**EXEGESIS RECEPTION OF *ĀYĀT AT-TAḤKĪM***

**(THE CHARACTERISTC OF THE REVIVALISM IDEOLOGY IN ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION)**

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*DOI :* [*http://dx.doi.org/10.30983/islam\_realitas.v6i2.3695*](http://dx.doi.org/10.30983/islam_realitas.v6i2.3695)

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| *Submission: date, month, year* | *Revised: date, month, year* | *Published: date, month, year* |

**ABSTRACT**

This research aims to determine whether or not revivalism ideology exists among academics in higher education, specifically in the province of Southeast Sulawesi. It is accomplished through the use of an exegesis reception approach to the *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* (Qur’an chapter *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47). This study takes a phenomenological approach. Data was gathered by combining survey technique development with in-depth interviews. The collected data then analyzed using a philosophical and phenomenological hermeneutic approach to assess the academic community’s understanding of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*. According to the survey results, *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* is very popular among academics in Southeast Sulawesi. The majority of the academic community’s information comes from religious studies on social media. They acknowledge and accept these verses as the foundation for the legitimacy of *kāffah* enforcement of Islamic law as the foundation for Indonesia’s political system. Meanwhile, the interviews show that the majority of informants label those who disagree with the discourse with theological labels (*kāfir* and *thāgūt*). As a result, even though these characteristics have not reached an extreme level, their comprehension is included in the revivalism ideology’s characteristics.

**Keywords**: *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*; Exegesis Reception; Islamic Higher Education; Revivalism; Shoutest Sulawesi.

***ABSTRAK***

*Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menakar eksistensi karakteristik ideologi revivalisme di kalangan sivitas akademika, khususnya di perguruan tinggi yang berada di wilayah provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara, Indonesia. Ini dilakukan dengan menerapkan pendekatan resepsi eksegesis terhadap āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* (*Q. al-Mā’idah [5]:44-47). Penelitian ini menggunakan desain fenomenalogi. Data dikumpulkan melalui elaborasi antara teknik survey dan wawancara mendalam secara bersamaan. Data yang diperoleh kemudian dianalisis mengggunakan pendekatan hermeneutika filosofis dan fenomenologis guna menakar pemahaman sivitas akademika terhadap āyāt* *at-taḥkīm. Hasil survey membuktikan bahwa āyāt* *at-taḥkīm cukup populer bagi kalangan sivitas akademika di Sulawesi Tenggara. Informasi tentangnya mayoritas diakses oleh sivitas akademika dari kajian-kajian keagamaan di media sosial. Mereka mengenal dan memahami ayat-ayat tersebut sebagai basis legitimasi wajibnya penegakan syariat Islam secara kāffah sebagai basis sistem politik pemerintahan di Indonesia. Sedangkan hasil wawancara membuktikan bahwa mayoritas informan menggunakan label-label teologis (kāfir dan thāgūt) terhadap orang-orang yang menolak wacana tersebut. Meskipun pemahaman mereka dapat dikategorikan mengandung karakteristik ideologi revivalisme, tetapi belum termasuk level yang ekstrem, sehingga masih berpeluang bagi mereka untuk mendapatkan pembinaan.*

***Kata Kunci***: *Āyāt* *at-Taḥkīm; Resepsi Eksegesis; Perguruan Tinggi Islam; Revivalisme*; *Sulawesi Tenggara*.

**Background**

Religious communities’ spiritual awareness is not always directly proportional to their awareness of coexistence in a peaceful society and state. However, this awareness can spark normative disagreements, which can lead to social conflict. At least since the reform era, when there were transnational religious, social movement groups based on revivalist ideology, such a phenomenon has emerged in Indonesia.[[1]](#footnote-1) This ideology instills Islamization dogma in all aspects of society and the state. They oppose the democratic government system, which they see as the result of colonialism, westernization, or liberalism.[[2]](#footnote-2) Furthermore, they intend to transform the Pancasila democratic government into a government political system based on the *khilāfah Islāmiyyah* dogma. They claim that the agenda is manifested in the interpretation of the *al-Mā’idah* [5]: 44-47 (*āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*) as legitimacy for Muslims in enforcing Islamic law in Indonesia, known as *kāffah*. In fact, they label Muslims who reject the discourse with theological terms like *kāfir*, *fāsiq*, and *ẓālim*.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The historical context of the revelation of these verses (*asbāb* *al-nuzūl*) is not specific to the Muslim community, but to certain groups of the *Ahl al-Kitāb* community in Medina, according to exegetical literature.[[4]](#footnote-4) Furthermore, Hudri conclude in his research that these verses do not contain an obligation commandment for Muslims to enforce Islamic law, based on their analysis of textual and contextual meanings.[[5]](#footnote-5) However, Zuhdi has demonstrated that religious, socio-political movement groups, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), use it as propaganda to establish the Islamic caliphate system.[[6]](#footnote-6) Wedi also point out that constructing such an understanding can lead to social discord at all levels, including religion, community, and state.[[7]](#footnote-7) The findings of Sarlan, which reveal that the target group is the majority of academics who still lack religious knowledge, particularly academics in universities in Southeast Sulawesi, are a more concerning issue.[[8]](#footnote-8) It is a serious problem that has the potential to jeopardize the long-term viability of peaceful community relations in religion and nation.[[9]](#footnote-9)

None of these studies have looked into the relationship between revivalist ideology and the reception of exegesis toward *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* among academics, particularly in the context of universities in Southeast Sulawesi. In fact, Sarlan reveals that the region is showing signs of growing radicalism and revivalism.[[10]](#footnote-10) Based on this preliminary data, this study aims to determine the relationship between the acceptance of understanding (exegesis reception) on *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* and the characteristics of revivalist ideology among academics in Southeast Sulawesi. This phenomenon is investigated by asking three main questions: (1) How the form of the exegesis reception on *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* by the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi? (2) Why are the characteristics of the revivalist ideology that underpins their interpretation of these verses? and (3) How the relationship between their interpretation and its implications for the stability of inter-religious and state harmony?

