



ISLAMIZATION, PIETY, FUNDAMENTALISM : RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN CAMPUS

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Diterima: 12 September 2018

Direvisi : 3 November 2018

Diterbitkan: 31 Desember 2018

Abstract

Religion is based on the perspective of attitudes and attention to the doctrines that apply in everyday life. On its journey, diversity is often a symbol and goal of achieving certain interests. However, sometimes he often raises conflicts within the structure of society. Power and religion sometimes cannot be united, which results in friction between the authorities and their people. In this regard, the existence of this study wants to highlight the dynamics of intellectual diversity in public space. They want to fight for religious rights that have been ruled out by the government. So that with the metamorphosed Tarbiyah movement being campus preaching, they have directed a non-confrontational movement that fights Islam in the public space by taking mosque settings as the foundation of religious idealism in the modern era. The rise of campus preaching in various universities throughout Indonesia originated from the concerns of Islamic activists on the impartiality of the authorities in a system based on religious guidance. Especially in the era of the 70s when the New Order replaced the Old Order, many actions were contrary to Islamic norms. The further development of the preaching of this campus is growing rapidly, as a result there is a new Islamic model conducted by students who try to instill an ethical system to the community. This study uses a qualitative method that combines literature sources with a phenomenological approach that refers to field data. Therefore the final result of this study presents the religious aspirations of young intellectuals in their relations with the political interests of the ruler who display modern piety attitudes that process into contemporary Islamic models in the public sphere.

Keywords: *Islamization, students, new order, public sphere, symbols*

Abstrak

Keberagamaan didasarkan pada perspektif sikap dan atensi atas doktrin yang berlaku di dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Pada perjalanannya, keberagamaan seringkali menjadi simbol dan tujuan mencapai kepentingan tertentu. Namun, adakalanya ia kerap memunculkan pertentangan di dalam struktur masyarakat. Kekuasaan dan agama terkadang tidak bisa disatukan, yang berakibat pada gesekan antara penguasa dengan rakyatnya. Berkaitan dengan hal tersebut, adanya penelitian ini ingin menyoroti dinamika keberagamaan kaum intelektual di ruang publik. Mereka ingin memperjuangkan keberagamaan yang selama ini dikesampingkan penguasa. Sehingga dengan gerakan Tarbiyah yang bermetamorfosa menjadi dakwah kampus, mereka telah mengarahkan pada suatu gerakan non-konfrontatif yang memperjuangkan Islam di ruang publik dengan mengambil seting masjid sebagai landasan idealisme keberagamaan di era modern. Maraknya dakwah kampus di berbagai universitas di seluruh Indonesia berawal dari keprihatinan para aktivis Islam terhadap keberpihakan penguasa pada liberalisasi nilai dan moral. Terlebih di era 70-an saat Orde Baru menggantikan Orde Lama, banyak sekali tindakan-tindakan yang bertentangan dengan norma Islam. Perkembangan selanjutnya, dakwah kampus ini berkembang dengan pesat, akibatnya terjadi model keislaman baru yang dilakukan oleh mahasiswa yang mencoba menanamkan sistem etika kepada masyarakat. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif yang memadukan sumber-sumber pustaka dengan pendekatan fenomenologis yang mengacu dari data lapangan. Oleh karena itu, hasil akhir penelitian ini menyuguhkan aspirasi keberagamaan kaum intelektual muda dalam persinggungannya dengan kepentingan politik penguasa yang menampilkan sikap-sikap kesalehan modern yang berproses menjadi model Islamisasi kontemporer di ruang publik.

Kata Kunci: Islamisasi, mahasiswa, orde baru, ruang publik, simbol



Background

The inspiration for peace for mankind comes from religion, so the teachings of truth come from it. Therefore, it requires an attitude of divine transcendence that leads to mutual respect between human beings. In addition, hostage taking to the essence of divine values is the cause of exploitative and excessive acts in actualizing religious teachings.¹

The changing era now requires a shift in values in society, editorial attitudes in the name of obedience and obedience have been associated as a teaching system that must be practiced. Strengthening spiritual values is the belief of some modern society for the modernization situation that has occurred so far. On the other hand, scripture is the reference of the scripturalists in launching spiritual being in the constellation of understanding of modern-day religion.² Truth claim emergence only gives a hidden message in showing the reality of religion that is. Democratization and egalitarianism have been used in pouring religious texts flexibly, which is adjusted to the times. It seems that what is presented by leading social thinkers reflects this situation, that religion will experience a degradation of function as globalization develops. Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Comte seemed to see the similarity of the way of looking at modern society in the 20th century to the death of the spirit of religious spirituality so that religion loses its main essence. The sacred texts are only practiced as a rite as a result, the domination of the values of fundamentalism becomes lost. Ethno-religious inequality is a domain that is difficult to solve until now.³

¹ Nelly van Doorn-Harder. "Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia." *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 130, no. 1, 2010, p. 132-135.

² Parry Benita, "What is left in Postcolonial Studies", *New Literary History*, 43(2), 2012, p. 341-392.

³ Joshua Edelman, *Performing Religion in Public* (UK & US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

In this paper, I want to present religious patterns that began in the New Order era. On the other hand, the various patterns of congruence have influenced the indoctrinate of some circles. In addition, the influence of power also resulted in the depoliticization of religion in the public sphere. Referring to this, the power established by the New Order narrated the interests of the authorities on one side.

