

## POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE OLD AND NEW ORDERS: ACTIONS AND REACTIONS OF ISLAMIC FIGURES VERSUS THE STATE (1945-1973)

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### Abstract

This article examines the political landscape during Soekarno's rule (referred to as the Old Order/Orde Lama) and the early years of Soeharto's regime (New Order/Orde Baru). For Islamic political activists, the period from 1945 to 1973 was particularly challenging. Both the Old and New Orders governments were wary of Islamic parties, often blacklisting and marginalizing them. Employing historical research methods, including source collection (heuristic), source criticism, interpretation, and historiography, this article is a type of qualitative research conducted through literature study. The sources used include books from various libraries and the author's personal collection, as well as journal articles and proceedings accessed online via Google Scholar. The study is further supported by theories and political approaches, this article explores the struggle of Islamic activists during the 1955 elections, which were the first in Indonesia's history. Despite their efforts, they faced defeat rather than success, particularly in their attempts to establish Islam as the state foundation. During the New Order, Islamic groups continued to struggle. The government's strict political stance viewed the continuous criticism from Islamic parties as rebellious, leading to further suppression and their restriction to a single party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP). Additionally, this article highlights the challenges faced by Islamic activists in advocating for political participation under the pressure of an authoritarian regime.

**Keywords:** Islamic Politics, Old Order, New Order, Islamic Activists, Indonesian State.

### Abstrak

*Artikel ini mengkaji lanskap politik selama masa pemerintahan Soekarno (dikenal sebagai Orde Lama) dan tahun-tahun awal rezim Soeharto (Orde Baru). Bagi aktivis politik Islam, periode dari tahun 1945 hingga 1973 sangat menantang. Baik pemerintahan Orde Lama maupun Orde Baru berhati-hati terhadap partai-partai Islam, seringkali memasukkan mereka ke daftar hitam dan meminggirkan mereka. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian sejarah yang terdiri atas heuristik (pengumpulan sumber), kritik sumber, interpretasi, dan historiografi, artikel ini merupakan jenis penelitian kualitatif melalui studi pustaka, sumber yang digunakan adalah buku-buku dari berbagai perpustakaan maupun milik penulis pribadi, serta artikel jurnal dan prosiding yang diakses secara online pada Google Scholar. Selanjutnya diperkuat teori dan pendekatan politik, artikel ini mengeksplorasi perjuangan para aktivis Islam selama pemilu 1955, yang merupakan pemilu pertama dalam sejarah Indonesia. Meskipun upaya mereka pada akhirnya harus menuai kekalahan ketimbang keberhasilan, terutama dalam upaya untuk menjadikan Islam sebagai dasar negara. Selama Orde Baru, kelompok-kelompok Islam terus berjuang. Sikap politik pemerintah yang ketat menganggap kritik berkelanjutan dari partai-partai Islam sebagai pemberontakan, yang menyebabkan penindasan lebih lanjut dan pembatasan mereka pada satu partai tunggal, yakni Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Selain itu, artikel ini juga menyoroti tantangan yang dihadapi aktivis Islam dalam memperjuangkan partisipasi politik mereka di tengah tekanan rezim yang otoriter.*

**Kata Kunci:** Politik Islam, Orde Lama, Orde Baru, Aktivis Islam, Negara Indonesia.

## Background

The Republic of Indonesia's declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, put an end to the nation's founders' bitter and contradictory views regarding the state's foundations, since independence was the ultimate goal and could bring the nation's varied elements together. Now, they focus their efforts on challenging the Dutch "unwillingness" to allow their former colony to become an independent state. After fighting together for the country's independence since before independence, the Islamic Nationalist group (henceforth referred to as the Islamic group) also eased their efforts to implement their long-standing goal of making Islam the foundation of the state.<sup>1</sup>

Due to the energy-draining state of affairs in the nation and Bung Karno's invitation in his speech prior to independence, which essentially stated that the outcome of the next election would determine whether Islamic groups and secular Nationalists (henceforth referred to as Nationalist groups) succeeded or failed in achieving their goals.<sup>2</sup>

Under such circumstances, and supported by a very strong belief in victory in the upcoming elections, they (the Islamic group) easily accepted Hatta's proposal to abolish the "seven words" which had been fought for persistently in the difficult times leading up to independence. . To illustrate how easy it is to delete the seven words. Endang Saifuddin Ansori described it very clearly, "that the consultation and insistence of Drs. M.

Hatta to Islamic figures for this purpose only takes no more than 15 minutes." Apart from that, they consider the replacement of seven words in the Jakarta Charter with the phrase "The Almighty One" as a symbolic step to show the presence of monoestic elements of Islam in the state.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Bahtiar Effendi claimed that this incident represented the first time that Islamic organisations had been defeated in their attempts to implement their vision of establishing a formal, legalistic connection between Islam and the State. The Islamic group would face more setbacks after this one, which would make it harder for them to achieve their goals.<sup>4</sup>

Then, a number of short-sighted and "despair-prone" Islamic figures appeared, such as Kartosoewirjo and Ibnu Hadjar. These individuals took quick action and engaged in "rebellions" to further their objectives, which ultimately made life even more difficult for Islamic groups. The outcome of the struggle of the Islamic group was even more unexpected when, in the 1955 elections, it was discovered that the Islamic parties had lost by receiving votes that were significantly fewer than anticipated-roughly 43% of the total electorate.<sup>5</sup>

This second setback directly affected later losses in crucial constituent assembly discussions. This set of issues, along with Soekarno's tendency to "act out" politically, finally caused some Islamic leaders to act in an uncontrollably erratic manner by making movements. This, in turn, caused difficulties for the Islamic group itself. For Islamic

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<sup>1</sup> Rif'at Husnul Ma'afi, "Politik Islam di Indonesia Pasca Kemerdekaan hingga Demokrasi Terpimpin," *Al-Daulab: Jurnal Hukum dan Perundangan Islam* 3, no. 1, (April 2013): 78.