This study is significant because higher education serves as a bulwark for the state’s defense against all forms of religious propaganda based on revivalist and radical ideologies.[[11]](#footnote-11) Thus, if this research is not conducted, it will be difficult in the future to realize religious ideas that are contrary to the government of the Republic of Indonesia’s religious moderation mission. This study can serve as a guide for university stakeholders in Southeast Sulawesi as they work to revitalize their learning curricula to include religious moderation, particularly in the fields of Qur’an study and interpretation.

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**Exegesis Reception Concept**

Hans Robert Jauss (1921–1997) coined the term reception to describe an approach to understanding the meaning of a text.[[12]](#footnote-12) Heidegger’s and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory heavily influenced his thinking about this approach. It began in 1966, or when the University of Constance was established, launching research based on an interdisciplinary paradigm. This influence is one factor that leads him to believe that there is no final word when it comes to comprehending the meaning of the text.[[13]](#footnote-13) Jauss believes that the meaning of the text can be traced through the continuity of transmission and transformation of the historical reception of the text using the reception approach. Jauss divided reception theory into exegesis or hermeneutical receptions, aesthetic receptions, and functional or cultural receptions. The three of them both explain how the reader interacts with the scripture text in various aspects ranging from comprehension, art, and culture.[[14]](#footnote-14)

In general, the term reception refers to the act of accepting something. Initially, it was used in literary theory as a framework to emphasize the reader’s role in shaping the formulation of a literary work’s meaning. When a literary work interacts with its readers, its significance is revealed. The findings show that readers’ responses to the text are not monolithic but rather reflect a range of perspectives reflected in the cultural practices that surround them (*fusion of horizons*). Although the Qur’an is not identical to a literary text in this regard, it can also be a source of reception. This is due to structural similarities between literary works. On the one hand, the Qur’an text is a language formulation with textual and historical meanings, but its readers also have a *fusion of horizon* or horizon around them that forms meaning outside of its literal meaning. This is what causes readers’ interpretations of the Qur’an’s text to differ depending on the socio-cultural context in which they find themselves.[[15]](#footnote-15) Departing from that articulation, the term exegesis reception is understood in this study as a form of acceptance in the aspect of understanding the Qur’an—in this case, *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* by the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi. It is, of course, important for research because the construction of understanding of scripture readers can determine their religious attitude.[[16]](#footnote-16)

**Tafsir Literature’s Dialectic of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* Interpretation**

*Mufassir* (commentators) contend that *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* (Q. *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47) revealed in the debate between Jews and Muslims in Medina. A group of Jews confirmed to the Prophet the legality of adultery in Islamic teachings to compare it to the teachings they believed in at the time. Ibn Katsīr stated this information in *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm*, quoting ‘Abdullāh Ibn ‘Umar’s history. He related how once the Jews came to the Prophet to report their adultery. They hope that the Prophet can act as a mediator (*ḥākim*) in this matter. They claimed that the Torah does not contain a provision for stoning for adultery, only for *jald* or flogging. In response, ‘Abdullāh bin Salām (one of the Jewish leaders who converted to Islam) rejected the Jewish group’s claims about the absence of stoning in their holy book. According to him, the Torah had previously established the penalty of stoning for adulterers. He also challenged the Jewish group to bring the Torah to prove his point. One of them actually covered the stoning verse with his hand when submitting the book. But when ‘Abdullāh bin Salām ordered him to raise the person’s hand, the verse about the punishment of stoning that they had purposefully concealed appeared.[[17]](#footnote-17)

This study discovers a dialectic of interpretation about *asbāb an-nuzūl* of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* in the exegesis literature and the information on it in the exegesis literature. Beginning with al-Mawardī in his work *Tafsīr al-Mawardī*, who cites three opinions on the meaning content of the phrase “*Hum al-kāfirūn...hum aż-żālimūn...hum al-fasiqūn*” According to the first point of view, the expression is only used by Jews in Medina and not by Muslims. This viewpoint is based on narrations by Ibn Mas‘ūd, Hużaifah, ‘Ikrimah, and al-Barā’. According to the second opinion, the expression was explicitly derived in the context of Jews, but its legal application is widely accepted. This viewpoint is based on al-Ḥasan dan Ibrāhim’s narrations. According to the third viewpoint, the expression “*hum al-kāfirūn*” is intended for Muslims, “*hum aẓ-ẓālimūn*” for Jews, and “*hum al-fāsiqūn*” for Christians. This viewpoint is taken from asy-Sya‘bī’s narration. According to the fourth opinion, those who do not judge according to Allah’s law because they deny it are disbelievers, whereas those who ignore the stipulation of Allah’s law are *żālim* and *fāsiq*. This viewpoint is taken from the narration of ‘Abdullāh Ibn ‘Abbās.[[18]](#footnote-18) Fakhruddīn ar-Rāzī in *Mafātīḥ al-Gaib* agrees with ‘Ikramah’s point of view. He stated that anyone who defies Allah’s law with his heart and tongue after being given the opportunity to apply Allah’s law but chooses to ignore it is a disbeliever explicitly, which means they have abandoned Allah’s religion.[[19]](#footnote-19)