In a different aspect, this regime has succeeded in making the religious system out of place. Transnationalism movements began to emerge in this era, but their existence was not so visible, because the New Order saw enough in creating a single political domestication.⁴ By some circles, the attitude taken to criticize the New Order is to build non-confrontational power among educated people. They try to build the power of da'wah through campus. Therefore, there was modernized Islamization, which the authorities did not seem to smell.⁵

Also, in this paper, I will elaborate the interests of educated people, namely students in carrying out their actions to confront the authorities. Regime depoliticism attitudes toward Muslims seem to be the cause of the students raising the power of da'wah secretly. They try to display Islam in an understanding that is believed to be true. *Halaqoh* on campus is a kind of routine that will strengthen their religious attitude.⁶ There has not been any aspect of radicalism in this model but lately, after the New Order stepped down, the

⁴ Robert W. Hefner "Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 58, no. 1, 1999, p.271-272.

⁵ Peter Lape, "Focus on Islam IV: Archaeological Approaches to the Study of Islam in Island Southeast Asia." *Antiquity*, vol. 79, no. 306, 2005, p.829-836.

⁶ Agus A. Safei, "In A Nation Of Muslims Political Islam Is struggling To Win Vote: Role Of Islam and The Political Crisis in Indonesia." *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, vol. 8, no. 7, 2015, p. 319-326.



students' religious attitudes have changed to a more dogmatic current.

The need to establish good communication to create comfort, and consistency in realizing a balance and even avoiding suspicion caused by sustainable religious conflict.⁷ So religion is no longer seen as a scary thing. Labeling religion that is not true must also be resolved comprehensively, religious exclusiveness, patterns that are not in accordance with modern civilization should actually be eliminated.⁸ The stigma that is often not pinned on that religion is the cause of fear and horror as Albert Hourani conveyed does not become a reality, if in the past Islam was conveyed with a sword, only as a defense against the enemies of Islam who used violence.⁹

The contextualization of the verse becomes inevitable when brought from the past dimension to the modern era, Islam is directed to the understanding of the absolute Shari'a, so as to be used as a justification for tasyri 'which prevailed at that time.¹⁰ The Geraudy view opens a perspective path towards the rise of the logic of Islamic fundamentalism which considers corpus (sacred text) as essential truth without the existence of multiple interpretations.¹¹ On the other hand, the expression Geraudy creates ambiguity in the Muslim community. Respect for the *Sunnah* as a legacy of the Prophet is a natural thing, this cannot be used as a

characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism. Criticism that is in line needs to be shown in looking at fundamentalism as a model to uncover the contextualization of the prevailing religion.

Bustaman-Ahmad, citing the exposure of several Islamic thinkers such as Said al-Ashmawy, Azyumardi Azra, John Obert Vall. Said al-Ashmawy saw that political attitudes can be derivative into political fundamentalism, then in another form as ratioanalist-fundamentalism. The difference between them lies in the position of revelation which is considered still sacred so that for rationalists following the teachings of revelation in modern times is a necessity. While political fundamentalism narrows the components of revelation in smaller discourses and interpret them according to the interests of their groups. Impartiality towards humanist Islam and universalism is characteristic of fundamentalist activist groups, so John Obert Vall emphasizes by adding traditional fundamentalists. For him, Saudi Arabia is a feature of this movement. Militancy loyalty is seen from the movement, that fundamentalism has been formed based on the royal political oligarchy which has been maintained until now. Whereas radical fundamentalism offers a more complex composition of the masses, promoting a more participatory attitude combined with opportunistic figures in it.¹²

Azyumardi Azra said a different argument, he divided into two aspects. To facilitate this perspective, he pointed out the emergence of fundamentalism in the Arabian Peninsula led by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, while the Muslim Brotherhood movement led by Hasan al-Bana became the first pre-modern fundamentalism movement period. This second typology is influenced by

⁷ Mun'im Sirry, "The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: The Pesantren and Civil Society in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *The Muslim World*, vol. 100, no. 1, 2010, p. 60-77.

⁸ Chiara Formichi, "Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas, and Value." *Indonesia*, no. 103, 2017, p. 95-98.

⁹ Derek Hopwood. "Albert Hourani: Islam, Christianity and Orientalism." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, 2003, p. 127-136.

¹⁰ Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java." *The Journal of Asian Studies* (1986-1998), vol. 46, no. 3, 1987, p.533.

¹¹ Itzhak Weismann. "Modernity from within: Islamic Fundamentalism and Sufism." *Der Islam*, vol. 86, no. 1, 2011, p. 142-170.

¹² Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad, *Relasi Islam dan Negara: Perspektif Modernis dan Fundamentalis* (Jakarta: Indonesiatera,2001),p.25-29.



aspects of culture, politics, economics and so on originating from the West.¹³

Islamic dynamics in the middle east of the 18th century had an impact on the Islamic situation in Indonesia, in that region, Islam became a magnet and central to other regions, such as Africa and Asia. Geopolitically the existence of Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern regions such as Egypt, Iran and so on has had a strong influence in the international world.¹⁴ In the beginning, this area also became a center for Islamic studies, especially in Saudi Arabia which became the center of the modern Islamic puritanism movement, which characterized itself as an Islamic state free from syncretism.¹⁵

Islamic revivalism in the Middle East also contributed inspiration to Islamic activists in Indonesia, such as the Muslim Brotherhood movement pioneered by Hasan al-Bana. At the same time, Indonesia's political situation in the early 20th century intersected with the interests of certain groups in fighting for Islam, with the birth of various Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and NU. The development of pesantren and madrasa is increasing, so post-independence Islamic intensity in Indonesia is so high. The role of diplomacy is an institutional element between Indonesia and the Middle East, especially Egypt. The relationship between the two countries after Soekarno's resignation was so close, the government also vigorously sent its students to study in the country. Starting in the 70s, Islam began to be facilitated by the Indonesian government and some Islamic

figures at that time. At the same time, the Middle East's political, social and economic climate influences the situation in Indonesia, in turn, the construction of Middle Eastern Islam is developing in Indonesia, with its transnational movements.¹⁶

