

## Persecution of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation through the MUI Fatwa, Tuan Guru, and the Lombok Community



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### Article History:

Submission : April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2023  
Revised : May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2023  
Accepted : May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2023  
Published : June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2023

### Keyword:

Ahmadiyya; MUI; Tuan Guru;  
Lombok.

### Abstract

Ahmadiyya has taken refuge in the Transito Dormitory since the end of 2005 and 2010. They tried to return to their homes in West Lombok but drove out by the community. This article will discuss Ahmadiyya, who experienced persecution in Lombok, and the basis for the MUI to issue deviant fatwas against the Ahmadiyya Congregation in 1980 and 2005. The process of the persecution of the Ahmadiyya in Lombok and the influence of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Tuan Guru on society are revealed in this study. The theories of Louis Althusser about state ideological institutions, in this case, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, and Johan Galtung's theory about direct violence perpetrated by the community and indirect violence through the SKB 3 Menteri (Joint Decree of Three Ministers) being operate in this study. The research uses in-depth interviews with Ahmadiyya members in the Mataram Transito Dormitory. This study finds that the MUI Fatwa serves as legitimacy for society in carrying out violence and persecution of the Lombok Ahmadiyya Congregation and the influence of Tuan Guru through their daily life and lectures at the mosque.

## Introduction

In Indonesia, Ahmadiyya entered via Sumatera brought by two Sumatran Thawalib students who had just returned from India. One of the Sumatran Thalawib figures was Haji Rasul, who led the Padang Panjang Thawalib College (Daya 1995). Haji Rasul, the father of Buya Hamka, as a representation of Muhamadiyah, explicitly said that Ahmadiyya's beliefs deviated from Islamic teachings in 1925 (Muhtador 2018). The statement was also supported by Hamka when he became chairman of the MUI (Adam 2012).

Despite all the controversies that Ahmadiyya first visited Indonesia, especially in Java, Ahmadiyya had direct contact with Muhammadiyah (Burhani 2020)(Ichwan 2001). The Muhammadiyah figure Raden Ngabehi H.M Djojosoegito was one of the founders of Ahmadiyya in 1928. He was also a cousin of Hasyim Asyari and Wahab Chasbullah, the founders of Nahdlatul Ulama. Apart from that, there is also Erfan (Burhani 2020), one of the sons of Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah. He studied in Lahore and then developed Muhammadiyah in Thailand (Adam 2012). Ahmadiyya, since the colonial era (Burhani 2014) has been in direct contact with the national movement in Indonesia against colonialism (Zulkarnain 2005). The sect is developing and growing in several cities in Indonesia. Ahmadiyya Qodian, also known as Jamaah Ahmadiyya Indonesia (JAI), often experiences rejection and violence by the community. The highest number occurs in West Java as the center of JAI, and also in several other areas. The Ahmadiyya congregation often experiences rejection, discrimination, and violence by the community.

Ahmadiyya Qodian in West Java, Surabaya, Lombok, and several other cities, are used to rejection and violence, even expulsions, as happened in West Lombok. According to the Setara Institute, between 2007–2009 there were 286 violations against



the Ahmadiyya congregation (Hosseini 2010). In Indonesia, Ahmadiyya has received rejection since the 1950s and gained legitimacy since the MUI issued a fatwa in the 1980s. Later, at the MUI National Working meeting in 1984, they declared the Qodian Ahmadiyya deviant from Islamic teachings and disrupting national order. As well as the 2005 MUI fatwa, which corroborated the 1980 MUI fatwa, stated that Ahmadiyya is heretical and misleading. Its followers are considered apostates, and the government is obliged to prohibit the spread of Ahmadiyya teachings (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005). This fatwa is supported by organizations such as the Institute for Islamic Research and Studies (Burhani 2016). The culmination of this rejection occurred in 2008 with the issuance of a Joint Decree of Three Ministers.