<sup>2</sup> Imam Munawwar, *Kebangkitan Islam dan Tantangan-tantangan yang Dihadapi dari Masa ke Masa*, (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1984), 309.

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<sup>3</sup> Endang Saifuddin Ansari, *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah Konsensus Nasional tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (1945 -1949)*, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), 90.

<sup>5</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, 91.

parties and groups, the July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree ended the "difficult struggle" but created new challenges. One of these was the effort to establish Islam as the foundation of the state.<sup>6</sup>

By referring to a number of narratives that have been presented by previous researchers, including Amos Sukamto (2013), in his article entitled "Tensions Between Religious Groups during the Old Order to the Beginning of the New Order: From Conflict over the Formulation of State Ideology to Physical Conflict" raises the issue the PKI rebellion from before independence until 1965, and also colored political dynamics in Indonesia, especially the 1955 elections.<sup>7</sup> Muhammad Rijal Fadli (2020) in his research entitled "Struggle of Islamic Political Parties during the Guided Democracy Period: Masyumi Tumbang, NU Melenggang, PSII Undecided" shows differences in perceptions of Islamic political parties in creating the basis of the state, so that one party, Mayumi, was forced to be brought down.<sup>8</sup> Miqdad Syukril Iman (2023) created a narrative with the title "Analysis of Islamic Political Parties Pre to Post-Independence 1910-1960: A Formalist Islamic Study" dividing the role and emergence of Islamic political parties into three stages, including the movement period, the pre-independence period, until post-independence period.<sup>9</sup>

This article attempts to explain the times leading up to and following the Presidential Decree, which is the unavoidably negative consequence of the way Islamic leaders articulated their activism and struggle to establish Islam as the foundation of the state. by emphasising a number of political circumstances from that era as well as a number of actions taken by Islamic leaders. Additionally, this study addresses the question of how Islamic politics functioned during the Old and New Orders, or how the Old and New Order governments treated Islam.

This article is based on historical methods, which include the stages of heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The research employs a literature review approach, utilizing references from books obtained from various libraries, including the author's personal collection. Recent references from journal articles and proceedings sourced from Google Scholar are also included. Additionally, the article discusses the challenges faced by Islamic activists in advocating for their political participation amid the pressures of an authoritarian regime.

### **1955 Election: Inter-Party Tensions and Presidential Decree**

As the 1950s approached, the Islamic group faced two main issues: first, building up enough strength to carry on the struggle; second, internal issues that were becoming more acute, particularly those pertaining to the modernist and traditionalist groups within Masyumi, specifically the conflict between NU and Muhammadiyah and its supporters. The PKI's 1952 reappearance after a protracted absence was the first issue. Masyumi's relationship with the PNI deteriorated as a result of the emergence and the "show of force" movement that spread throughout the

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<sup>6</sup> Amos Sukamto, "Ketegangan Antar Kelompok Agama pada Masa Orde Lama sampai Awal Orde Baru: Dari Konflik Perumusan Ideologi Negara sampai Konflik Fisik," *Jurnal Teologi Indonesia* 1, no. 1, (July 2013): 25.

<sup>7</sup> Amos Sukamto, 25.

<sup>8</sup> Muhammad Rijal Fadli, "Pergumulan Partai Politik Islam pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin: Masyumi Tumbang, NU Melenggang, PSII Bimbang," *JUSPI: Jurnal Sejarah Peradaban Islam* 4, no. 1, (2020): 34.

<sup>9</sup> Miqdad Syukril Iman, "Analisis Partai Politik Islam Pra hingga Pasca Kemerdekaan 1910-1960: Sebuah Kajian Islam Formalis," *Tanjak: Jurnal Sejarah dan Peradaban Islam* 3, no. 1, (2023): 49.



country, leading to Masyumi's expulsion from Ali Sostroamijoyo's cabinet in 1953.<sup>10</sup>

The second issue pertains to the discontentment of the modern orthodox (also known as Muhammadiyah or Modernist) group within Masyumi, who hold the position of leadership in the party, with the traditionalist or conservative orthodox group (also known as the Conservative Group or NU). This issue was first raised in 1949 at the Yogyakarta congress. At this congress the modernist group was able to seize the top leadership of the party, immediately after that they made regulations that limited the movement of the Shura Council which was controlled by NU ulama.<sup>11</sup> This dispute became even sharper when the position of the Ministry of Religion, the only position controlled and considered the most vital for NU, was handed over to the Muhammadiyah group.<sup>12</sup>

Upon observing this predicament, Rais 'Am NU's K.H. Wahab Hasbullah promptly sought a resolution by striving to secure the ministerial position, deeming it the most crucial issue to prevent the party's integrity from shattering. However, Masyumi leaders did not respond favourably to his efforts. Because they have mastered the party leadership and based on short-term calculations, they are more interested in the issue of religious ministry positions being determined by voting (to determine who will occupy the ministry position). The result was predictable, their group won. After this incident

occurred, the unity of the party was only a memory and division was only a matter of time.<sup>13</sup>

Voting is prioritised when deciding which problems should be implemented through a deliberation system. This is regarded as a weakness of Masyumi leaders who emphasise democracy excessively at the expense of group dynamics. Thirty years later, Mr. Moh. Roem, a senior figure in Masyumi and one of the participants in that election, felt that it was a mistake to take the Ministry of Religion position away from NU and give it to Muhammadiyah group.<sup>14</sup> The consequences were disastrous because in 1952, NU formally announced its departure from Masyumi at its Mu'tamar in Palembang, feeling that it was no longer respected.<sup>15</sup> This is the second failure for the Masyumi party in maintaining its integrity, after Perti had previously declared its departure from Masyumi.