New Order depoliticization Against Muslims

A fairly accommodative Islamic situation in the New Order era appeared to be a mirage, behind that the regime put pressure in such a way. At first, he provided space for the Muslim community to display its characteristics, but later it precisely castrated the interests of Muslims to strengthen its position. Mohammad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Mohammad Natsir were Muslim figures who were not allowed to contest national politics at the time. Therefore, Mohammad Natsir took the initiative to establish DDII (Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council) towards the end of the 60's.¹⁷

The return of Muslims to take part in the New Order era did not seem to be welcomed, Soeharto not only eliminated the PKI but also removed the Muslims. This is based on the unilateral interests of the New Order in running the wheels of government, Soeharto's background which is Islamic *abangan* and his perspective on Islam influences the model of government that is carried out.¹⁸ So that Muslims suspect that the New Order government has been infiltrated by certain parties who aim to achieve hidden interests.¹⁹ According to Ariel Heryanto, the Soeharto

¹³ Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam : Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina,1996),p.67-73.

¹⁴ Quintain Wiktorowicz, "The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia / Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2001, p. 154-156.

¹⁵ Igor Lipovsky, "The Awakening of Central Asian Islam." *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, no. 3, 1996, pp. 4-7.

¹⁶ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal : Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia* (Jakarta: Erlangga,2007),p.81-85.

¹⁷ Robert Pringle, *Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity*, (Singapore: Didier Millet PTE LTD,2010), p.93- 98.

¹⁸ Robert W.Hefner and Patricia Horvatic (ed), *Islam in Era Of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* (Hawai'i:University of Hawai'i Press,1997),p.77-79.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*



government was rich in sharing political maneuvers with a tendency to patrimonialism.²⁰

From the beginning, Suharto's desire to obstruct the various desires and aspirations of the Muslims was so clear.²¹ The perception of the New Order regime when the state wanted to be built using Islamic conceptions. The failure of the Masyumi leaders to rehabilitate his own party and various other desires such as the application of Islam as the basis of the state; the wish of Mohammad Hatta, former Vice President along with HMI and PII exponents, to establish the PDII party (Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party); the aspirations of Muhammadiyah leaders to reactivate the PII party (Indonesian Islamic Party) were strongly responded by the New Order regime. Even more frontal, Soeharto with his "iron-handed" politics suppress radical Islamic groups that have the potential to fight the government.²²

Encouragement of religious formalization is often launched by some who want strong elements of doctrine to be included in *Shar'i* values, this is an awareness of God's presence in the daily dimension. Middle Eastern cultures are tried to be institutionalized as characteristics that isolate interests outside of them. Therefore, the perspective of Islamic inclusiveness cannot be avoided to place religion as the basis of action, no longer ethically Islamic.²³ Which does not only convey

contradictions between right and wrong, between right and wrong, unclean and lawful so that it falls into the exclusivity of religion which is still prominent.²⁴

In the meantime, the attitudes of monotheistic militancy appear in the social structure of the Indonesian people. The framework of fundamentalism was born in the era of the 70s era, was Imaduddin Abdulrahim, one of the initiators of the birth of ICMI in the 90s. He is a graduate of ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology) who has influence in the world of campus preaching. In that era, he was the initiator of various da'wah movements initiated by Salman ITB mosque. For those who know him, his critical attitude towards the New Order raises the notion that he is part of Islamic fundamentalists. At first, he joined the HMI (Islamic Student Association), then to channel his spirit of da'wah he often fostered da'wah cadres who opposed the New Order regime. After returning from his education in America, he did not dampen his enthusiasm to build religious awareness in his alma mater, he often offered ideas that tended to arouse youth's enthusiasm at that time to study Islam more deeply. In the end, he became a central figure in the campus da'wah movement that inspired similar models throughout Indonesia. His figure has given birth to a new model of non-mainstream da'wah, which can be done among students. Therefore, stretching da'wah at the university illustrates the other side of the attitude of fundamentalism that is built based on the reaction of the younger generation who try to find understanding of religion based on the construction of the logic of Islam-scientific.²⁵

Furthermore, campus proselytizing militancy driven by students correlates with

²⁰ Ariel Heryanto and Sumit K.Mandal (ed), *Challenging Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia* (New York:Routledge,2003),p.4-5; also see, Wieringa. "Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia." *Der Islam*, vol. 90, no. 2, 2013, pp. 481-482.

²¹ Kenneth M. George, "Designs on Indonesia's Muslim Communities." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 57, no. 3, 1998, p. 693-713.

²²Andrew Weintraub. "Dance Drills, Faith Spills': Islam, Body Politics, and Popular Music in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *Popular Music*, vol. 27, no. 3, 2008, p. 367-392.

²³ Robert W. Hefner, Zachary Abuza, and Gerry van Klinken. "Religion and Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 67, no. 2, 2008, p. 667.

²⁴ Vali Nasr, "The Rise Of "Muslim Democracy"." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 2, 2005, p. 13-27.

