals. *Shuluh* is conducted by government officials and community leaders with the authority not to take sides but to create goodwill between parties involved in negotiations. *Shuluh* ends with the rituals of *musafaha* (handshake) and *mumalaha* (eating together). Conflict resolution is handled by people with a background in Islamic law so that all parties to the conflict are led into a jointly signed agreement<sup>65</sup>.

Another alternative to peaceful settlement through *shuluh* is the application of the value of *Badal al – shulh* (peace money). The value of *Badal al-shuluh* is not determined in the form of a property or right of value that cannot be determined in the form of money based on shari'ah regulations. *Badal al-shuluh* may be paid or abandoned request or deferral of time agreed between the conflicting parties. The government or *wali* (guardian over a person) is willing to assist in implementing *badal al-shulh*. *Badal al-shuluh* means the agreed compensation to be paid or given by the offender to the *Wali* in cash or in the form of movable or immovable property.<sup>66</sup> After the Helsinki agreement, the government of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia tried to resolve the problem of integration conflict with the independent Aceh Movement (GAM) by providing assistance money of 25 million per person in March 2006. Then the victims (former combatants who were killed) asked the government to support the cost of *diyat* (blood money) until today, it has not been implemented. The incident has proven to suggest the growth of a *tepa selira* attitude in resolving mutual problems.

<sup>63</sup> Sapto Priyanto, Mohammad Kemal Dermawan, and Arthur Josias Simon Runturambi, "ISLAH AS THE KEY SUCCESS OF TERRORIST DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS IN INDONESIA," *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 15, no. 1 (June 2020): 159–62, <https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol15no1.11>.

<sup>64</sup> Ibrahim Al – Bajury, *Hasyiyah Al-Bajury 'Ala Syarah Ibnu Qasim, Tahqiq. 'Abdu Al-Aziz Al-Khathib Al-Husny, Juz. II* (Beirut: Dar Al – Kutub Al – Alamiyah, n.d.).

<sup>65</sup> Daniel Philpott, *Just And Unjust Peace: Abn Ethics Of Political Reconciliation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

<sup>66</sup> Taylor Dan Francis, "Commonwealth Law Bulletin, Vol. 30," 2004.

Conflict resolution should apply rethought, re–imagined, and re–engineered ways to condition the situation to turn from a state of conflict to de–escalation of conflict until reaching an agreement even within the limits of negative peace.<sup>67</sup> Every conflict starts with verbal or physical clashes, contradictions, friend images, or enemy images.<sup>68</sup> The impact is that Hardline Islamic Group has changed the discourse of the government by replacing the madrasa curriculum with the disappearance of learning everything that speaks Arabic including clamping down on the reader of jihad book. Islamic boarding schools are not "den of hardliner" as claimed by the pro–government. Given that Islamic boarding schools indirectly have Arabic–based knowledge that is not partial to the motivation for "violence". The government seems suspicious of good–looking teenagers or being good–looking and diligent in going to the mosque as a new radicalism. New radicalism was exposed to good–looking youth through online media, such as Al Busyro. Ahmad Azhar Bashir from the Solo's hardliner group learned to make a detonator from an article on the internet that finally caught on<sup>69</sup>.

In conflict conditions, the first step is to turn war journalism into peace journalism to limit the exposure of superiority and victory<sup>70</sup>. Subsequent actions opened up space for peace–building. After that, work on peacekeeping agendas, nonviolent or victims, reconciliation, and peace policies<sup>71</sup>. This can be seen in the Malino I Agreement, which was operated with a delegation of 25 people representing the Islamic group as well as 25 people representing 25 from the Poso–Christian side, and 25 representing the mediator<sup>72</sup>.

The use of positive peace deals with underlying, deep–rooted causes and stops the manifestation of violence. Building positive peace is the result of maximizing peacebuilding. Meanwhile, minimalist peacebuilding is only achieved as limited as negative peace<sup>73</sup>. Conflict must reach zero sum so that negotiations against hardliners are always concessions that lead to convergence by starting with an offer of position through collective bargaining to achieve peace, bargaining power, or an offer from a coalition of partners<sup>74</sup>.