The prohibitions issued by several local governments also influenced the violence against the Ahmadiyya Congregation. The escalation of violence in several areas is increasing yearly. Setara Institute records violations against Ahmadiyya in 2007 were 15 violations, 193 violations in 2008, 33 violations in 2009, and 50 violations in 2010 (Hosseini 2010). Between 2007, 2009, and 2010 violations continued to increase, while 2008 was the most significant number of violations against Ahmadiyya. The year in which the Joint Decree of Three Ministerial were issued.

This article will discuss the case of Ahmadiyya Lombok, who has fled since 2006 at the Transito Dormitory Mataram, through several points: First, the basis for the MUI to issue a heretical fatwa against the Ahmadiyya Congregation. Second, the process of persecution of Ahmadiyya Lombok and the influence of the MUI and Tuan Guru on society. Many studies on Ahmadiyya are carried out by Setara Institute using a legal perspective. Setara Institute's findings are limited to mapping law violations and the number of victims as well as the amount of damage and its development from year to year (Hasani Ismail dan Naipospos 2010).

Studies on intolerance towards Ahmadiyya also occur because of political interests (Baihaqi 2020). State violence against Ahmadiyya, which was carried out through the MUI Fatwa, occurred in Lombok and Surabaya (Gaffar 2013). Punishment and discipline also occurred for female refugee Ahmadiyya Lombok. This happened inseparable from the fatwas used by the community as legitimacy in carrying out violence (Gaffar 2022). The Joint Decree of Three Ministers in 2008 also served as legitimacy other than the MUI fatwa.

## Research Method

This research uses qualitative research methods. Qualitative research has axiological, epistemological, and axiological (Somantri 2005). The axiological assumptions of qualitative research see that reality is subjective and multiple. Epistemologically, qualitative research is not independent of something studied but interacts directly with those being studied. Ontologically, research is value-laden. Methodologically, qualitative research is inductive, not limited to the time before the investigation, but is simultaneous, develops in the field, identification is carried out during the research process, bound to context, theoretical patterns are formed to build an understanding, as well as accuracy, and reliability is established through verification.

Data collection techniques using in-depth interviews, observation, and documentation. Informants were members of the Ahmadiyya Congregation who had taken refuge in the Mataram Transito Dormitory, community leaders, and the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion Affairs of West Nusa Tenggara. Observations were made at the Transito Dormitory by looking at their lives while displaced at the Transito hostel. Both are related to social interaction with the local community, economic vitality, and religious activities, which were considered to deviate from mainstream

Islam. The documentation was carried out by collecting data from Jamaah Ahmadiyya, the Ministry of Religion Affairs, and the police regarding statistics on conflict escalation, conflict chronology, and victims.

### **Ahmadiyya Version of the MUI: Unilateral Verdict**

How far are the influence of the MUI fatwa and the forces that have supported the strong MUI fatwa and its significant influence on the members of Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), especially in Lombok? Two things need to be explained. First, the basis for the MUI issuing the fatwas. It will be called the MUI version of Ahmadiyya. Second, will explain the background of the strong MUI fatwa, which is embedded in society. It is important to explain because several matters related to JAI were significantly influenced by the MUI fatwa and several different responses in several areas. The areas where the majority were non – Muslim and places the majority were Muslim.

The MUI fatwa was issued for the first time in 1980 and then confirmed in 2005. The MUI fatwa only issued heresy against JAI in 1980. The second fatwa, MUI issued a fatwa not only for JAI but for the Gerakan Agama Islam (GAI) or Ahmadiyya Lahore in 2005. The contents of the fatwa are inseparable from theological considerations related to the fundamental differences between Islam Ahmadiyya and Islam represented by the MUI. These considerations by the MUI were based on nine books. It was these nine books that convinced the MUI to issue a heretical fatwa against Ahmadiyya (Fithrotul'aini, Mustaqim, and others 2017).