²⁵Jimly Asshiddiqie ed, *Bang Imad: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002).



transnational movements in the 21st century today. Many fundamentalistic ideas were absorbed by them, often they studied the thoughts of Middle Eastern revivalism, such as: Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Bana, Abul A'la Al-Maududi. Although they are not from the pesantren group that specifically studies religion, religious diversity is very pronounced, the process of Islamization in the academic world is not only through science, but also penetrates the non-compromise attitude which is their doctrinal perspective.²⁶ Religious symbols, the use of everyday language began to be used to reveal the element of Arabism within them. That there has been a shift in Islamic identity which is influenced by the actualization of the values and norms of shari'a non-critics.²⁷

Religious Contestation in Public Sphere

The interpretation of religion in the public sphere has a tremendous impact in the community. At present, the meaning of religion becomes rather rigid which is connoted as a symbol of radicalism.²⁸ When radicalism is described as the ability to interpret religion in a public space, the consequences displayed have different interpretations. Based on the Indonesian Dictionary,²⁹ the term radicalism has at least three meanings, namely (1) radical understanding or flow in politics; (2) understanding or flow that wants social or political change or renewal in a violent or drastic manner; (3) extreme attitudes in political flow. Of the three terms, the second understanding seems more appropriate to explain the symptoms of religious radicalism in

Indonesia and some other Muslim-majority countries. Radical Muslim groups have a strong tendency to make Islamic social and political changes in various ways, even with violence. The meaning of radicalism thus has a negative nuance.

On the other hand, the debate over ethnic, religious, racial and class groups (SARA) in the public sphere became a study that attracted the attention of state loyalists and religious loyalists. A more specific study in the modern debate by raising the term "politicization of religion" which is widely discussed in the stage of national-international studies. All of that is a form of strengthening socio-religious identity.³⁰ Strengthening socio-religious identity has existed since humans began to interact with others. The framework of the study of the politicization of religion initially comes from the classical debate between religion (*al-din*) and the state (*al-daulah*) in the study of Islamic politics (*al-islam al-shiyasiy* or *siyasah syar'iyah*) which continues to develop until now.³¹

Although Indonesia adheres to Pancasila as the basis of the state, not based on religion (Islam), but the state has an obligation to protect its adherents to religion. Although religion (Islam) is no longer a tool of legitimacy of political power, but on a social level, besides being a moral-ethical guide in social life, it is the basis for important social identity and political affiliation.³² This was confirmed by Hefner that political organization in modern Indonesia was built on loyalty to existing religions and communities, which he knew with the term flow of politics.³³

²⁶ Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory." *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 5, 2004, p. 669-690.

²⁷ Johan Meuleman (ed), *Islam in the Era of Globalization : Muslim Attitudes Towards Modernity and Identity* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002).

²⁸ Andreas Ufen, "Party Systems, Critical Junctures, and Cleavages in Southeast Asia." *Asian Survey*, vol. 52, no. 3, 2012, p. 441-464.

²⁹ <http://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id>, accessed July 2018.

³⁰ Carol Kersten, "Islamic Post-Traditionalism: Postcolonial and Postmodern Religious Discourse in Indonesia." *Sophia*, vol. 54, no. 4, 2015, p. 473-489.

³¹ Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic...*

³² Stephen A. Douglas, "Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 56, no. 1, 1997, p. 266-267.

³³ Robert Hefner. *Civil Islam : Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (UK:Priceton University Press, 2000),p. 76-82.



This is increasingly evident during the transition of multicultural politics which has strengthened the paradigm of political ethnocentrism — using views and ways of life from its point of view as a benchmark for assessing other groups. The emergence of the ethnocentrism movement in Indonesia began to be seen after obtaining Indonesian independence from the hands of the invaders. This form of ethnocentrism with the emergence of the Islamization and Christianization movements.³⁴

By the end of the New Order government ahead of the reform transition, the Islamization movement had given rise to tensions between Muslim and Christian communities. This tension occurred because of the discrimination of the Soeharto government against Christian communities with the marginalization efforts of Muslim groups. This can be seen from the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), indirectly having an affiliation with the New Order authorities.³⁵

The collapse of the New Order on May 21, 1998, provided opportunities for the presence of the dynamics of political culture which again played the role of civil society as the spearhead of political change in Indonesia. The political openness of civil society through the right to equality of association is a participatory mandate.³⁶ However, this role is still interpreted as limited to building "strength" in politics. Therefore, it makes the behavior of "pulling" political interests between individuals and individuals, individuals with groups and groups with other groups,

using media or tools that are considered to have the power to occupy political power.³⁷

The reappearance of the Islamism movement in the 20th century marked the end of Western colonialism, in Muslim countries (Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Algeria), reviving concepts of radicalism which led to political conflict between Islamic loyalists (religious authority) with state loyalists (state authorities). From this, a systematic study was developed between the issue of religion that was brought to the public sphere which has always evolved to the present with the transformation towards the dynamics of contemporary issues.³⁸

In general, socio-religious movements usually take several models: 1) the transformative movement and the revolutionary movement which both aim to change the structure of the life of a society which is seen as a total crisis; 2) reformative movement which aims to change certain aspects of people's lives; 3) the redemptive movement that commonly occurs within the scope of the religious sect towards complete safety; and 4) an alternative movement, as opposed to a rescue movement that aims to change a small part of the individual lives of its members.³⁹

The concept of the public sphere that was appointed by Habermas was a space for critical discussion, open to everyone. In this public sphere, private citizens (private people) gather to form a public, where "public reason" will work as a supervisor of state power. Exchange of opinions and active participation

³⁷ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan : Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 45-47.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Anthony Giddens. *New Rules of Sociological Method*. (California: Stanford University Press, 1993); also see Sanjay G. Reddy. "The Dilemmas of Globalization." *Ethics & International Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2001, p. 159.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Patrice C. Brodeur, "Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia." *The Muslim World*, vol. 92, no. 1, 2002, p. 216-222.