This contrasts to the revivalists, who tend to take these verses to their extreme conclusion. One example of their interpretation is the *Buletin Dakwah* *Kaffah*, a da’wah bulletin published by the HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) group. In edition 129, the author uses a fragment of the *al-Mā’idah* [5:44] “...*Wa man lam yaḥkum bi-mā anzalallāh fa-‘ulā’ik hum al-kāfirūn*” as the legitimacy of the obligation to apply God’s law or Islamic syaria in a *kāffah* (all-encompassing) manner above human-made constitutional law. One of the most important aspects of this implementation is enforcing the *Khilāfah* *‘alā minhāj an-nubuwah* on government’s political system. Although they explicitly disagree with the Khawārij's interpretation of the term *kāfir* as kafir in the context of *‘aqīdah*, they claim that this does not mean that man-made law (positive law) is permissible to use. They refuse to recognize the President’s legality as an *ulil ‘amr* (religious political leader) in the context of a state leader because after the Prophet died, the command to obey only the government system based on the instructions of the Qur’an and Sunnah, namely the *Khilāfah* *‘alā minhāj an-nubuwah*.[[20]](#footnote-20) To make it easier to understand the dynamics of the interpretation, the level of interpretation mapping is described in table 1.

**Table 1**. Interpretation Level Mapping of *Āyāt* *at-Taḥkīm*

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| **Interpretation Level of *Āyāt* *at-Taḥkīm*** |
| Moderate | Extremis | Liberal |
| *A̅yāt* *at-taḥkīm* is a rebuke to those who make the law but purposefully contradict sharia values. The terms *kāfir*, *żālim*, and *fāsiq* represent God’s condemnation of the use of God’s law to further the subjective interests of specific individuals or groups. | Because *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* is widely accepted, it is also intended for Muslims. Those who do not use Sharia law as state law may be considered infidels in the sense of abandoning Allah's religion (apostasy). | Because *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* is historical, it only has temporal application. As a result, as the context in which these verses were revealed indicates, the verse is specifically intended for the Jews and Christians in Medina, not for Muslims throughout the ages. |

Mapping the level of interpretation of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* in table 1 becomes the primary reference in this study to assess the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi’s acceptance of the verse. Each respondent is objectified based on these parameters using this mapping. However, it is important to note that the objectification mentioned here is not intended to justify the truth or misunderstanding of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*. Rather, it is only identification or confirmation in placing their interpretive positions into these levels of interpretation. This research has a foundation in determining whether it contains revivalism ideology's characteristics.

**Characteristics of The Revivalism Ideology**

Various definitions of revivalism can be seen from the perspectives of Muslim scholars (insiders) and non-Muslims (outsiders). There are at least three classifications of general definitions that can be described here. First, revivalism as an ideology aimed at reforming societal socio-cultural norms;[[21]](#footnote-21) Second, revivalism as an ideology oriented toward a revolutionary movement of a political order system based on certain religious dogmas.[[22]](#footnote-22) They are unconcerned about the process of realizing it, whether through authoritarian or democratic means;[[23]](#footnote-23) Third, revivalism as an ideology that tends to legalize the dogma of violence to realize the establishment of a state based on certain religious beliefs.[[24]](#footnote-24) Nonetheless, Bruce B. Lawrence believes that these terms appear to generalize the understanding of Muslims. In fact, this ideology is only held by a small number of Muslims worldwide, and it arose from a defensive movement against Western colonialism.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Scholars’ perspectives on the long history of the emergence of the term revivalism cannot be separated from the diversity of these definitions. The emergence of salafism groups, which advocate for the purification of the faith from all forms of local cultural assimilation in every region outside of the Arab tradition, has influenced those who define it as a movement to purify Islamic teachings. According to Choueiri, this category is identical to the Salafi Wahhabi group founded by Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792) in Saudi Arabia. In this category, the term revivalism refers to the purification of faith from all local cultural assimilation practices; second, expressing *ijtihad* and rejecting *taklid*; and third, necessitating *hijrah* or migration from *Dār al-Kufr* or non-Muslim majority areas to *Dār as-Salām* or Muslim majority areas. Fourth, as a *mujadid* or reformer, follow a just leader. Those define it as a revolutionary political movement inspired by the emergence of dakwah activists with a political genre or as “fundamentalism”.[[26]](#footnote-26) According to Dekmejian, the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* in Egypt, *Ḥiẓb at-Taḥrīr* in Syiria, Syia’ in Iran, Jama‘at Islāmī in Afghanistan, and other groups that share their vision and mission founded this organization. These organizations have a mission and vision to change the world’s political system. Through the political propaganda of the *khilāfah ‘alā minhāj an-nubuwah*, they are attempting to reclaim the Islamic State’s sovereignty from the European colonial movement.[[27]](#footnote-27)

*Outside* researchers have also linked revivalism to the concepts of “radicalism, extremism, and terrorism.” They appear to be motivated by transnational Jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other organizations that share their ideology. This group is thought to be attempting to combine Salafism and Puritanism. As a result, this movement is also known as Neo-Revivalism, Neo-Salafism, or Neo-Fundamentalism, and it emerged in the modern era.[[28]](#footnote-28) Despite their differences, these organizations are united by a common goal: to carry out a revolutionary movement against the global political system through jihad propaganda in the form of war.[[29]](#footnote-29) They believe that the plan will restore a country with a predominantly Muslim population as a sovereign state capable of enforcing Islamic law. As a result, jihad or holy war discourse is the only way for them to carry out this mission.[[30]](#footnote-30) The apocalyptic dogma, also known as *mahdism* and *messianism*, embodies the holy war.[[31]](#footnote-31)