It would be interesting to look further at the legitimacy of the MUI in issuing heretical and misleading fatwas against Ahmadiyya. The MUI, as the party issuing the fatwa, is responsible for what forms the basis of the fatwa. The MUI fatwa has a major influence on society. Until now, the nine books that justify the fatwa have never been disclosed to the public. Second, it is based on a fatwa issued by the Organisasi Konferensi Islam (OKI) and Rabhithah Al – Alam (Alnizar, Manshur, and Ma'ruf 2022). MUI considers the international organization in its considerations apart from theological considerations reflections. Third, the public never understood the basis for the MUI issuing a heretical fatwa. The public only knows theological considerations. It is even more crucial as the basis for the MUI issuing the heretical fatwa.

The logical consequence behind the MUI fatwa is that it creates societal prejudice. Finally, the dialogues around theological considerations issued by the MUI are more prominent than the essential dialogue on the fatwa. The discussion about Ahmadiyya, the heretical dictions are more pronounced. Dialogues around JAI regarding Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet as recognized by JAI and Tadzkirah as JAI's holy book. It is not the Al Quran. This fact is the legitimacy of violence against JAI is strong. Eventhough it is not the basis for the MUI to issue a fatwa. It continues to surface and becomes very sensitive if it is campaigned by Tuan Guru.

This MUI fatwa later became more vital in society based on dialogues that further distorted and brought down Ahmadiyya. JAI has never been discussed. MUI remains adamant with its fatwa. MUI close the door for discussion with Ahmadiyya. There is only guidance as an effort to urge JAI residents to leave JAI. This is as stated by the head of the section on law and religious harmony, the Ministry of Religion Affairs, West Nusa Tenggara, that "MUI has closed the door for discussion."

The MUI has declared the Ahmadiyya heretical and infidel on the basis of nine books and the basis of international Islamic organizations, such as the Organisasi Konferensi Islam (OKI) and Rabhithah Al – Alam. Ahmadiyya is considered to have violated the UU PNSP 1965 (Ahyar 2015) concerning blasphemy. On this basis, the MUI

fatwa becomes legitimate, not only for the community but through the UU PNPS 1965 (Sumbulah 2014) the MUI fatwa becomes legitimate.

MUI was not born in an empty space, nor was its fatwa on Ahmadiyya. MUI is a group of people with Islamic religious competence called Kiai in Java and Tuan Guru in Lombok Island. The MUI fatwa is so strong. It cannot be separated from the community's support for Tuan Guru, who are considered by the community to be representatives of God in the world to interpret religious texts.

So that what is said by Tuan Guru will always be followed by the community. Issues that distort Ahmadiyya, as explained above, make Ahmadiyya's position in society a party that must be removed. Therefore, there was violence against JAI by the community. Between the MUI fatwa and the community, it only occurs in areas where the majority are Muslim because these regions define diversity from the perspective of majority (Setara Institute 2023). The difference in conditions between an area with a predominantly Muslim population and a non – Muslim majority population resulted in a much different treatment of JAI. Several areas became the destination of JAI Lombok after being kicked out of the house, besides living in the Transito Dormitory. They are relatively safe without interference from the community or the government through regulations that result in discrimination against JAI. For example, in NTT, Bali, Kendari, and several places where the majority are not Muslim. JAI is classified as safe without any resistance from the community (Mukhsen et al. 2017).

Apart from being the majority, religious knots or obedience to religious leaders is also one of the causes, as in Lombok and several other places, *sami'na waata'na* is still valid. Indeed, several places do not reject Ahmadiyya even though the majority are Muslim. Yogyakarta and maybe several other places are guarantees from the local government regarding security and civil society (Maliki 2010). A city is known as the center of the Ahmadiyya Lahore or the Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), a safe place (Rahman 2011).

In contrast to some of the areas above, in Lombok, the government and religious leaders seem to be collaborating against JAI. JAI has become a common enemy, and the majority community legitimizes this treatment. Besides the MUI fatwa (ideology), the community has an important role in legitimizing the treatment of the government and religious leaders. Without the strong influence of the community, government regulations and religious leaders will not function and play an important role (Baihaqi 2020).