in the process of public decision making is a new meaning of "public" in a modern sense.⁴⁰

In the Indonesian context, the development of the Islamic movement, in the last thirty years, has undergone many changes in the vision and socio-political orientation that has been championed. What is interesting is that the movement is more directed to the process of re-Islamization which is related to social practices and disciplinary practices to form active Muslim subjects in the public sphere.⁴¹ However, the Islamic movement's project is not directed at establishing an Islamic state or supporting military use and violence to create programs to create "good Muslim" individuals and communities. But the project is directed to self-transformation through morality and ethics as a foundation for being able to appear in the public space.⁴²

Current discourse on radicalism as the main issue of religious understanding often leads to the struggle of an inappropriate understanding, that radicalism is manifested as an individual pattern of piety has no basis at all. In contrast to radicalism, piety is not negative even it has humanism values that can be used to counter radicalism.⁴³

According to Pipensky, piety in Islam is Muslim who believes and practices or runs the pillars of Islam, creed, performs prayers, performs Fasting in the month of Ramadan, pays Zakat, and performs Hajj to the holy land if he is able. Even so, the term piety is also equipped with sunnah worship such as reciting the Qur'an, giving charity, helping others and other good social behaviors. The definition of

piety conveyed by Pipensky above, self-recognized by him, is very relative and debatable. He even says that piety has four assumptions: (1) Piety is a property of individual (piety is a private matter) (2) Piety is unobservable (3) Piety is multifaceted (4) Piety is apolitical (piety is apolitics).⁴⁴

Pipensky once again holds that the measure of a Muslim's piety can be seen from the implementation of the pillars of Islam. This is because the pillars of Islam are compulsory which is not limited by the geography and culture in which a Muslim lives. The mainstream schools and schools of Islam recognize the pillars of Islam as an obligation that must be believed and implemented by a Muslim.

Campus Islamization in Contemporary Indonesia

The political and social situation that occurred in Indonesia during the 70s and 80s which resulted in the pressure of the New Order power was felt by Islamic activists. However, the situation did not diminish their enthusiasm in preaching non-confrontational Islam, so the method used was hidden. In this regard, there has been a depoliticization of Islam carried out by the New Order. The euphoria of Indonesian society at that time caused anxiety for some people who were worried about the degradation of ethics and morals, especially with the condition of their young generation if there were no religious teachings that imprinted on them, then how terrible result. Such a perspective inspires da'wah activists to transmit a hanif ideology, which frees society from the shackles of ignorance towards the ultimate source of truth.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Rodney Benson, "Shaping the Public Sphere: Habermas and Beyond." *The American Sociologist*, vol. 40, no. 3, 2009, p. 175-197.

⁴¹ Thomas Gibson, "Islam and the Spirit Cults in New Order Indonesia: Global Flows Vs. Local Knowledge." *Indonesia*, no. 69, 2000, p. 41-70.

⁴² Iqra Anugrah, "Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia." *Indonesia*, no. 95, 2013, p. 181-183,189.

⁴³ Watson, "Islamic Books and their Publishers: Notes on the Contemporary Indonesian Scene." *Journal of Islamic Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2, 2005, p. 177.

⁴⁴ Thomas Pipensky. *Piety and Public Opinion: Understanding Indonesian Islam* (UK: Oxford University Press,2002).

⁴⁵ Interview with alumni activists of the Jamaah Shalahuddin UGM campus, January 2018.



The emergence of the campus da'wah movement spearheaded by Salman Mosque ITB, then followed by various campuses throughout Indonesia. The next phase, DDII, which was founded by Mohammad Natsir, provided support to Islamic students to institutionalize campus propaganda institutions in each university mosque. Among other things spread in Bandung, Yogyakarta, Padang, Lampung and Ujung Pandang, the actors are alumni of the Salman Mosque ITB. They move one voice based on concern for the injustice of the ruler, and return to the true teachings of Islam. On the other hand, the threat of secularization cannot be avoided, according to them western culture that enters Indonesia damages the community's religious system.⁴⁶

They move one voice based on concern for the injustice of the ruler, and return to the true teachings of Islam. On the other hand, the threat of secularization cannot be avoided, according to them western culture that enters Indonesia damages the community's religious system.⁴⁷

As explained above, the propaganda initiated by the students was greeted with joy throughout Indonesia. Which then universities like UI, UGM, IPB, ITB became the pioneer of the implementation of campus preaching in Indonesia. These four universities are central to the training of activists throughout Indonesia, then campus preaching extends to religious campuses such as the IAIN (State Islamic Institute), and STAIN (State Islamic High School). There is no denying the presence of these activists as a religious belief that is used as a legitimacy of non-confrontational resistance caused by the suppression of the political regime. Considering the opinion of Riaz Hassan, the

strong doctrine of teachings gave rise to an enlightenment movement, this was like that of Muhammadiyah which at first was a modern Islamic purification movement. The idea of piety became the attraction they offered, religious beliefs became the only way to develop the movement.⁴⁸

Islam Revivalism and Fundamentalism Among Youths

The youth movement is increasingly revealing Islamic symbols and identities in the public space of the 70s to 80s, in addition to the rampant preaching of campuses in various universities in Indonesia, the generation of Muslim women at that time began to dare to use a veil, then among those who were male men keep beards, call among themselves as ikhwan and akhwat. The influence of the rise of modern Islam emerged in this era, not only from the Middle East. Rather, the pan Islamism movement in Pakistan, Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and so on contributed to the development of the movement.⁴⁹ The position of Muslims who are always marginalized triggers a series of efforts to present Islamization models in various fields, such as the establishment of Islamic education institutions, Islamic banking that has begun to grow, social institutions established for the benefit of Muslims. Then, in terms of religious performance, there was a shift in religious orientation which was initially pragmatic to be more religious. Not only do rituals that are right, but patterns of indoctrination become daily practices.