When referring to the mapping of the definition and characteristics of revivalism that have been described, this study can draw a common thread that all three are historical forms of synthetic transformation. Salafism’s revivalism arose in tandem with the Muslim community’s ideological contestation, particularly beginning in the third century Hijriyah or the ninth century AD. After the Ottoman dynasty, or the *Khilāfah* *Islāmiyyah* (Islamic Khilafah) system, collapsed in Turkey in 1924 AD, the second definition emerged. After the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, a new definition was born. The three are depicted in table 2 to make mapping easier:

**Table 2**. Classification of Revivalism Ideology

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|  | **Classic revivalism** | **Modernist Revivalism** | **Neo-Revivalism** |
| **Groups** | Salafi-Wahabism | Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir, etc. | al-Qaedah, ISIS, Taliban, etc. |
| **Movements** | Dakwah on *akidah* and *fikih* genre. | Dakwah in the form of a *kāffah* (comprehensive) application of Islamic sharia. | Holy war propaganda as resistance to Western (European) domination |
| **Characteristics** | (1) Restoring the teachings of Islam as they were applied in the 7th century AD; (2) slogan: “*ar-Rujū‘ ilā al-Qur’ān wa as-Sunnah*”; (3) nuances of apolitical da'wah; (4) anti-*ashabiyyah* or *taklid* on certain schools of thought; (5) *Takfīr*, *Bid‘ah*, *Khurafāt*, and *Syīrk* are terms used to oppose ideologues | (1) Restore the Islamic political system as practiced by Muslims in the seventh century AD. (2) the slogan “*Khilāfah ‘alā Minhāj an-Nubuwah*”; (3) nuanced political dakwah; (4) *Takfīr* and *Ṭagūt* are terms used for ideological opponents*.* | (1) Anti-Shia, Zionist-Jewish, American and European; (2) use of apocalyptic narratives or dogma of *mahdism* and messianism; (3) nuanced political propaganda of violence; (4) slogan: “*The Return of Khilafah*”; (5) *Takfīr* and *ṭāgūt* are the terms used for ideological opponents. |
| **Mission** | Purification of faith from all aspects of local culture outside of the 7th century AD Arab tradition. | Liberation from the democratic political system by preaching the caliphate system of *khilāfah ‘alā minhāj an-nubuwah* through passive political dakwah.  | Revolution of the global world order through active political da'wah by presenting the discourse of new world order under the *Khilāfah Islāmiyyah* government system through the dogma of holy war. |

**Method**

This research employs a qualitative approach based on a phenomenological design. The research design paradigm is only limited to describing the data, with no objectification.[[32]](#footnote-32) It is important to note that the purpose of this research is not to prove whether or not the academic community's understanding of four universities in Southeast Sulawesi is correct. Furthermore, this research is concerned with the quality or *authoritative knowledge* rather than the quantity of information.[[33]](#footnote-33) As a result, while the data presented is in percentage form, the ultimate goal of this study is to uncover socio-religious phenomena.[[34]](#footnote-34)

This study's primary data source is a collection of survey responses from respondents and in-depth interviews from informants. In this study, survey data are referred to as respondents, while interview data are referred to as informants. Respondents and informants are the same material object in this study. They are made up of academics from four universities in Southeast Sulawesi that have a curriculum base for religious learning: the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Kendari, the Universitas Muhammadiyah Kendari (UMK), the Universitas Muhammadiyah Buton (UMB) in Bau-bau, and the Institut Agama Islam (IAI) Al-Mawaddah Warrahmah in Kolaka. The four universities were chosen because the researchers thought they were deserving of being evaluated as the most influential higher education institutions in Southeast Sulawesi in terms of religious learning. The academic community referred to in this study is the academic community comprised of lecturers and students. There were 58 people in the total sample of data from the academic community referred to in this study. There are 9 teachers and 49 students. Furthermore, this study uses secondary data, which is a collection of supporting information obtained from bibliographic data or literature related to this study. These works can be accessed via offline data (printed books) or online (journal articles and news based on website services). As a result, field studies and literature are combined concurrently.

To collect data, this study uses survey and interview methods. Both were done simultaneously to get good data from respondents’ and informants’ responses.[[35]](#footnote-35) Using a multiple-choice answer format, the survey was conducted. Not only is multiple choice closed, but it is also open. In other words, the researcher provides answer options and allows respondents to enter answers that aren't available in a multiple-choice format. The survey was created using the Google Forms service, and each respondent received a copy.[[36]](#footnote-36) In-depth interview techniques were used to follow up on the responses to the survey questions. From August 2019 to July 2021, two years were used to implement the two data collection techniques.

This study employs two data analysis techniques, interpretation and explanation. In this study, the data were interpreted using the theory of reception of exegesis, while the data were explained using the theory of socio-religious phenomenology. Exegesis reception theory is used to critically describe the pattern of acceptance of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* by the academic community of Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam (Islamic Religious Colleges) in the province of Southeast Sulawesi. It was accomplished by tracking textual and contextual understanding based on their responses in survey and interview results. This understanding relationship is tested using three indicators: first, the consistency of responses from the three types of questions posed to respondents; second, the knowledge capital embodied in the respondents’ answers to the first question category; and third, the orientation of their answers embodied in the third category of questions. It aims to expose the presence of revivalist ideology in the construction of their understanding of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*. The theory of socio-religious phenomenology is used to explain data. Thus, socio-religious phenomena reveal the socio-cultural context of the informants’ responses.