The Islamic group faced an even harder test, particularly in 1955, with an incomplete and even tense internal situation. The election that it was expected to win, particularly by Masyumi figures, did not turn out to be what was anticipated. Elections, which are supposed to be a way to solve problems for the country and state, actually increase the complexity and fuzziness of national politics since no single political party can win hands-down.<sup>16</sup>

What happened next was a division of power which required compromises in the

<sup>10</sup> Imam Munawwar, *Kebangkitan Islam dan Tantangan-tantangan yang Dihadapi dari Masa ke Masa*, 310.

<sup>11</sup> Insan Fahmi Siregar, "Sejarah Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Partai Masyumi (1945-1960)," *Jurnal Thaqâfiyyât* 1, no. 1, (2013): 95.

<sup>12</sup> Imam Munawwar, 310.

<sup>13</sup> M. Syafi'i Ma'arif, *Studi tentang Masalah Percaturan Islam dalam Konstituante dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996), 121.

<sup>14</sup> M. Syafi'i Ma'arif, 121.

<sup>15</sup> Moh Amirul Mukminin and Sumarno, "Hubungan NU dan Masyumi (1945-1960): Konflik dan Keluarnya NU dari Masyumi," *Anatara: Journal Pendidikan Sejarah* 3, no. 3, (October 2015), 488.

<sup>16</sup> Greg Fealy dan Greg Barton, 65.

political field, both in parliament and in the constituency. The final results of the elections did not satisfy the Masyumi officials, even the winner of the PNI elections, because the narrow lead he obtained was not able to make him determine the party's ideals and desires, but had to come up with compromises, which of course, by reducing the ideals party.<sup>17</sup>

After splitting, the Islamic parties persisted in their fight "for Islam as the basis of state ideology" within the constituency.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, by drawing and persuading nationalist groups and even other Islamic groups (read: abangan) to join in this endeavour, they were unable to grow in power and number of supporters. But in order to prevail in the debate with the nationalist party, other parties—especially Islamic ones like the Abangan Islamic party—must lend their support.<sup>19</sup>

Despite this, the country was dealing with a wide range of issues at the time, particularly in the lead-up to the 1955 elections. These issues included social, economic, political, and ideological issues. Political parties are promoting solutions to this issue in line with their own philosophies. The purpose of all of this was to get people's sympathy and attention.<sup>20</sup>

Despite their small size, Abangan Islamic parties have a significant voice. Thus, the PKI and Nationalist camps were extremely happy when

they loudly declined to join the Islamic parties that were fighting to establish Islam as the foundation of the state in the constituent assembly. The Islamic party of Abangan may be represented by the Gerinda Party, led by Atmodarminto. During his speech at the Constituent Assembly, he publicly opposed and rejected the Islamic parties' proposal to establish Islam as the foundation of the state.<sup>21</sup>

This rejection clearly angered the Islamic parties, but on the other hand it was very encouraging for the PKI and PNI, because this incident could clearly illustrate that there had been conflict and division within the Islamic camp.<sup>22</sup> The Islamic group's struggle came to a standstill as a result. However, nationalists found it difficult to fulfil their goals, which was in opposition to the Islamic community. These two groups were not superior to one another.<sup>23</sup>

The balance of political party power gave Sukarno the opportunity to intervene at a later date. Sukarno had long been dissatisfied with the position of president, who according to the Temporary Law (UUDS) did not have direct power. The government is held by the Prime Minister, and the ministers are accountable to parliament. From this, serious and ongoing problems emerged between Soekarno and critical party leaders, including Masyumi later on.<sup>24</sup>

The first event that sharply raised political temperatures in the nation was Soekarno's

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<sup>17</sup> Ajjp Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut kepada Allah*, (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 184.

<sup>18</sup> Anggi Muhammad Adha, "Kebijakan Politik Nahdlatul Ulama mengenai Dasar Negara 1945-1984," *Factual: Jurnal Sejarah dan Pendidikan Sejarah* 9, no. 1, (April 2020): 17.

<sup>19</sup> Ajjp Rosidi, 184.

<sup>20</sup> Nanang Rendi Ahmad, Wasino, dan Putri Agus Wijayati, "Kampanye Partai-partai Politik Menjelang Pemilihan Umum 1955 di Kota Semarang: Studi Kasus PNI, PKI, NU, dan Masyumi," *Journal of Indonesian History* 8, no. 1 (2019): 63.

<sup>21</sup> Sukanto, "Ketegangan Antar Kelompok Agama Pada Masa Orde Lama Sampai Awal Orde Baru: Dari Konflik Perumusan Ideologi Negara Sampai Konflik Fisik," 30.

<sup>22</sup> Herbert Feith dan Lance Castles, *Pemikiran Politik Islam 1945-1965*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995), 184–185.

<sup>23</sup> Muhammad Himawan Sutanto, "Kegagalan Partai Politik Islam: Kegagalan Agenda Setting?," *Jurnal Dialog* 72, no. 2, (November 2011): 17.

<sup>24</sup> Herbert Feith dan Lance Castles, 186–189.

proposal to form a "Four Legs" cabinet—that is, a cabinet made up of the four major parties—in response to the 1955 election results (PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI). Islamic-based parties like Masyumi and NU responded to this notion by strongly objecting to the PKI's appointment to this cabinet.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the political temperature became increasingly heated when Soekarno, after seeing that his ideas were rejected by Islamic parties, expressed his controversial conception in his speech in front of youth representatives on October 28 1956. The essence of his conception was the need to bury the parties which he thought were the root of all national divisions, then a democratic system was formed that was not liberal, but "Guided Democracy".<sup>26</sup>

According to Soekarno, the goal of the struggle since before independence was to prevent the nation from disintegrating, and the troublesome parties that were already in place were primarily responsible for this. Sukarno was apparently unaware of the fact that the nature of democracy contributes to contradictions and disputes amongst current party elites to some extent. He thus truly wants to dissolve these parties right away. Sukarno's dramatic use of the phrase "bury the parties" suggests that he was eager to put an immediate stop to any parties that dared to disagree with the idea he had just presented.<sup>27</sup>