Actualization of *Shar'i* values was proclaimed as a solution to overcome the inability of the state to accommodate the developing situation of the 70s, the presence of

⁴⁶ M.Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS: dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen* (Yogyakarta:LKiS,2008).

⁴⁷ Gregory Starret, "The Varieties of Secular Experience", *Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History*, 3, 52, 2010, p.626-651.

⁴⁸ Riaz Hassan, "On Being Religious : Pattern of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies", *The Muslim World*, 3, 2007,p. 437-478.

⁴⁹ Howard M. Federspiel, "Modernist Islam in Southeast Asia: A New Examination." *The Muslim World*, vol. 92, no. 3, 2002, p. 371-386.



campus propaganda became an alternative to madrasas and pesantren as government-supported religious formal education. In fact, the aspirations of Muslims at the practical level are always not well accommodated. Western domination which has always been the da'wah rhetoric promoted by activists has become a manifestation of public piety driven through campus.⁵⁰

The usrah that have been formed are then directed to explore the training that has been previously designed, such as the Da'wah Mujahid Training, which is carried out in Islamic Mentoring and Integrated Islamic Studies. Such models were adopted from training initiated by the Ikwanul Muslimin and Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami which was represented by the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII). At the same time, the government was suspicious of such preaching. At the end of the 70s, the New Order carried out the Normalization of Campus Life (NKK), which was due to government concerns in dealing with the religious fundamentalism movement carried out by students at that time.⁵¹

In the framework of the government, seeking a campus free from politics. According to Hefner, the religious fundamentalism movement can be seen as a modern Islamic narrative caused by social, economic and political dynamics in the structure of Indonesian society. The turmoil exists because Islam in Indonesia becomes the main vortex of "tension" which often has to deal with the interests of the state.⁵²

Campus Da'wah has been manifested as a method for finding adjustments to religious systems beliefs. Their militancy is formed as a moral force in the fight against

unrighteousness, and injustice. Religion is the only ideology that can move quietly, without losing its essence. Idealism as an agent of change is institutionalized in a movement that is able to fight without having to confront directly. Even so, the government sees it as a conservative movement that can at times endanger the country's sovereignty.⁵³

Modern society cosmopolitanism sometimes accompanies religious interests as a foundation for democratization in the global era. At the time the West became a dialectic reference between compromises to create peace and humanitarian values.⁵⁴ On the other hand, Western hegemony always creates concern in Muslim regions in various parts of the world. Nevertheless, the West reasoned to create an expansion of civilization that was able to bridge the interests of various groups.⁵⁵ The existence of secularization provides an argument for reacting reactively to situations that are considered to sow fear. Therefore fundamentalism was brought to liberate Western idealism from the dark side of Muslim society. As a result, religion has become a neglected value in the worldview, even educated groups are following this flow. Academic knowledge is used to see the possibilities of friction between religion and the interests of the state, the identity and legitimacy of power is an excuse to marginalize religious aspirations in the public sphere.⁵⁶

Religious doctrine is used as an excuse by some individuals and groups in showing piety in expressing the observance of shar'i values. Islam becomes a public symbol and political aspirations voiced by certain groups.

⁵³ Asef Bayat (et.al), *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North* (US:Oxford University Press,2010),p. 28-31.

⁵⁴ Atreyee Gupta, "Cosmopolitan Modernism and a Politics of the Self in Muslim South Asia." *Art Journal*, vol. 71, no. 3, 2012, p. 117-119.

⁵⁵ Saul Tobias, "Pragmatic Pluralism: Arendt, Cosmopolitanism, and Religion." *Sophia*, vol. 50, no. 1, 2011, p. 73-89.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Thomas B.Pepinsky, *Piety...*p. 62-67.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Robert W.Hefner, *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization* (US: Princeton University Press,2004).



At a certain point, the voicing group consists of educated people, they will fight for the idealism that has been shackled in the perspective of an authoritarian regime.⁵⁷

Often power becomes a tool to achieve certain interests. The creation of framing in the community was carried out to give the impression that the regime was making efforts to refresh the instability of the situation. The existence of pros and cons in the community is utilized along with the Islamic dynamics trapped in the scriptural and non-scriptural groups. Transnationalism issues are deliberately led by parties who do not like developing domestic interests, here the role of educated people is that most of the students contribute critical ideas for the progress of the country according to their perspective.⁵⁸ They saw that the occurrence of modern imperialism carried out by the interests of the regime, religious understanding across from power would be suppressed.⁵⁹

The process of modernization of Islam which has actually taken place from the 19th century has changed the relationship between Islam and the West. Moreover, Indonesia as the majority of Islam in the world has an important position in global relations, the anxiety of some Islamic groups that are not accommodated in their interests is a problem that often occurs. They speak of the Shari'a and the state must be united in the same portion, which is what raises Islamization in various fields. Western ideologies that are thick with capitalism and secularization are always used as reasons that weaken the authoritarian of Islam.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam...*

⁵⁸ Inaya Rakhmani, *Mainstreaming Islam in Indonesia: Television, Identity, and the Middle Class* (US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 24-29.