**Islamic Higher Education Institutions in Southeast Sulawesi**

The findings of this research, conducted between 2019 and 2021, revealed that the province of Southeast Sulawesi has no less than ten higher education institutions, both public and private. There are four universities that are fairly influential, namely:; the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Kendari, the Universitas Muhammadiyah Kendari (UMK), the Universitas Muhammadiyah Buton (UMB) in Bau-bau, and the Institut Agama Islam (IAI) Al-Mawaddah Warrahmah in Kolaka.

In the province of Southeast Sulawesi, IAIN Kendari is the only Islamic university with state status. According to its statute, its mission statement is “to become a center for developing transdisciplinary Islamic studies in the Asian region by 2045”. These visions and missions reflect the management commitment based on a moderate religious understanding. UMK is also one of the largest universities in the province of Southeast Sulawesi, with a private status under the auspices of Muhammadiyah. The mission of UMK is “A progressive, superior, highly competitive university with good morals”. It also serves as a university, introducing the concept of religious moderation. In the mission narrative, the term *akhlakul karimah* refers to one of the manifestations of the function of higher education, which aims to present Islamic education based on the concept of progressive religious moderation. UMB is in the Buton archipelago, more specifically in the city of Bau-bau. UMB has been officially operating as a university since 2001, or since the issuance of the Minister of National Education's Decree Number 81/D/O/2001 on July 10, 2001, under the Muhammadiyah foundation. Despite the fact that UMB is a private university, it has a large student body. There were over 7000 students and hundreds of educators and education staff in the 2020/2021 academic year. The IAI Al-Mawaddah Warrahmah is located in the Kolaka district. Although the number of academics is relatively small (around hundreds of students) during the 2020/2021 academic year, it is steadily increasing.

The data description then catalyzes this research, which aims to assess the extent to which the academic community of universities in Southeast Sulawesi province is constructing an understanding of religious moderation amid a pluralistic and multicultural Indonesian society. At the very least, the effort can begin by testing their understanding of religious texts. *Al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47 is one of the verses suspected of being used by Islamists in developing the discourse on the relationship between religion and the state. This surah is frequently used to instill dogma and indoctrination in the formation of public opinion regarding religion as the foundation for a religious system of government. As a result, the data gathered in this discussion is specifically related to the mapping of the academic community's construction of understanding towards *al-Mā’idah [5]:44-47* in the context of universities in Southeast Sulawesi, both in terms of textual and contextual understanding.

**Exegesis Reception on *Āyāt Thaḥkīm***

According to the survey results, *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* (Q. *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47) is a popular verse among academics in Southeast Sulawesi. Even though 96.5 % have read or heard the Indonesian translation and 80.7 % have read or heard the interpretation. An intriguing finding from the survey results is that the majority of respondents’ sources of knowledge about *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* are obtained through access to religious studies on social media, accounting for up to 49 percent, while learning in class accounts for 32 %, and sources other than the two account for only 19 %. It demonstrates that religious understanding information, particularly the explanation of such polemical verses, has not been adequately taught in the classroom.

According to respondents’ textual understanding of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*, as many as 84 % believe these verses contain an obligation for every Muslim to enforce Islamic law in a *kāffah* manner, both in the context of religion, society, and state. Only about 11% understand that these verses do not indicate the meaning of the obligation but rather a suggestion for a better life. 5% of them have no idea what the legal position of the verse is. According to 40.3 % of respondents, there was command diction, which was explicitly mentioned in *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*. This is reflected in the fact that people who refuse to enforce Islamic law are classified as *kāfir*, *fāsiq*, and *ẓālim*. As many as 5.1 % of respondents believed it was not mandatory. They reasoned that they could only be partially understood in the legal context because the verses were complex. They would rather defer to the authority of religious figures or ulama.

Furthermore, the findings show that as many as 30% of respondents believe that people who oppose the discourse can be punished as *thāgūt*, compared to 35% who judge not *thāgūt* and 35% who do not respond. It is in contrast to their attitude toward the label of *kāfir* towards this attitude. A total of 51% of respondents said those who rejected the discourse were *kāfir*, 32% said they were not, and 17% said they didn’t know. These findings suggest that the labels *thāgūt* and *kāfir* have different implications for claims made by people who reject the discourse of applying Islamic law based on their interpretation of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*. For them, the label of *kāfir*, rather than *thāgūt*, is more appropriate for those who reject it. It can be seen explicitly in the findings of field interviews, where they state that:

“*al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47 deals with the legal context, which has ramifications for the status of a Muslim’s creed. It is evident in the verses that directly mention the term *kāfir*. As a result, the *kāfir* status is more authentically used than the tagged *thāgūt* status” (SRL/20 years old/Student).

This oppositional attitude was not accompanied by a desire to take extreme measures. It is demonstrated by their attitude toward people who refuse to enforce Islamic law to continue preaching or who prefer to leave the matter to the government and ulama. According to the findings, 43.9 % of respondents chose to continue preaching in inviting Muslims to enforce Islamic law, while 42.1 % chose to leave the matter to the government and the ulama. Nonetheless, 3.5 % of respondents choose *jihadi* attitudes in the sense of fighting people who oppose the discourse of enforcing Islamic law. It implies that only a few have an extremist interpretation of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*. Aside from the data findings, it is also important to understand how respondents responded to the discourse on the enforcement of Islamic law in the discourse on the political system used in Indonesia. As a result, the data description further explains this phenomenon within the scope of the academic community’s reception of the exegesis in contextual understanding of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm*.