His concept of "Guided Democracy" – which he expressed several times again on various occasions and in his speeches – contained two main points: first, forming a new cabinet called the "Gotong Royong Cabinet", second, forming a

"National Council" which would later he will lead it himself. Seeing this kind of very unfavorable situation, Moh. Hatta, as vice president, felt very depressed, especially about Sukarno's actions which he saw as no longer in accordance with the law. So, after finding it difficult to follow Soekarno's leadership style of "cowboy romanticism" (according to B.J. Boland's term), finally at the end of 1956, he declared his resignation from the position of Vice President.<sup>28</sup>

This President's conception was controversial, yet for certain parties such as the PKI, PNI, Baperti and Murba, this was encouraging and therefore they were very supportive. On the other hand, for religious-based parties such as Masyumi, NU, PSII, Perti and Catholics, this idea was deemed wrong and strange, so they agreed not to reject it. According to those who are against it, this conception has gone outside the corridor and touches on very fundamental matters relating to state administration, which is actually the authority of the constituent assembly. For example, institutions such as the National Council, which exist in the president's conception, were not recognized in the Constitution.<sup>29</sup>

A new phase of open competition between Soekarno and his supporters, along with the army, versus the opposition parties, commenced with this change in the notion of democracy. Prime Minister Ali Sostroamijoyo, therefore, returned his mandate to the President on March 14, 1957, despite the unfavourable working environment. Following this incident, political tensions quickly rose, and Soekarno declared a state of war

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<sup>25</sup> Aji Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut Kepada Allah*, 185.

<sup>26</sup> Herbert Feith dan Lance Castles, *Pemikiran Politik Islam 1945-1965*, 62–63.

<sup>27</sup> Herbert Feith dan Lance Castles, 64–66.

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<sup>28</sup> B.J. Boland, *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1985), 91.

<sup>29</sup> Aji Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut Kepada Allah*, 189.

emergency (SOB) over the entirety of Indonesia just thirty minutes after the handover.<sup>30</sup>

Hatta's resignation and Soekarno's intervention in the government increased tensions between Jakarta and the regions, especially Sumatra and Sulawesi, which were clearly pro-Hatta. In an unsafe atmosphere due to frequent terror attacks, several Masyumi leaders who came from outside Java, such as M. Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harahap left Jakarta for Padang in West Sumatra.<sup>31</sup>

PPRI, with its headquarters in West Sumatra, was established at 22.00 WIB, with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara appointed as prime minister. Additionally, on February 17, 1958, Lt. Col. D.J. Somba's Universal People's Struggle Movement (PERMESTA)—a movement akin to this one—emerged in Sulawesi. This adds credence to the theory that the policies of the central government differ between areas inside and outside of the island of Java.<sup>32</sup>

Ajip Rosidi claims that the involvement of multiple Masyumi figures in PRRI exposes their true vulnerabilities. Their incapacity to choose the appropriate attitude in the most dire circumstances was their weakness. Political calculations were too influenced by sentiments of shame and solidarity, regionalism, and other such things. Instead, they should be founded on calculations of objective facts reached firmly and rationally. For example, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara

believed that this endeavour would fail because Lt. Col. Barlian (Commander of Toritorium II), one of the local Army Commanders in charge of oil, started to rescind his support for the plan after being involved from the beginning. This was evident at the planning meeting for the formation of the PRRI on the Dareh River, where Major Alamsyah Ratu Prawira Negara, his deputy, was the only person to attend in place of this significant army commander. Sjafruddin felt embarrassed to back down from this intention, though, as it might be seen as being timid, given that he had "already" intervened. It's also crucial to note that the individuals who spearheaded PRRI were native to the same area. His spirit was infused with a deep sense of unity.<sup>33</sup> This strategy's "mistake" ultimately caused resentment not only among those directly involved but also among his followers, including those who joined the Masyumi Party and other Islamic parties even though they did not agree with them.

Meanwhile in the constituent assembly, sessions continued. Representatives from Islamic groups gradually began to soften their stance, and spearheaded by NU, the final effort that could be made was the struggle to include several basic Islamic principles in the Constitution, especially those already contained in the Jakarta Charter regarding the implementation of sharia. But even this struggle was unsuccessful.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, the arduous constitutional battle came to an end.

Following a deadlock, the Constituent Assembly voted on June 2, 1959, to return to the '45 Constitution (as suggested by the President). There were two major formations: the Nationalist camp, which garnered 263 votes, was the camp

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<sup>30</sup> Todiruan Dydo, *Pergolakan Politik Tentara Sebelum dan Sesudah G 30 S/PKI*, (Jakarta: Golden Terayon Press, 1993), 55.

<sup>31</sup> Ajip Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut kepada Allah*, 198.

<sup>32</sup> Dhoni Frizky Aryasahab, "Sejarah PRRI/PERMESTA: Awal Mula Munculnya Otonomi Daerah Secara Menyeluruh di Indonesia," *Historis: Jurnal Kajian, Penelitian, dan Pengembangan Pendidikan Sejarah* 8, no. 1, (June 2023): 43–44.

<sup>33</sup> Ajip Rosidi, 208.