Comparing the condition of Ahmadiyya in several areas with JAI in Lombok is important in order to get clear answers to what extent the strength of the MUI fatwa and the role of the state were involved in the violence that occurred against JAI Lombok. This position is also important when one sees that not only the different treatment of religious and state figures towards JAI, but also the different perpetrators of violence from civil society. The majority in several areas, especially in West Java which is the site of the highest number of violence against JAI (Aini and Mustaqim 2016), who carried out the majority violence were representatives of Islamic mass organizations which incidentally were not stronger in terms of quantity with JAI as victims of violence.

Violence against JAI in Lombok was carried out by the local community based on the MUI fatwa, which declared JAI (Wahab and Fakhruddin 2019) be heretical and misleading. For the community, the MUI fatwa is the main reason for their refusal to even expel JAI from their homes. Apart from that, the influence of religious leaders also

legitimized the community for committing violence against JAI. So that it can be said that the community and Tuan Guru are the units that make the MUI fatwa against Ahmadiyya so deeply rooted, without the community and Tuan Guru. The MUI will not be so deeply rooted. This has happened in several areas where the majority are non – Muslims. Not only are they not strong, it is possible that the local community is not aware of the existence of an Ahmadiyya heretical fatwa.

The findings of the Setara Institute in 2013 (Fahmi et al. 2013) showed that minority groups are not weaker than those who are intolerant. The intolerant groups are not more numerous in terms of quantity. Their persistence and propaganda with religious or ideological symbols that they carry are able to influence the majority community. This is also supported by the legitimacy of local religious leaders.

This incident occurred in several places and was carried out by an intolerant Islamic mass organization (Simamora, Hamid, and Hikmawan 2019)). In contrast to what happened to JAI Lombok, it was precisely the people who committed the violence who were the majority, much stronger in terms of quantity than JAI. So that what is experienced by JAI Lombok is more severe when compared to what happened in other areas. For example, more incidents are carried out by intolerant Islamic mass organizations, which are small in number in West Java. The cases in places carried out by Islamic mass organizations there are contra from a tolerant and pro – JAI mass organization. Although from a legal point of view, it was a bit disappointing. Several incidents in Java were managed to be brought to court by tolerant parties. Meanwhile, there was no law enforcement in Lombok. The perpetrators who had been arrested by the police for committing the killing of Hasan was released. There was greater community power than demonstrations by Islamic mass organizations which rarely succeeded in acquitting the perpetrators, although the sentences were very light.



**Scheme 1:** The Strength of MUI Fatwa

The scheme above explains how strong the position of the MUI fatwa is surrounded by the power of the majority community and Tuan Guru. It also describes how the MUI fatwa has power, both in society and in government. MUI's control over society cannot be separated from the influence that exists within Tuan Guru, who is in direct contact with the community every day. Even though MUI is an institution that originates from Tuan Guru, it is a different matter when it comes to direct influence on society. MUI fatwa is considered an institution representing Muslims but does not directly come into contact with the community. At the same time, Tuan Guru has direct contact with the community daily.

Gramsci's (Merli 2010) concept of organic intellectuals becomes weak in the context of Ahmadiyya Lombok, because of the weak counter – discourse carried out by JAI. Those who side with JAI (civil society) are not as strong as what happened in other places, which have succeeded in counter – discourse, at least capable of bringing the offender to justice. Moreover, countering the MUI discourse will be more challenging to implement, especially after the Joint Decree of Three Minister silenced JAI as an organization. Gramsci, also called state and civil society an iron layer that is difficult to penetrate. Ahmadiyya cannot do much to respond to and even against the MUI fatwa because it is supported by the grassroots community. Even though the majority

community does not fully agree with the violence against Ahmadiyya, the MUI fatwa is sufficient for the community to reject Ahmadiyya and even expel them to physical violence. The closeness of Tuan Guru, who is part of MUI, with the community makes MUI's fatwa even stronger and becomes a strong legitimacy for the community to join in and consider Ahmadiyya heretical. The Master's authority in determining whether or not a religious movement is misguided is powerful in the lower community. Without further confirmation, the community strongly believes in MUI's fatwa that misleads Ahmadiyya based on confidence in the Tuan Guru's ability which is part of MUI as an institution.