⁵⁹ Mona Abaza, "More on the Shifting Worlds of Islam. the Middle East and Southeast Asia: A Troubled Relationship?" *The Muslim World*, vol. 97, no. 3, 2007, p. 419-436.

⁶⁰ Edward Aspinall, "The Surprising Democratic Behemoth: Indonesia in Comparative Asian

Islam is expected to appear in the public space in a different way, he is expected to dynamize in various fields. So in fact, Islamism is an ideology that is processed to display Islamic revivalism in the international world which was initiated by classical and contemporary Islamic figures, such as Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1228) and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-1787). Indeed, when Islam is only seen partially, it is only as a rite that it does not arrive at institutionalized teachings in daily life. So that these figures look to do 'restoration' of past glory. So revivalism and puritanism are the only way that must be done to rival Western modernity.⁶¹

The issues of contemporary Islamism that spread to Indonesia were largely inspired by Egyptian reformist ideas and discourses such as Jamaludin Al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1859-1905) and Rasid Ridha (1865-1935). These figures are influenced by the social and political conditions in their country, their ideas are endeavored to support modernity (modernizing Islam). On the other hand, Islam becomes the umbrella of modernity (Islamising modernity).⁶² According to Rippin, that Islamist movements aim at a comprehensive reform of the political, economic and social world in the country. Therefore, the style of the Islamism movement is giving birth to belief in Islam as a foundation for all aspects of life that are private to the public sphere.⁶³

Another thing that deserves attention is the conception of Jihad. The thing that should

Perspective." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 74, no. 4, 2015, pp. 889-902.

⁶¹ Mandaville. *Global Political Islam* (London: Routledge, 2007)

⁶² Roxanne L. Euben. "Premodern, Antimodern, Or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity." *The Review of Politics*, vol. 59, no. 3, 1997, p. 429-459.

⁶³ Rippin. *Muslim: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London: Routledge, 2005); Edward Schatz. "Islamism and Anti-Americanism in Central Asia." *Current History*, vol. 101, no. 657, 10, 2002.



not be forgotten is the emergence and development of the conception of jihad which has changed meaning for years. Jihad, which began in earnest efforts in mobilizing energy, thought and wealth for "Islamic awakening" through da'wah, turned out to be more artificial and physical.⁶⁴ Jihad is not understood to be no different from gun violence. This is a transformation of the meaning of jihad that is now often occurring among Islamic societies, especially Wahhabi followers or Wahhabism, which is identical with neo-fundamentalism or neo-salafi. The early Wahabis interpreted jihad as a struggle to uphold monotheism, but later jihad was an uncompromising global resistance movement, with anyone who was ideologically different. Abdul Wahab appreciated Jews and Christians, while Osamah bin Laden had no compromise, did not cooperate and did not dialogue. What exists is a war against Jews, Christians and the West globally.⁶⁵

Such a conception of jihad seems to continue to grow in Indonesia today, that jihad is synonymous with violence, such as placing bombs in public places, harming people of different faiths and ideologies and other terrorists. That is what Fazlur Rahman criticized as a narrow salafi form, not a salafi who took the spirit like Ibn Taymiyah or Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. Al-Gazali states that human actions are not *zahir*, appearing as good (jihad), but there are actions that are inward. This is truly the most important part in faith in God. Therefore, our task is not only to carry out the fiqh, in theology (the science of kalam) or in rationality and inwardness alone. But

everything is in Sufism. Sufism is one of the opening ways to truth.⁶⁶

The space for the movement of Islamic organizations in the New Order era was limited, especially with the direction of Suharto's depoliticization of Muslims so intensively. The author would like to emphasize the influence of transnational Islamic organizations such as Hizbut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood, which in fact the two mass organizations had a tremendous influence when the New Order came to power.⁶⁷ The mass organization is a new Islamic movement which has always been accused of the New Order as an unconstitutional movement that has become the enemy of the government, therefore such organizations must be fought because it is not in line with government policy.⁶⁸

Another thing that Islamic students do to respond to the repressive New Order policy is by cadre among themselves. There are those who call it LKD (da'wah cadre training), LMD (training in da'wah mujahid) and SII (intensive Islamic studies). This was solely carried out as a step to strengthen the position of the campus da'wah movement in negotiating with the political atmosphere at that time.⁶⁹

The 1980s were an important part of the development of Islam in Indonesia. In the 1980s, on non-Islamic-based campuses such as the Institute of Technology (ITB), Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), University of Indonesia (UI) and Brawijaya University developed campus study groups, often referred to as the Campus Da'wah Movement ,

⁶⁴ Mahmood Mamdani, "Whither Political Islam?; the War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 1, Jan, 2005, p. 148.

⁶⁵ William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 55, no. 3, 1996, p. 613-634.

⁶⁶ van der Vyver. "Religious Fundamentalism and Human Rights." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 1, 1996, p. 21.

⁶⁷ Richard C. Martin, "Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 61, no. 2, 2002, p. 774-776.

⁶⁸ Julia D.Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 60, no. 3, 2001, p. 701-729.