The survey findings show that 55.2 % of respondents chose the answer to the importance of applying Islamic law in Indonesia, while 39.7 % chose the answer as unimportant, and only 5.8 % did not respond. According to these findings, most respondents value the discussion of Islamic law enforcement in Indonesia. Those who believe it is significant to point out that Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, so it is natural that the discourse is popular. This information can be gleaned from interview data derived from one of the lecturers’ perceptions, which state:

“Because Indonesia has a Muslim majority, it is preferable that Islamic law be applied so that all of their activities are protected from disobedience. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, can adapt to Islamic law that does not contradict their beliefs and beliefs. If they disagree, they can apply positive law that is accepted by all religious adherents other than Muslims” (Jml/40years old/lecturer).

Quotes from interviewees' responses show that the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi is more supportive of the discourse on enforcing Islamic law in religion, society, and the state in Indonesia. This discourse can also be seen in the wide range of comments obtained during the research via in-depth interviews. Here are some of their reactions to it:

“Gradually apply Islamic law to the *khilāfah* state” (MN/22years/student);

“In my opinion, the best solution is to reaffirm Islamic Sharia law” (SO/20years/student);

“My advice is to follow the way the Prophet Muhammad gave the provisions of his time, because the best way is the way that the Prophet Muhammad exemplified. *pbuh*.” (SN/23years/student);

“In deciding cases, every legal product refers to and follows what is outlined in the Qur’an.” (MAZ/30 years/lecturer).

However, some informants responded moderately to the discourse. They even believe that the Indonesian political system is following the values of Islamic teachings. It is clear from their various comments, which are as follows:

“Just follow what is already there because this system has also been approved by the scholars so that the Pancasila born and we just *Sami‘nā wa atha‘nā*” (MR/30 years/Lecturer);

“In my opinion, we must understand our situation in Indonesia, what is needed. Do not let because of their arrogance to apply Islamic law, some people are oppressed. If it's best to be together, then go for it, but keep looking for the best solution” (AJN/21 years/student);

“In this context, spiritually (*maqāshid*) Islamic law is justifying the good, forbidding the bad, and taking advantage to reject harm. In other words, we consider that this form of state is the best form for the Indonesian people, because with this form of state, national unity and progress can be realized” (AR/33th/Lecturer);

“In the circle of *mufassirin* scholars of *Ahlussunnah wal Jamā‘ah*, the interpretation of *al-Mā’idah*: 44 is very diverse. This means it will be a very disputed thing. Therefore, to maintain the integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, we must think moderately and accept each other’s opinions” (MAZ/29th/Lecturer).

“The important thing is that it does not conflict with Indonesian culture and does not conflict with the Qur’an and Sunnah. That would have been the ideal system.” (FAA/19 years/Student); “Following what has been stated in the constitution and Pancasila” (IK/20 years/student).

According to the interview data excerpt, the majority of the informants interpret *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47 as verses that legitimize Muslims’ obligation to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia. However, it appears that the attitude they have chosen has not yet reached a high level of comprehension. However, it cannot be denied that some of them adopt an extreme attitude, albeit in relatively small numbers when compared to those who adopt a moderate attitude. It demonstrates that the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi is still open to deradicalization efforts or the socialization of religious moderation. As a result, it is critical to understand the historical context of the discourse on the enforcement of Islamic law in Southeast Sulawesi to identify aspects of its transmission and transformation. This information can be used to formulate preventive measures to prevent the massive growth of revivalism ideology in Southeast Sulawesi, particularly within the scope of religious understanding of the academic community in higher education.

**The Socio-Historical Context of the Discourse on Islamic Law Enforcement in Southeast Sulawesi**

1. Traces of the Sultanate of Buton’s History

The discourse on the enforcement of Islamic law in Southeast Sulawesi is inseparable from the historical influence of the Islamic kingdom in the Sultanate of Buton. The incident began in 948 H/1538 AD when the king of the 6th generation named Timbang Timbangan better known as Halu Oleo embraced Islam. According to historical records, it was Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahab bin Syārif Sulaimān al-Fathanī from Johor who played a major role in this transformation. After the king embraced Islam, he later changed his name to Sultan Marhum Kaimuddin Khalifatul. Since then, the Buton kingdom changed its status to the Sultanate of Buton I, which implemented Islamic law as the basis of their political system of government. The system is translated through the motto “*Yinda-yindomo arataa somanamo karo; Yinda-yindamo sara karo somanamo lupu; Yinda-yindamo somanamo agama*.” (Let treasure be destroyed as long as this soul is saved; let soul be destroyed as long as this land is safe; let country be destroyed as long as this religion [Islam] is safe).[[37]](#footnote-37) From the beginning of time, Islamic teachings spread from the islands to the mainland in Southeast Sulawesi, including the Islamic kingdom in Konawe district.

In addition to the *dakwah* route, traders from Bugis-Makassar lands engaged in trading activities centered in the Wawonii district, which helped spread Islamic missionaryization. Migrants from the Bugis-Makassar Muslim community were interested in spreading Islamic teachings and carrying out trade missions. They disseminate it via the educational system. Before becoming king of Konawe, Lakidende has accepted Islamic teachings there until converting to Islam in the 18th century. Islam has been the majority religion in Southeast Sulawesi since the latter half of the 19th century or the early 20th century [[38]](#footnote-38). As a result, the people of Southeast Sulawesi's romanticism toward the discourse of enforcing Islamic law has been greatly influenced by the long history of Islam’s entry.