### **Ahmadiyya Polemic: MUI, Tuan Guru, and Society**

MUI (Hasyim 2011) comes from elements of society who have religious abilities. Even though not all Tuan Guru are members of the MUI, the fact that Tuan Guru in the Ahmadiyya case has the same voice. They agree that JAI is not part of Islam. They are encouraged to create a new religion outside of Islam. As a result, JAI becomes a common enemy that must be eliminated.

It is interesting to see what informant put forward, Interview. September 17, 2021":

*Who is talking? The Tuan Guru campaigned for SD, SMP, and not even school right away. The brainwashed Tuan Guru spoke, wore robes, wore his robes, saints, and so on. On the other hand, some friends came from Jakarta. He said that he had visited Lombok several times. He had seen it on the Internet. Ustadz, the Lombok person, turned out to be a rigorous person, yes, very fierce. I was in NTB since 1994, late 1994, early 1995, so how many years have I been here? The fundamental character of strengthening the Sasak people is similar to Sundanese, Javanese, and Balinese. What are the characters? Gentle. The actual character is peaceful, open, and happy to receive guests. Then how? The problem is sociological and psychological. The shape of a loaf depends on the tick. There is a triangular, rectangular, round, and so on, depending on the mold. Well, the heart of the Sasak people was simple, open, and peaceful, and they liked to receive guests. It depends on who is educating him earlier. Suppose he falls under the guidance of a cleric or kiai or a teacher who is strict in his education. Well, that's how he is formed. He will be formed if he sees someone else willing to kill, that is formed. But if he is nurtured and educated by a master teacher who is gentle, loves peace, and looks like Gusdurian, yes, Gus Dur. The medium is an Islamic boarding school, right? The Islamic boarding school is good at instilling morals, ethics, and so on, even from graduates there, all good alumni. So it depends on who is teaching.(Interview with NA, 2021)*

In several cases that occurred in Lombok, Tuan Guru became one of the puzzles that connected MUI fatwas with the community. On several occasions, they campaigned for hatred against Ahmadiyya and referred to the MUI's fatwa regarding the deviance of Ahmadiyya and being considered infidels. Several cases show that Tuan Guru at this point, has a vital role in the Ahmadiyya case. In almost all places where JAI residents live, Tuan Guru has always been a provocateur in the community.

Pancor, the founder of Nahdlatul Wathan, was one of the figures who discriminated against JAI members, although not through recitation. Sarcastic statements towards JAI members resulted in hatred among the people. Tuan Guru's triggers for society to commit violence are very strong, as stated by JAI residents who have experienced attacks. Although there are still people who are cynical people, but before there was an appeal and even a provocateur from Tuan Guru, the incident was not so massive as the

burning houses and houses of JAI's worship belonging to residents. The MUI fatwa before Tuan Guru's appeal was not so significant to JAI residents. If you look further, what the community did to JAI residents was an accumulation point of events and issues surrounding JAI residents. As a consequence of what was stated by several JAI members above. The question arose of how far Tuan Guru could influence the public to hate JAI members. It is possible for what Tuan Guru said to be so powerful without the community's support or vice versa. The community will commit violence against JAI members if there is no direct or indirect provocation that creates hatred towards JAI members.

Tuan Guru in Lombok society is considered someone with above – average religious ability. A place to ask for advice if the community has a problem, not much different from the Kiai in Java. For this reason, Tuan Guru has a strategic position in influencing the community to commit violence against JAI members. MUI is also the starting point for discrimination or differentiation between Ahmadiyya Islam and other mainstream Islam. As a country whose population is predominantly Muslim, it is easy to say that the MUI fatwa will have a big influence and significance in society. This means that the same question will also be asked regarding the role and power of the MUI fatwa in the Ahmadiyya case.