<sup>34</sup> M. Syafi'i Ma'arif, *Studi tentang Masalah Percaturan Islam dalam Konstituante dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, 180.

that consented to go back to the 1945 Constitution as it was drafted on August 18, 1945. However, the Islamic camp, which garnered a mere 203 votes, is pressing for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter clause in the UUD'45. There was no consensus reached on this matter, and neither side was able to secure the support of the full two-thirds of the members in attendance. This makes it impossible to make decisions, which heightens the tension in the room. Ultimately, Sukarno—who had the army's backing—used this setback as justification to issue his decree on July 5, 1959. This action was part of a well-thought-out plan to give the executive branch (government) vast authority in order to rule the nation.<sup>35</sup>

From the contents of President Soekarno's Decree above, the main points can be taken, including: 1) Dissolution of the constituent assembly; 2) The re-enactment of the 1945 Constitution; 3) Establishment of a Temporary People's Consultative Assembly, and 4) Establishment of a Supreme Advisory Council.<sup>36</sup>

The phrase "returning to the '45 Constitution" originated with a suggestion made by the army prior to the Decree, namely by General Abdul Haris Nasution during a National Council meeting in August 1958. Going back to the 1945 Constitution means that the assurance of the validity of functional groups' participation in the political sphere is becoming more and more relevant. Even going further back, the military

group had begun to meddle in politics ever since the SOB was passed on March 14, 1957.<sup>37</sup>

### **Guided Democracy: The Dissolution of Masyumi and the "Deterioration" of Islamic Parties**

The existence of a Presidential Decree can symbolically be interpreted as the defeat of the Islamic group. Behind it all, during the Guided Democracy period, the legalistic and formalistic articulation of Islamic political ideas and practices, especially the struggle for Islam as the basis of the state, began to show negative implications.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, since Guided Democracy was inaugurated by President Soekarno, Islamic political parties such as Masyumi were considered as competitors for power that could threaten state sovereignty, so Soekarno tried to weaken and marginalize Masyumi's role. Apart from that, Masyumi is also considered to be obstructing the process of political development in Indonesia.<sup>39</sup>

During the Guided Democracy era, Soekarno took a policy of softening political parties, so that they would not return to power as during the Liberal Democracy era. The selection was carried out strictly, with the aim of ensuring that parties that were still (willing to) survive became supporters of his political ideas, while parties that were considered to be troublesome for him were retooled. Masyumi and PSI were in this party.<sup>40</sup> Due to accusations that the party had carried out

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<sup>35</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 110.

<sup>36</sup> Dahimatul Afidah dan Abdul Ghofi Dwi Setiawan, "Meninjau Perjalanan Perumusan Dasar Negara hingga Penetapan Dekrit Presiden 1959," *Historia Madani: Jurnal Ilmu Sejarah* 7, no. 1, (2023): 78–79.

<sup>37</sup> Todiruan Dydo, *Pergolakan Politik Tentara Sebelum dan Sesudah G 30 S/PKI*, 56–58.

<sup>38</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 110.

<sup>39</sup> Abdul Rahman, "Masyumi dalam Kontestasi Politik Orde Lama," *Proceeding of National Seminar: Research and Community Service Institute Universitas Negeri Makassar* 1, no. 1, 2017: 160.

<sup>40</sup> Todiruan Dydo, *Pergolakan Politik Tentara Sebelum dan Sesudah G 30 S/PKI*, 65–66.





a rebellion—basically, that its leaders had either actively participated in the uprising, known as PRRI, or had blatantly given support—Masyumi was dissolved in August 1960.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the party did not formally assign blame for the defiant members' actions.<sup>42</sup>

There were actually ten parties remaining after Masyumi and PSI split up, but the PKI was the only one who could still be involved. However, Islamic parties, particularly NU, changed their political stance by endorsing Soekarno's Manipol Usdek out of fear of suffering the same fate as Masyumi. Regrettably, this party proved to be overly cautious and resorted to politics to avoid being overthrown by Soekarno. "bubbly" or "pliable route". As a result, the Islamic political party's reputation suffered. Naturally, this was Soekarno's true desire.<sup>43</sup>

The Masjumi Party continued to have a significant impact on Muslims throughout the 1960s. To that end, Masyumi leaders who participated in PRRI—despite having been granted amnesty and abolition—as well as individuals judged "dangerous" were subject to charges under "Government Regulation in Lieu of the Dangerous Conditions Law" (PPUKB) No. 23 of 1959, which superseded the Dutch ordinance "Over de staat va oorlog en beleg" (SOB).<sup>44</sup>

Anyone can be imprisoned for an indefinite period of time under this "Circumstance of Danger". Among the Masyumi community members who were imprisoned under this law were Mr. Mohammad Roem, Prawoto

Mangkusasmito, M. Yunan Nasution, M. Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, Isa Anshari, E.Z. Muttaqien, Kasman Singodimejo, Hamka, and others. These were years of intense defamation, terror, particularly at night, and an unruly, chaotic environment for Islamic leaders and Sukarno's detractors.<sup>45</sup>

The Masjumi people lost their political authority around 1963. Following its incorporation into Soekarno's Manipol Usdek, NU was largely ignored and purposefully given little prominence; in fact, Sukarno gave the PKI numerous opportunities to participate in his visits. The PKI leaders expanded their party by taking advantage of Soekarno's opportunities and their personal relationship with him.<sup>46</sup>

This led the PKI, led by D.N. Aidit, to adopt a variety of strategies towards labourers and agriculturalists, as well as to work with anti-colonial non-communist organisations. Furthermore, the PKI increased the number of people it demanded be appointed to cabinet positions in order to increase its power. Njoto, the PKI's Deputy Chairman II, was added to the Dwikora Cabinet by Soekarno in response to the PKI's demands. In addition, the PKI appointed its citizens to positions as Regional Heads in a number of regions, such as Regent of Kayanganyar, Regent of Trenggalek, Regent of Banyuwangi, Regent of Cilacap, Regent of Boyolali, and Regent of Tapanuli.<sup>47</sup>

It's possible that Soekarno's evaluation of the Islamic Party—which he believed would be far more dangerous than the radicalism of the Communists (radical left) if it were to grow and

<sup>41</sup> Rahman, "Masyumi Dalam Kontestasi Politik Orde Lama," 164.