1. Traces of the DI/TII Movement in Southeast Sulawesi

In addition to the historical influence of the Islamic empire, it has been documented that the influence of Islamic law is also powerful through the traces of the Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) movement that once existed in Southeast Sulawesi. The incident began shortly after Qahar Muzakkar declared DI/TII as an affiliate of the Kartosoewiryo group in Answer Barat. At the same time, Qahar Muzakkar appointed Djufri Tambora as Brigade II DI/TII in Southeast Sulawesi. He commanded four battalions: Battalion I in Kendari, Battalion II in Muna district, Battalion III in Kolaka district, and Battalion IV in Buton district. The movement was also known as the “horde” troops at the time. They carried out various terrors in the form of propaganda to intimidate the public into agreeing to implement Islamic law by the legitimate Indonesian government. In fact, they frequently looted property in various community settlements to meet their food needs during their forest guerrilla warfare. The terror ended on July 5, 1959, when the government issued a Presidential Decree.[[39]](#footnote-39) The historical traces of DI/TII have a strong influence on the spirit of upholding Islamic law by the Muslim community in Southeast Sulawesi. The story of the agents' struggle, at the very least, played an important role in strengthening the fighting spirit of the Muslim community in Southeast Sulawesi in realizing Islamic law as a normative legal basis for the Muslim community in the area.

1. Mediatizationof Religious Information through Social Media

Social media as an alternative vehicle for da’wah media is an important indicator in disseminating discourse on the application of Islamic law in Southeast Sulawesi. Although social media as a medium of religious information can make it easier for the public to access religious information, it does not imply that all religious information is authoritative. Stig Hjavard previously expressed this concern in *The Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change*, who saw a shift in the authority of the religious information function, which was previously controlled by formal institutions but is now played by social media via journalistic work.[[40]](#footnote-40) Such fashion trends are not always beneficial to society, particularly for teenagers who have recently experienced a religious “fever”. Certain religious-social movement groups can openly use religious information content on social media due to this momentum. They use religious materials as a “modus operandi” to spread the legality of their slumbering political propaganda ideology. Greag Fealy demonstrated this phenomenon by revealing that the strategy of recruiting new members used by jihadist-extremism groups in Indonesia in 2013 was mostly done through social media.[[41]](#footnote-41)

The fear of a similar reoccurring phenomenon, particularly among Southeast Sulawesi academics, is not exaggerated. They are more responsive to religious information distributed through social media than religious information distributed through formal institutions. Previous research has also revealed that social media platform Facebook is one of the most commonly used platforms by HTI groups as a medium for distributing da’wah. Furthermore, one of the major agendas is the doctrine of the discourse on the enforcement of a government system based on the Khilafah Islamiyah ideology. They discuss a *kāffah*, or comprehensive revolution, in the Islamic sharia-based government system through this agenda.[[42]](#footnote-42) According to the data description, one of the factors influencing the academic discourse on applying Islamic law by academics in Southeast Sulawesi is the practice of religious mediatization, as described in the research data.

**Implications of Islamic Law Propaganda on Religiousity Ideology**

The analysis of the data presented in the preceding sections reveals that the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi is still growing and developing revivalist ideology at a non-extreme pace. This should not be overlooked, however, because the level can rise at any time as the dynamics of its development change. The phenomenon is unpredictable, particularly in terms of how long it will take for extreme growth to occur. The extent to which the government and related agencies or institutions obstruct the country’s development is determined by this growth. If the government’s handling is slow or appears to be ignored, the development will be accelerated. However, suppose the handling can be done in a systematic and massive manner. In that case, its growth can be stifled so that it does not reach alarming levels, which is especially important for maintaining religious and state harmony. As a result, to determine the magnitude of the impact that the development of this ideology can have, this study considers the following social conditions in various countries where people have been exposed to revivalist ideology:

According to previous research findings, similar phenomena have been observed in many parts of the world. M. A. Muqtedar Khan on *Islam as Identity: After a Century of Islamic Revivalism* stated that the emergence of revivalism movement groups impacted de-normativizing the concept of Islamic teaching. They tend to lead to worldly interests rather than afterlife interests, indicated the reduction.[[43]](#footnote-43) It proved to be quite significant in Asian countries where Muslims make up most of the population. Bangladesh is one example of this phenomenon, where people are becoming more aware of the importance of following religious teachings. However, political interests and socio-religious movements of certain groups were the primary drivers of this awareness. Bob Oliver describes a similar phenomenon in his book *Islamic Revivalism and Politics in Malaysia*. In his research, he found that raising awareness of the practice of Islamization was not directly proportional to peace between the Muslim Malay population and non-Muslims of Chinese and Indian descent. Islamization has created barriers between them, limiting the space for social interaction.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Similar symptoms have been observed in West African countries (Nigeria). Despite the growing development of Islam in the country, this situation has contributed to the growth of the revolutionary political movement mobilized by religious groups with revivalism.[[45]](#footnote-45) A similar phenomenon can be found in East Africa (Tanzania), which is grappling with the development of its Muslim population. The emergence of preachers instills fear in people about government policies suspected of violating Muslims’ rights. This condition directly impacts the social interaction of its residents in the development of harmonious relationships between communities.[[46]](#footnote-46) To pique the interest of their supporters, revivalism activists have even engaged in various patterns of religious mediatization. This is how Yasmin Moll describes her research on the development of revivalism groups in Egypt. He described the lecture method used by the missionaries, who wore sad expressions as if the chaos that had occurred there was the result of the Islamophobic movement's influence.[[47]](#footnote-47) Furthermore, theological debate activities broadcast via television are becoming increasingly intense there, triggering the emergence of revivalism, which is prone to causing inter-religious riots.