The MUI is a group of Tuan Guru who have quite high religious knowledge. However, in certain contexts, the MUI and Tuan Guru cannot be linked with one another, especially with regard to their influence on society. Tuan Guru is an individual with the MUI as an institution that has fatwa products. However, Tuan Guru may issue a fatwa on an issue faced by society, both communities and individuals. The authority of the MUI fatwa is more vital than a fatwa only by a Tuan Guru, who is a representative of various elements of Islamic mass organizations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Wathan, and others. MUI influences all Islamic societies, while Tuan Guru is only heard or implemented in the midst of people who have the same ideology. MUI as an institution transcends ideology or crosses ideological borders in Indonesia. It is more easily accepted by all Islamic communities in Indonesia.

The incident occurred in Sambielen, was provoked by one of the Tuan Gurus who brought a mob to burn down the houses and prayer rooms belonging to JAI residents. Before setting fire to the house, the contents of the house were looted first by the masses. This was seen by JAI residents. There were no traces of house furniture after the fire occurred. Apart from burning, it turned out that the mob also looted the assets of JAI residents. Incidents of looting did not only occur in one place where JAI residents were attacked but in almost all incidents of violence against JAI. Looting always occurred. In Pancor, after the destruction of a shop belonging to one of the JAI residents, the mob looted it.

The problems between Ahmadiyya and Tuan Guru, MUI, and the community became complicated. It seemed that the three elements influenced or strengthened each other. With the MUI fatwa, Tuan Guru broadcast hatred against society as well as society. The violence perpetrated against JAI was legitimized by the religious doctrine conveyed by Tuan Guru through the MUI fatwa. The problem now is how far they influence each other with the capital and position roles they have. Indeed, these three elements cannot be separated from each other without the presence of the community. The MUI fatwa would not be operational or sound and would not have much effect on JAI residents.

Even so, not all Tuan Guru have that attitude towards JAI, some of them prefer not to be too hard on them. However, what happened on the ground, because the MUI

fatwa and other issues surrounding JAI have become so deeply rooted, has made a truth, even those who defend JAI in several cases are shunned by the majority community, including Tuan Guru. They prefer the path that is softer than the hard way that results in casualties. It is not all Tuan Gurus have that attitude towards JAI. Some of them prefer not to be too hard on them. However, the MUI fatwa and other issues surrounding JAI have become deeply rooted. It has made a truth that even those who defend JAI. Several cases are shunned by the majority community, including Tuan Guru. They prefer the path that is softer than the hard way, which results in casualties.

*Not all, because during the coaching yesterday, yes, during the coaching. The Governor's program was here at that time. Some said, I apologize to ladies and gentlemen. My luck was wrong because I was outside. I was told like this. After I saw it here with my eyes, Astagfirullahaladzim. What can distinguish you are infidels. What can distinguish you outside of Islam. What can distinguish you can go to heaven and go to hell is Allah ta'ala. I am the same as you, so that person is right then that person, really thinks, but what are the words said the prophet Muhammad peace be upon him. (Interview with Shd, 2021)*

These issues strengthen in society so that people who listen are very sensitive. Especially matters related to holy books. Yet according to Ahmadis, they never teach their children tadzkirah, what they teach their children is only the Koran as a holy book. To prove this, the first time they fled their children were tested reading the Koran which was not carried out on other students. Holy book tadzkirah, going on pilgrimage to rubwah, getting paid, and several other issues are derivative issues that are inseparable from issues surrounding heresy against JAI members. Including the difference in the creed sentence, which is the result of the MUI's deviant fatwa against JAI. For this reason, JAI residents did not only face one accusation, instead issues that were not true were more prominent in society. In fact, the discussion about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was not given space for JAI to explain Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's position. In what position and what arguments did they put forward about the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad can never be disclosed freely. Especially after the issuance of the Joint Decree of Three Ministers.