<sup>42</sup> B.J. Boland, *Peryumulan Islam di Indonesia*, 106.

<sup>43</sup> B.J. Boland, 107.

<sup>44</sup> Ajip Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut kepada Allah*, 218.

<sup>45</sup> Ajip Rosidi, 218.

<sup>46</sup> Runalan Soedarmo, "Perkembangan Politik Partai Komunis Indonesia (1948-1965)," *Jurnal Artefak* 2, no. 1, (Maret 2014): 130–131.

<sup>47</sup> Runalan Soedarmo, 132–133.

become radical (often referred to as the radical right)—influenced his decision to be close to the PKI rather than an Islamic party. Based on his experiences, this is what was ingrained in Soekarno's consciousness.

On August 7, 1949, the radical right (Islamic) uprising got underway in West Java and quickly expanded to other parts of Indonesia. The government needs to exert a great deal of effort and sacrifice in order to put an end to this movement because radical right movements frequently exhibit remarkable tenacity. Only in the 1960s were these uprisings put an end to. In Kalimantan circa 1963, in Sulawesi circa 1965, and in West Java circa 1962. In other words, the crackdown happened quickly. It did not take long for the radical left (communist) rebellion to be put down.<sup>48</sup>

Since the 1960s, when Sukarno's impassioned and anti-imperialist speeches garnered widespread praise from the Indonesian people and the international community, the PKI has grown stronger and more influential. Predictions from parties inside and outside of Indonesia at the time suggested that the PKI, as one of the main parties, would grow quickly and eventually establish a Communist State.<sup>49</sup>

From here, after the PKI felt big and capable, it took the method it was used to, namely rebellion to overthrow the government. Soekarno was wrong in choosing friends. Apparently he had raised a “tiger cub” that he could not tame or control.

### **The Beginning of the New Order, New Hope and New Disappointment: The Taming of Idealism and Islamic Political Activism**

Soekarno's reign ended with the G 30 S/PKI incident. This event is considered to be the determinant of the transfer of power from President Soekarno to Suharto, based on the Eleven March Order (Supersemar) of 1965. This states that in the face of an urgent situation, Soekarno ordered the Minister of Army Commander, Lieutenant General (at that time) Soeharto to take important steps and provide a new direction for the life of the nation and state. On March 12, 1967, General Soeharto took the oath of office as President, and the New Order era was born.<sup>50</sup> Islamic leaders, particularly Masyumi, were also filled with great hope that their party could be turned around as a result of this shift.

This is predicated on two points: first, Masyumi and its leaders, who were totally encircled during Guided Democracy, believed they were a crucial component of the coalition forces that had been successful in destroying the PKI.<sup>51</sup> Second, approaches from Masyumi figures who escaped Sukarno's prison to the government through special channels, especially through Colonel Alamsyah Ratuprawiranegara. This approach seemed to show results with Colonel Ali Moertopo's visit and approach to Masyumi figures who were in prison. There he invited us to work together to build a new, healthy and democratic force.<sup>52</sup> *Third*, sympathetic steps from the

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<sup>48</sup> C. van Dijk, *Darul Islam: Sebuah Pemberontakan*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995), xviii.

<sup>49</sup> Lila Pelita Hati dan Lestari Dara Cinta Utami Ginting, “Segitiga Kekuasaan Demokrasi Terpimpin Tahun 1959-1965: Soekarno, TNI-AD, dan Partai Komunis Indonesia,” *Yupa: Historical Studies Journal* 6, no. 2, (2022): 171.

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<sup>50</sup> Hayatun Na'imah, “Peralihan Kekuasaan Presiden dalam Lintasan Sejarah Ketatanegaraan Indonesia,” *Khazanah: Jurnal Studi Islam dan Humaniora* 13, no. 1, (Juni 2015): 126–130.

<sup>51</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 111.

<sup>52</sup> Aji Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut kepada Allah*, 241.

government to free Masyumi figures who are still in detention.

As a result, on December 16, 1965, the Muslim Charity Coordinating Board (BKAM) was established. Its goal was to inhibit the NU Party's movement and comprised members of 16 Islamic organisations, including a few army personnel. Since the NU Party was the only party that was still active and intact at the time, and because new, progressive, and critical figures were beginning to emerge, the army was required to take action. It has been established that NU played a crucial role in overthrowing the PKI and the Old Order.

According to Abdul Munir Mulkan, this agency was formed in an effort to find a breakthrough to rehabilitate Masyumi. Meanwhile, Prawoto Mangunsasmito, the last chairman of Masyumi before it was disbanded, after leaving prison immediately made rehabilitation plans. A letter was written to General Soeharto as chairman of the Presidium of the Ampera Cabinet who also served as Acting<sup>53</sup>. President. Abdul Munir Mulkan, *Changes in Political Behavior and Polarization of the Islamic Ummah 1965-1987 in a Sociological Perspective*. However, before the letter was answered, there was a meeting of ABRI regional commanders on the 21st December 1966 issued a shocking statement, as written by Bahrtiar Effendy,<sup>54</sup> quoting the opinion of Allan Samson, or Ajip Rosidi,<sup>55</sup> or Abdul Munir Mulkan,<sup>56</sup> that they:

“Will take firm action against anyone, from any group, and from any sect, who wants to deviate from Pancasila and the '45 Constitution as was done through the Communist Party Rebellion in Madiun, Gestapu, Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (a movement "Fanatical Islam was strongest in the 1950s and gained its support base in West Java-which sought to establish an Islamic state by force of arms) and Masyumi-the Indonesian Socialist Party.”