At the peacemaking level, positive actions are used to handle new methods without violence such as strikes, vigils, picketing, sit–ins, blockades, and other forms of demonstrations<sup>75</sup>. Strong social interactions can withstand counter efforts and persuasive (counter–inducements), namely, positive persuasion is more effective in generating de–escalation<sup>76</sup>. The handling of hardliners in Indonesia through Detachment 88 lurks then ambushes between shooting and death. Likewise, the

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<sup>67</sup> Kevin Avruch, *Culture & Conflict Resolution* (Washington: United State Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

<sup>68</sup> (Galtung, Johan, and Fischer, 2013a)

<sup>69</sup> Yalizar Rahayu, *Patriotisme Dalam Konsep Islam* (Jakarta: Guepedia, 2021).

<sup>70</sup> Galtung, Johan and Fischer, *Johan Galtung: Pioneer of Peace Research*.

<sup>71</sup> Galtung, Johan and Fischer.

<sup>72</sup> Ilovia Ayaregita Widayat et al., "Konflik Poso : Sejarah Dan Upaya Penyelesaiannya," *Jupiiis: Jurnal Pendidikan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 13, no. 1 (June 2021): 1, <https://doi.org/10.24114/jupiiis.v13i1.18618>.

<sup>73</sup> Sandole, *Peacebuilding*.

<sup>74</sup> Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflict: From Escalation to Resolution*.

<sup>75</sup> Saritoprak, "Badiuzzaman Said Nursi's Paradigm of Islam Nonviolence," in *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar Ul–Huda, 2010, 103.

<sup>76</sup> Zartman and Aurik, "Power Strategies in De–Escalation," in *Timing The De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, ed. Stuart J. Kriesberg, Louis and Thorson (Syracuse University Press, 1991), 152.

handling of separatism by carrying out a brutal militarism approach only, omits deep sorrow for the people who are victims. In the long term, the Detachment 88 operation will create a black history for the memories of the future community, as in the case of the Aceh conflict. This condition gradually mingled between the combatant and military leaders. The elimination of suspicion so that the sterilization of the pathogenic state of conflict turns to a new satisfaction in which the elimination of neurotics from furious is no longer differences and suspicion becomes a gunfight but *tepa selira* (sensitivity to other people's feeling) which means hatred but castrated emotions <sup>77</sup>.

Some studies show that the Poso case was started by subjective issue that migrants are more prosperous than the local population. The Poso tragedy was initiated by competition between immigrants and the indigenous population for political and economic motives. The failure of immigrants to interact with the local culture led to what was termed the "second Maluku" <sup>78</sup>. After the Malino One declaration, military operations were conducted to realize Maleo awareness, and then tradition-based reconciliation was continued with Operation Sintuvu Maroso I to IV in 2001 to 2004 <sup>79</sup>.

## Conclusion

The characteristics of hardline Islamic groups are limited to enforcing sharia-oriented, not treason, not extortion, or their inability to change state ideology. However, terrorists are those who execute suicide or lone-wolf attacks on government infrastructure, hotels, churches, and security forces. Militant hardline Islam is like JAT and JAD, which JAT is considered Indonesia's Taliban. JAD is anti-local wisdom, close to *takfiri* extremist idea, but has not been proven to commit acts of sabotage or bombings. However, soft radical Islam is accused of FPI and HTI. These two organizations acted wildly, ignoring the police, disobeying regulatory rules, distorting the meaning of Pancasila, and destroying the diverse social order.

The handling of hardline Islam with shoot to kill by Detachment 88 must be changed to a peacemaking approach by way of *shuluh* (ritual of handshake) or *badal shuluh* (compensation) to restore militant faith. Hardline Islamists, like militant networks as similar to JAT must be reconstructed dyspraxia (carelessness) non-recidivists, immigrants from conflicted countries, or militants without bomb-making skills.

The handling of Hardline Islamic groups is enforced with harsh and blind attacking. However, when handling steps in a period of silent conflict escalation, one must pay attention to the components and destructiveness of the conflict. First, changing identity includes shifting attitudes of exclusivity, intolerance, and wrongfully arrested that will be created by applying inclusiveness, radicalism, and holy blood. Second, all complaints include trust, feelings of humiliation, and constrained expectations by eliminating a threat and diametrically negotiating to ascertain the optimal resolution point for each issue. Third, the abolition of grudges, which involve imminent violence, non-discriminatory violence, elimination of suspicion, and denial of violence.

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<sup>77</sup> Thania Reyhler, Luc and Peffenholz, ed., *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Colorado: Lynne Ryenner Publishers, 2001).

<sup>78</sup> Hasrullah, *Dendam Konflik Poso* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2013).

<sup>79</sup> (Wijaya, 2020)

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