Apart from issuing deviant fatwas, MUI is not passive, but in certain cases they produce issues surrounding JAI issues. For example the issue of repentance of JAI residents and returning to Islam which is considered true by MUI. Case examples as disclosed by Shd:


*Including MUI Yes, I did too, do you know Mr. Syaiful Anwar or Syaiful Muslim? chairman of the NTB MUI. He once called me, hello Assalamualaikum, Waalaikum greetings, this is Pak Sahidin, yes, yes Sir, what's wrong, Sir. Oh yes, I am Mr. Syaiful Muslim, chairman of the NTB MUI. Oh yes, I want to ask permission from Mr. Shd. I wanted to publish it in the newspaper, but before Mr. Shd allowed me. Yes, I thought about it. What's the problem, Sir? Yes, there are Ahmadiyya people from Transit to my office. Yes, I want to repent. Oh yes, Sir, who is that. Sir, just one because the Ahmadiyya people who were in Transito started from zero, I know all of them? (Interview with Shd, 2021)*

The role of the three elements cannot be denied. These three elements alternately play their role. There is no room for JAI to clarify everything. These three elements in all directions seem to have been closely guarded. Doctrinal legitimacy is carried out by MUI through Tuan Guru and the community not only as perpetrators or gatekeepers



but in the same way as MUI or Tuan Guru legitimize people's rejection of JAI through religious texts or doctrines. Society legitimizes what has been fatwa by MUI through Tuan Guru. In several areas where most people are non-Islamic, MUI fatwas are not heard and could not able to influence the community to commit violence against JAI members. As "users" of the MUI fatwa, the community actually has a significant role in incidents of violence against JAI members. Society does not only have a direct legitimacy function over MUI fatwas, but as direct perpetrators of violence against JAI members.

The discussion on the roles of MUI, Tuan Guru, and the community has significant theoretical implications. Even though we have to be careful in taking the positions of the three elements between MUI, Tuan Guru, and the Community. The positions of these three elements in the case of JAI Lombok have different roles and positions but mutually reinforce one another. The following is a scheme for JAI to refer to roles and positions as well as elements that have a major influence in committing violence against JAI Lombok residents.



**Scheme 2:** Process of Violence Against JAI

There are several things that need to be noted from the above scheme on how the power of the majority affects all. The influence of the MUI and Tuan Guru Fatwas will not be strong without the influence of the majority community. Likewise, the majority community will not insist on committing violence without the legitimacy of the MUI and Tuan Guru Fatwas. In reality, the community committing violence against JAI is inseparable from their belief in the MUI fatwa as well as Tuan Guru. His charisma through several "provoking" recitations to commit violence against JAI. Three of the eight arrows referring to JAI Lombok indicate violence that does not directly affect JAI but through the intermediary of the majority community. Through the majority power, Tuan Guru, and MUI spread the hatred that arises against the community. Tuan Guru provokes and slanders JAI during recitations, when people commit violence. They cannot be separated from the influence of the MUI fatwa, which creates hatred in society.

**Table 1:** Direct and Indirect Violence Against Ahmadiyya

Direct Violence	Indirect Violence
East Lombok Regent Regulation 1983 and Prosecutor's Regulation 1985	The MUI fatwa influenced the public and government institutions to issue a ban on Ahmadiyya
Tuan Guru sarcastically and in several cases participated in expelling and destroying Ahmadiyya assets	Tuan Guru's provocation through the Mosque
Rejection and driving out by society	
MUI directly attacked the JAI organization through the fatwa	
Police, Directorate General of Population and Civil Registry, and Ministry of Religion Affairs cannot carry out their duties and functions as they should	

Ahmadiyya experiences not only direct violence but also indirect violence. The MUI undertakes direct violence through its fatwas. There is also indirect violence. Direct violence by the MUI is carried out through fatwas. Heretical fatwas directly attack the Ahmadiyya organization, including the psychology of its adherents. Likewise, indirect violence will affect people's awareness to believe that Ahmadiyya is deviant. Moreover, countries with various kinds of apparatus or systems in force will not be affected by the MUI without the dynamics involving the majority community. Therefore, even though it is not absolute, the majority community is solid and can influence all existing elements, including the state. The state is powerless against the community in the case of releasing the detainees responsible for killing Hasan. This is an example of community power that can defeat the state.