It is clear that the New Order did not have the intention of rehabilitating Masyumi, and instead positioned Masyumi as a party in the same vein as the PKI. This assumption really shocked the characters. Therefore, Prawoto immediately wrote a letter to General Suharto to clear up the problem. Soeharto's answer to Prawoto's letter on January 6 1967 actually confirmed the army's statement by saying "...juridical, constitutional and psychological reasons have brought ABRI to a stance, that ABRI cannot accept the rehabilitation of the former Masyumi political party".<sup>57</sup> The fact that Masyumi leaders had been involved in the PRRI rebellion in 1958 was used as a strong reason to continue the ban on the party. Whether this is the main reason or not, still needs further research.

With this statement, hope for rehabilitating Masyumi seems to have been closed. It is clear that the military is still very suspicious of political Islam, especially Masyumi, which sympathizes or at least does not blame the "treason" scenario known as PRRI, and which sacrificed the lives of 2,500

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<sup>53</sup> Abdul Munir Mulkan, *Perubahan Perilaku Politik dan Polarisasi Ummat Islam 1965-1987 dalam Perspektif Sosiologis*, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1989), 49–50.

<sup>54</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 112.

<sup>55</sup> Ajip Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut kepada Allah*, 240.

<sup>56</sup> Abdul Munir Mulkan, *Perubahan Perilaku Politik dan Polarisasi Ummat Islam 1965-1987 dalam Perspektif Sosiologis*, 50.

<sup>57</sup> Ajip Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut kepada Allah*, 242. Although the letter also states that members of the former Masyumi Party as citizens are still guaranteed their democratic rights in accordance with applicable regulations. However, this answer hit them hard.



soldiers.<sup>58</sup> B.J. Boland gave a short comment on Masyumi's fate, "That is how the fate of the old Masyumi party was outlined."<sup>59</sup>

The former Masyumi leaders and activists had to find a different route as a result of this shocking reality, which required them to reframe their line of struggle and find a format that the New Order would accept. The best course of action is to create a new party that embodies the essence of the previous Masyumi. Due to this, a "Committee of Seven" was established, tasked with negotiating the formation of a new party with the government. Thus, on April 7, 1967, the Masyumi party was replaced by a new organisation called Partai Muslimin Indonesia, or Parmusi for short.<sup>60</sup>

Unexpectedly, the government gave permission to establish the party. However, regarding why the government gave permission to create this new party, it turns out to be a brilliant scenario, namely in order to make it easier for the government to "tame" (to borrow Dr. Bahtiar Effendy's term) those who are in a controlled political forum. Therefore, granting permission is, of course, not without limitations and conditions. The army (the actual controllers of the government at that time) strongly objected to the appearance of former Masyumi leaders to join the party. Most likely, on that basis, M. Natsir resigned from the (temporary) leadership of the new party on October 24, 1967.<sup>61</sup>

Furthermore, to further strengthen the army's wishes, on February 5 1968, General Soeharto

informed the leaders of the new party, that no former Masyumi leader would be permitted to hold a leadership role in the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi).<sup>62</sup> Therefore, when Parmusi was declared on February 20 1968, this party was led by two Muhammadiyah activists, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun.<sup>63</sup> In this way, Muhammadiyah played an important role in the birth of a new party which was seen as the successor to the Islamic party Masyumi which existed from 1945 to 1960. However, since the decision taken by Soeharto regarding limiting members of Parmusi, namely not from former Islamic parties, especially Masyumi, Parmusi has lost its relationship. with Muhammadiyah, both organizationally and ideologically.<sup>64</sup>

The decision left Masyumi's supporters extremely disappointed. Muslims "without a true leader" were hard to sympathise with for Parmusi. Thus, on November 4–7, 1968, in Malang, they held their first congress, where they invited and chose Mr. Moh. Roem, a former well-known Masyumi leader, to head the new party. However, it is clear that the government could not accept this decision. Earlier in the congress, a telegram from Jakarta reminded all that "the government's attitude in this matter has not changed."<sup>65</sup> Nonetheless, it is clear that the government finds this decision unacceptable, aPrior to the congress, everyone was reminded by a telegram from Jakarta that "the government's attitude in this matter has not changed."

<sup>58</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 112.

<sup>59</sup> B.J. Boland, *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, 158.

<sup>60</sup> Abdul Munir Mulkan, *Perubahan Perilaku Politik dan Polarisasi Ummat Islam 1965-1987 dalam Perspektif Sosiologis*, 50.

<sup>61</sup> B.J. Boland, *Pergumulan Islam di Indonesia*, 159.

<sup>62</sup> M. Abduh Wahid, "Pergumulan Islam dan Politik di Indonesia," *Jurnal Politik Profetik* 7, no. 1, (2019): 151–152.

<sup>63</sup> B.J. Boland, 159.

<sup>64</sup> Suwarno, "The Pattern of Relation of Muhammadiyah and Parmusi," *Journal of Islamic and Muhammadiyah Studies* 1, no. 2, (Agustus 2020): 31.

<sup>65</sup> B.J. Boland, 159.

It is evident from the government's treatment of Moh. Roem that the New Order shares the same mindset as the Old Order. The fact that he did not specifically punish the Masyumi leaders involved in "treason" or the organisation that did not denounce them is evident. However, everyone associated with the Masyumi party—especially its leaders—is subject to punishment. Not only should Moh. Roem, the Masyumi leader from Java, escape punishment and the government's "black list," but he should also be exempt from this act of "treason." This scenario of party-stunting persists slowly but surely.