The various symptoms of discordant social relations between religion, society, and the state that appear in various parts of the world as a result of the influence of revivalism’s religious ideology are sufficient concrete evidence of the threat's existence. Tenriwaru revealed the phenomenon of a massive ideological revivalism movement from the Middle East to Indonesia, particularly through Islamic mass organizations.[[48]](#footnote-48) This does not rule out the possibility of Indonesian territory experiencing sociopolitical and economic turmoil similar to that of Middle Eastern countries. Especially if the government cannot handle the pace of development as soon as possible. As a result, here are some descriptions of the symptoms that have surfaced to this concern.

Since the Reformation era in Indonesia, the emergence of freedom of speech or democracy has grown and developed. A critical moment to mark this is the space for negotiating information for each group of mass organizations to voice their ideas in the public sphere. Furthermore, the distribution negotiation space is becoming more flexible due to digitization.[[49]](#footnote-49) This momentum is being exploited by at least four major ideologies: the Islamic ideologies of revivalism, reformism, traditionalism, and fundamentalism. HTI and Wahdah Islamiyah mobilized the ideology of revivalism, Liberal Islam groups mobilized the ideology of reformism, mainstream mass organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah) mobilized the ideology of fundamentalism, and the Salafi Wahabiyah Islamiyah group mobilized the ideology of fundamentalism. Each of these groups uses various strategies to negotiate their latent ideology through the digital space, particularly in the form of religious studies on social media.[[50]](#footnote-50)

These groups also have different reactions to Pancasila as the democratic system in Indonesia. At the very least, there are three major groups involved in this matter: those who accept democracy as a whole, those who reject it entirely, and those who accept it partially while rejecting it entirely. Islamists, both reformist and traditionalist, fully support the group that accepts it. They believe that the democratic system implemented in Indonesia has accommodated the values of Islamic teachings, either directly or indirectly. They believe that the *founding fathers* of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) attempted to internalize Islamic teachings and local traditions as the foundation for Pancasila and the Constitution. The fundamentalist group believes that, while Indonesia’s democracy has adequately accommodated the values of Islamic teachings, some of its regulations still require revitalization to accommodate the values of Islamic teachings in a *kāffah* manner.[[51]](#footnote-51) Unlike revivalist groups, which oppose the democratic system entirely. They believe that the system is, after all, a cultural product of Western colonialism. They are adamant about carrying out a *kāffah*, or comprehensive revolution, by enforcing the *khilāfah ‘alā minhāj an-nubuwah* government system as the foundation for Indonesia’s political government system.[[52]](#footnote-52)

One of the strategies used by revivalist groups to spread their ideology is through education. Through a scholarship program, students can continue their education in the Middle East. When they finish their studies, they are encouraged to return to Indonesia and spread this ideology.[[53]](#footnote-53) They encourage more excellent distribution through media publications, both in the form of lectures at the mosque pulpit, social media, bulletins, and da’wah writings via the internet based on blogs or websites, so that they are more easily accessible to Indonesia’s Muslim community.[[54]](#footnote-54) This phenomenon demonstrates how widespread they are in spreading religious ideas based on the revivalist ideology. In fact, they are very creative in utilizing all of the digital-based da’wah mediatization services that traditional Islamic groups have not fully utilized. As a result, their reach in the post-reform era is broader and more massive than traditionalist Islamic groups. The chaos that occurred in the Middle East may occur in Indonesia if it continues to grow and is allowed to continue.**Chart 1.** Waste Service System

**Conclusion**

The learning curriculum for the study of the interpretation of the Qur’an is not sufficient in distributing learning materials comprehensively for the academic community of universities in Southeast Sulawesi. It can be seen from those who tend to get information related to the interpretation of *āyāt* *at-taḥkīm* (Q. *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47) through social media access. Most of the interpretive information they get comes from a scriptural understanding, so it still seems like a crisis from their historical contextual understanding. In addition to the construction of this understanding, other factors that make the ideological dogma of revivalism more easily accepted by the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi compared to the dogma of religious moderation are the existence of several other supporting factors, namely; *First*, the influence of the historical traces of the Islamic kingdoms in Buton and Konawe which had earlier applied Islamic law at that time; *Second*, traces of the history of DI/TII’s struggle to fight for Islamic law in the region; *Third*, the weakening influence of mainstream Islamic organizations based on traditional teachings due to not being able to balance the massive proselytizing movement of transnational-based Islamic organizations; and *Fourth*, the mediating effect of religious information through social media. It is these factors that make the majority of them influenced by the propaganda of religious ideas based on the ideology of revivalism. Although basically, the influence is still in the early stages (soft) or has not reached the extreme level, the condition still has the opportunity to get socialization or reconstruction of religious understanding in a moderate direction.

The findings of this study have ramifications for the importance of revitalizing the learning curriculum for learning materials in Ilmu Al-Qur’an dan Tafsir programs, particularly at universities in Southeast Sulawesi. This revitalization necessitates the adoption of a scientific discipline integration paradigm, at the very least in the form of an interdisciplinary approach. It could be a substantial effort to convey a comprehensive understanding of Islamic teachings to the academic community based on the concept of religious moderation. However, the researcher realizes that one aspect that has not been addressed is the relationship between the level of revivalism’s ideology and the dynamics and dialectics of the political and economic aspects. As a result, future researchers must investigate these limitations to obtain comprehensive and holistic information. As a result, they can determine whether the revivalism ideology they espouse poses a threat to social, political, and economic stability in society, religion, and state.

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