Even though it is so clear the role of the community in carrying out violence against JAI, it is too naive to say that the majority community is generalized into an ethnic group, in this case, the Sasak tribe. Budiwanti's findings (Budiwanti 2009) reveal that what happened to JAI residents was a form of resistance by the Sasak people against sects that were considered to deviate from Islamic teachings, which were often voiced by burning mosques, houses as a defense of the faith. What was revealed by Budiwanti, which is directly to the Sasak tribe, is certainly not a simple matter when we reveal the majority community as perpetrators of violence. It seems that what was stated by Budiwanti requires further discussion because what happened to JAI residents did not happen everywhere. There was no significant resistance to JAI members leading to attacks or expulsions. The Sasak tribe, like other tribes, certainly has its values that base its members on carrying out their lives. As we have discussed repeatedly, this problem is a matter of certain religious beliefs that are not easily linked to the values of a tribe. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the role of the community as members of certain tribes and as members of certain religions.

This discussion leads us to a theoretical discussion that is quite complex, bearing in mind that one element is inseparable, very closely influencing one another or one another. But looking at the role and position of the community as the perpetrators who have the most influence, their role, and opportunities to commit violence against JAI residents. Even though the data above shows that JAI residents basically have no

problems with the local community, the majority of the community has sensitive issues like a time bomb that explodes at any time. Direct violence, as expressed by Galtung cannot be fully carried out by the state directly but through several elements in society. Especially in a democratic country, neither direct violence nor structural violence can fully work because a country that adheres to a democratic system does not allow a system to be favored by a particular group or faction. However, Johan Galtung's theory of violence finds its relevance in discussions about legitimacy between one element of society and another. Through cultural violence, this mutual legitimacy can be explained and helps to reveal the party that has the most legitimacy and is most influential (Webel 2007).

Not much different from Galtung, Gramsci's, and Althusser's theories have similarities when used as thinking constructs in this study. The strength of the state is inseparable from the legitimacy of the people who have mass power capable of supporting the running of the state's hegemonic power over minority communities. In this theoretical discussion, it is very difficult to find the state's interest in carrying out violence directly against minority communities, but this interest surfaced after a case occurred and was carried out by the majority community. In this case, both mutually attract certain interests. One of the interests lies in the interests of the survival of the majority ideology, and the other in the interests of positions or in a larger status, the interests of election statistics that are possible to be played by the authorities, both at the local and national levels, so that the community has two positions as the legitimacy of the MUI fatwa based on the quantity of the majority community and as the direct perpetrators of violence.

MUI, Tuan Guru, and the majority community mutually support each other. Ahmadiyya is considered a common enemy by these three elements for the legitimacy of the MUI fatwa. Even though not all of them approved of the violence, the community's strong rejection captured much attention from the Ahmadiyya community. Without the majority community, the MUI, and Tuan Guru cannot stand, as well as society. Without the MUI's fatwa and Tuan Guru's status in society will not conclude that Ahmadiyya is deviant and infidels.

## Conclusion

The role of the MUI in several acts of persecution of Ahmadiyya in Lombok greatly influenced the community through Tuan Guru's lectures. Through this lecture, the community can commit violence and expel the Lombok Ahmadiyya from their homes. It happened in 2005 in West Lombok and most recently occurred in East Lombok in 2018 during Ramadhan.

Through the MUI fatwa, Tuan Guru spread through his lectures that Ahmadiyya was heretical and misleading. Furthermore, in 2008 the Joint Decree of Three Ministers was issued banning the activities of spreading Ahmadiyya teachings. Rejection and driving out by society. Both state ideological institutions such as the MUI through fatwas delivered through educational institutions and mosques regarding the deviance of Ahmadiyya and repressive institutions. The police who were supposed to enforce the law acted passively, even one of the suspects in the murder of Hasan, an Ahmadiyya member, was released by the police after a public demonstration demanded the suspect it to be released.

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