In 1970, a coup against the party's leadership was orchestrated by John Naro, a leader whose origins are unclear and who was trusted by the government. Naro was known to be close to Ali Moertopo, and his influence continued despite their exclusion from the management. Internal strife, which was the actual situation, made it easy for the government to step in and resolve the party leadership dispute, which resulted in the appointment of Soeharto cabinet member M.S. Mintartedja to succeed Djarnawi Hadikusumo.<sup>66</sup>

In the meantime, NU attempted to take on a more defined role. NU was the only party that survived the G 30 S/PKI uprising that was mostly intact. Before Soekarno's downfall, a shift in sentiment towards the government had started with the rise of youthful NU figures like Subchan Z.E., Yusuf Hasyim, Zamroni, Munasir, and Chalid Mawardi, who vehemently disagreed with the older figures (who were thought to be close to Soekarno) and opposed the PKI. The protests against Soekarno were led by Subchan Z.E. and Zamroni, and the NU youth wing Ansor played a significant part in demolishing the PKI in East

Java. An attitude that Sukarno found very objectionable.<sup>67</sup>

Since then, the Army and NU youth have collaborated closely. Suharto's appointment to the presidency at that time was also greatly influenced by NU. However, it soon became evident that the army-run government did not want NU to grow significantly. The army government was extremely concerned that NU would continue to adhere to its earlier principles, which called for Islam to be the foundation of the state.

During the 1966 NU (Harlah NU) 40th anniversary parade, banners advocating a return to the Jakarta Charter were displayed. Even in April 1966, during the NU Party Central Leadership Council meeting in Bogor, an official NU announcement said:

"It is possible to implement the party's ideals because the state is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which are inextricably linked to the Jakarta Charter. If Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are correctly applied in state life and the Jakarta Charter is correctly applied in society, the outcome will be a society that adheres to the party's ideals."<sup>68</sup>

It's undoubtedly difficult for NU to fight alone. Thus, his attempts to go back to the Jakarta Charter—for which he advocated—also came up short. Even though the 1966 MPRS session did not meet the expectations of going back to the 1945 Charter, the success of NU's struggle was limited to making religious education mandatory in schools. However, this seemingly insignificant victory ultimately contributed significantly to the

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<sup>66</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 115.

<sup>67</sup> Greg Fealy dan Greg Barton, *Tradisionalisme Radikal, Persinggungan Nahdlatul Ulama - Negara*, 36–37.

<sup>68</sup> Greg Fealy dan Greg Barton, 51.

ongoing struggle against Islamization throughout the Indonesian archipelago.<sup>69</sup>

The Republic of Indonesia was established with significant assistance from NU. The 1945 NU Jihad Resolution, which obligated the nation to fight to protect itself against Dutch attempts to re-colonize Indonesia, is the clearest example of this. The 1965 PKI Rebellion was put down with the help of the TNI, but before that, a number of NU leaders were instrumental in the founding of the Masyumi party, which later evolved into a control mechanism used to disseminate criticism of intellectuals and preserve the status of ulama/kiai. Since ulama/kiai are so important to a religious community's existence,<sup>70</sup> even in maintaining the integrity of the country.

However, NU started to clash with the government more regularly following the fall of the PKI. The election issue was the catalyst for the conflict's beginning. NU desired that the elections take place in 1967. Aside from that, NU disagreed with the 1966 Draft Political Law because it contained provisions that were thought to be detrimental to political parties. Over time, these contradictions grew more pronounced, and young people in NU circles who had previously been close to the army eventually became radicalised.

Duta Masyarakat, the NU newspaper, became increasingly outspoken in criticizing the government, even Subchan Z.E, at the 1968 MPRS general session dared to reject Suharto from becoming President. Soon, Subchan Z.E. became the most outspoken opponent of the New Order political system. The result, as is usual

for those who are critical, is the marginalization of NU's position in the national political arena.<sup>71</sup>

The government's intervention in preparing the Muslim Party's leadership, along with the postponement of the elections and the expulsion of prominent Masyumi figures from Parmusi, proved to be highly successful in reducing the size and influence of Islamic parties<sup>72</sup> The results of the 1971 elections reflected the government's "success".<sup>73</sup> Dr. Bahtiar Effendi describes dwarfing and taming as having its zenith with the 1973 merger of political parties into the PPP and PDI. It started to manifest when the results of the 1971 election were disregarded. The parties' fate was thus sealed. Islamic group.<sup>74</sup>

### Conclusion

The historical evidence presented makes it abundantly evident that the attempt to establish Islam as the foundation of the state ultimately failed. It was even sparked by the impatience of some party leaders, who went on to engage in actions that might be considered "treasonous," leading to the "struggle" of Islamic parties and the leaders of these parties for a considerable amount of time.

Islamic movements and organisations have a long history of "criticism" of governments deemed abnormal. The myth of severe criticism, which is also known as Islamic disobedience, has a long history in the country. It dates back to the

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<sup>69</sup> Greg Fealy dan Greg Barton, 51.

<sup>70</sup> Martin Rizaldi, dkk, "Dampak Keluarnya NU dari Masyumi terhadap Politik Indonesia, 1952-1960," *Jurnal Humanitas: Katalisator Perubahan dan Inovator Pendidikan* 9, no. 2, (2023): 127–133.

<sup>71</sup> Martin van Bruenesen, *NU Tradisi Relasi-relasi Kuasa Pencarian Wacana Baru*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), 94.

<sup>72</sup> Bahtiar Effendi, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, 116.

<sup>73</sup> Martin Van Bruenesen, *NU Tradisi Relasi-relasi Kuasa Pencarian Wacana Baru*, 93–97.

<sup>74</sup> Qisthi Faradina Ilma Mahanani, et al., "Islam and Politics in Indonesia: Historical Perspective," *Al-Isnad: Journal of Islamic Civilization History and Humanities* 3, no. 1, (July 2022): 64.



Dutch era, the Republic of Indonesia (DI/TII), and the traditional kingdoms. As a result, policy makers from both the New Order and the Old Order were highly critical of political Islam. Based on Kuntowijoyo's version, that concludes the discussion and tries to explain the government's stance on Islamic parties.<sup>75</sup>

A movement to "reformulate the theological foundations of political Islam" and "redefine the socio-political ideals of Islam" is necessary in response to overly stringent restrictions that are always coupled with a suspicious mindset.

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<sup>75</sup> Kuntowijoyo, *Identitas Politik Islam*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).



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