⁶⁹ M. Imdadun Rahmat. *Ideologi...*,p.10-12.



congregation of *musholla*, *usrab*, *tarbiyah* and *halaqah* groups.⁷⁰

The Islamic movement groups of the Campus have at least characteristics, extending the beard (which is considered part of the *sunnah* of the Prophet), extending the veil, which previously used the headscarf was only identical to *krudung* (Mbak Tutut veil / Ibu Shinta Abdurrahman Wahid), later developed into the headscarf of Astri Ivo, Inneke KoesHerawati, Desy Ratnasari, Ratih Sanggarwati, even before the hijab and *veil* Krisdayanti for the female campus recitation group. As for the male group, in addition to lengthening the beard, blackening the forehead, and calling it "ana" and "antum". These two vocabulary words are almost always used by campus study groups so that they differ from other groups of worshipers. Some even call it the call of the brothers and sisters, identification of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The emergence of the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia cannot be separated from the campus da'wah movement. Two important things that can be used as a foothold in identifying the birth of the campus da'wah movement, are *First*, with regard to the emergence of high-spirited young groups studying and practicing Islam in response to the New Order's political pressure on Muslims. *Secondly*, the existence of a relatively spacious public space, such as a mosque or campus mosque, as an ideal place for young Muslims.⁷¹

The rise of campus preaching is caused by; first is an increasingly deep religious awareness of students; second, there was a kind of identity crisis among students and students who were to overcome the crisis, so

returning to Islam was the solution, and; third, the da'wah activists are convinced that in order to deal with problems in the future, it is Islam that can answer them.⁷²

The phenomenon of campus proselytizing is a piety representation in public sphere, this is interpreted as a commitment to carry out all religious recommendations such as five daily prayers, deepening the science of religion, behaving Islamically.⁷³ This process requires interiorization that focuses on self-discipline, which according to their assumption campus propaganda can protect from the influence of western modernity.⁷⁴

In addition, the practices of campus proselytizing as stated by Benjamin F. Soares (2004) relate to public piety who seek to negotiate with state policies that are not in line with the idealism of the activists. Because campus da'wah activities try to make their own regulations which have an impact on the social and political structures that make the government's suspicion even higher. The activists want the enactment of 'piety' or 'Islamic' values in the community and even want to control and discipline the community regarding the regime's attitudes and behavior. Islam has been used as ideological tools to fight colonialism and strengthen the 'religious' character of the state.⁷⁵

So this is the background of the emergence of various campus da'wah in Indonesia. Each of them has a religious experience that is different from one another, according to Baran (2014) that as lived-religion is the actual experience of an institutionalized

⁷⁰ Edward Aspinall, "The Irony Of Success." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2010, p. 20-34.

⁷¹ Burhanuddin Muhtadi. *Dilema PKS: Suara dan Syariah* (Jakarta:gramedia, 2012),p.204; also see Scott B. MacDonald, and Jonathan Lemco. "Political Islam in Southeast Asia." *Current History*, vol. 101, no. 658, 11, 2002, p. 388-392.

⁷² Kikue Hamayotsu. "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia." *Asian Survey*, vol. 51, no. 5, 2011, p. 971-992.

⁷³ Saiful Mujani, and William Liddle. "Muslim Indonesia's Secular Democracy." *Asian Survey*, vol. 49, no. 4, 2009, p. 575-590.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Elizabeth Fuller, "Islam and the Habits of Democracy: Islamic Organizations In Post-New Order." *Indonesia*, no. 78, 2004, p. 93-120.



religious person. Everyone has their own religious practices according to their social and political conditions. So that with a different experience will transform the identity of spirituality through the realization of piety and religious discipline in daily life.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The emergence of the campus da'wah movement is a means of non-confrontational actualization to foster more intense religious awareness on campus or university. On the other hand, this reflects the "resistance" of young people to authoritarianism towards the freedom to practice diversity on campus. In various campuses, this missionary movement spread, with limited recitation models which were only attended by students who wanted to increase their knowledge of Islam.

A new model of the movement which turned out to have received a great response especially among students. This approach then also attracts many parties in channeling disillusionment with the government more constructively. Logically, the government cannot be resisted by violence but must be influenced through gradual propagation. This is where the Tarbiyah Movement model emerged which became one of the new alternatives between the freezing facilities and activities of various Islamic movements and organizations that existed at that time.

Intellectuality and idealism are the main strengths of movements that arise on campus. Islamic movements that appear on campus, are generally represented through Islamic religious institutions engaged in da'wah. This institution is often referred to as campus propaganda institutions. Campus da'wah institutions try to create a self-coaching that harmonizes Islamic intellectuality and idealism. In general, it can be

said that the purpose of the establishment of a da'wah institution on campus is as a place of coaching for students, so that in addition to being mature in terms of intellectuality, it is also solid in terms of faith and devotion to Allah SWT.

Observing the failure to build a religious situation recognized by the government, a group of people gave birth to a new model as an effort to solve the problems of Muslims with a more structured pattern. A group of people are mostly alumni of several Islamic Higher Education Institutions in the Middle East. They founded the Tarbiyah movement which was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt which also spread to the Arabian peninsula.

The persistence of the Tarbiyah Movement between the crush and political pressure that was so strong in the long period made some people suspect the movement's relationship with the ruling regime (including intelligence). This is possible, but in fact the concept of the Tarbiyah model of da'wah that is non-confrontational and far from these political issues is more protecting and distancing them from the oppressive hands of the government.

The Tarbiyah movement undertook a strategy of withdrawing from the political frenzy and replacing it with Islamic studies that focused on deepening the practical teachings of Islam which were becoming increasingly popular among students on campuses. The energy that was once spent fighting and blaspheming the government began to be directed to explore Islam. Such conditions occur almost evenly in various state campuses in Indonesia.

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⁷⁶ Zeyno Baran . *Hisbut Tabrir: Islam's Political Insurgency* (Washington: The Nixon Center, 2004) ; Also, Dyna Rochmyaningsih, "Focus on Political Islamic Groups to Boost Science." *Nature*, vol. 518, no. 7540, 2015, p. 457.



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