

REVIVALISM AND EXEGETICAL RECEPTION OF *ĀYĀT AT-TAḤKĪM* IN ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION

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Abstract

This research aims to determine whether or not revivalism ideology exists among academics in Islamic higher education institutes in the province of Southeast Sulawesi. It is accomplished through the use of an exegetical reception approach of their understanding of the *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* (Qur'an chapter *al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47). Data was gathered by combining survey technique development with in-depth interviews. The collected data was analyzed using a philosophical and phenomenological hermeneutic approach to assess the academic community's understanding of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*. According to the survey results, *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* is very popular among academics higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi. Most of the academic community's information comes from religious studies on social media. They acknowledge and accept these verses as the foundation for the legitimacy of *kaḥffah* enforcement of Islamic law as the foundation for Indonesia's political system. Meanwhile, the interviews show that most informants label those who disagree with the discourse with theological labels (*kaḥffir* and *thaḥgūt*). As a result, even though these characteristics have not reached an extreme level, their comprehension is included in the revivalism ideology's characteristics.

Keywords: *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*; Exegetical Reception; Islamic Higher Education; Revivalism.

Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menakar eksistensi karakteristik ideologi revivalisme di kalangan sivitas akademika, khususnya di perguruan tinggi yang berada di wilayah provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara, Indonesia. Ini dilakukan dengan menerapkan pendekatan resepsi eksegesis atas pemahaman mereka terhadap *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* (Q. *al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47). Data penelitian ini dikumpulkan melalui elaborasi antara teknik survey dan wawancara mendalam secara bersamaan. Data yang diperoleh kemudian dianalisis menggunakan pendekatan hermeneutika filosofis dan fenomenologis guna menakar pemahaman sivitas akademika terhadap *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*. Hasil survey membuktikan bahwa *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* cukup populer bagi kalangan sivitas akademika di Sulawesi Tenggara. Informasi tentangnya mayoritas diakses oleh sivitas akademika dari kajian-kajian keagamaan di media sosial. Mereka mengenal dan memahami ayat-ayat itu sebagai basis legitimasi wajibnya penegakan syariat Islam secara *kaḥffah* sebagai basis sistem politik pemerintahan di Indonesia. Sedangkan hasil wawancara membuktikan bahwa mayoritas informan menggunakan label-label teologis (*kaḥffir* dan *thaḥgūt*) terhadap orang-orang yang menolak wacana tersebut. Meskipun pemahaman mereka dapat dikategorikan mengandung karakteristik ideologi revivalisme, tetapi belum termasuk level yang ekstrem, sehingga masih berpeluang bagi mereka untuk mendapatkan pembinaan.

Kata Kunci: *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*; Resepsi Eksegesis; Perguruan Tinggi Islam; Revivalisme.

Background

The revivalist worldview has gained in popularity in numerous regions of the world during the last two decades, particularly in Southeast Asia.¹

According to Agus Wendi, M. Nurdin Zuhdi, and Ruth Soulé Arnon's research, its tremendous expansion occurred during the learning process in

¹ Vincent J H Houben, "Southeast Asia and Islam," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 588.1 (2003): 149–170. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716203588001010>>.

higher education institute, both formally and informally.² This ideological doctrine is mainly aimed at teenagers among students in higher education. According to Syamsul Rijal, teenagers have the potential to become the major target because they are in a transition time to develop an identity to communicate their dissatisfaction with worldly concerns. The doctrine gives educated young people (students) the impression that they have found their identity in religious people.³ According to John L Esposito and John Obert Voll, proponents of this ideology's fundamental aim was to establish the "*Khilāfah 'alā minhāj an-nubuwah*" system as the state's political principle.⁴ They claim that the agenda is manifested in the interpretation of the Q. *al-Mā'idah* [5]: 44-47 (*Āyāt at-Tabkīm*) as legitimacy for Muslims in enforcing Islamic law in Indonesia, known as *kauffah*.⁵ In fact, information found in the interpretation literature indicates that the historical context of these words' revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*) is not definite to the Muslim community but to specific groups of the *Ahl al-Kitāb* community in Medina.⁶

Previous research has found that the seeds of revivalist ideology are sprouting and spreading in the Islamic higher education, mainly through knowledge transmission in Islamic higher

education. Abdul Wahab's assessment, the basis of revivalism's expansion in Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi is student interactions with diverse networks of religious organizations that adhere to radicalism based on the revivalist philosophy.⁷ Furthermore, Ambar Sri Lestari stated that students in Southeast Sulawesi have access to the concept of revivalism through religious material on internet-based social media, as well as through communication contacts and engagement.⁸ Arifuddin and Andy Hadiyanto et al. also discovered that the phenomena of revivalism spreading in Indonesia occurred following the transformation of IAIN to UIN. This shift means that public school graduates who lack significant religious knowledge competency can enter religious universities. Because they lack basic theological knowledge, they are more easily indoctrinated by puritanism and revivalism.⁹ Although the findings of these studies have explored the distribution of the development and influence of revivalism through Islamic institutions, none of them have looked at the relationship between revivalism and the reception of exegesis toward *Āyāt at-Tabkīm* among academics, particularly in the context of Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi.

² Agus Wedi, "Remoderasi Islam Melalui Re-Interpretasi Al-Quran," *Shabih: Journal of Islamicate Multidisciplinary* 5, no. 2 (2020): 58–76. See, Ruth Soulé Arnon, "Muslim Revivalism and Higher Education," *History of Education Quarterly* 22.4 (1982): 461–478. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2152362>>. See, M. Nurdin Zuhdi, "Kritik Terhadap Pemikiran Gerakan Keagamaan Kaum Revivalisme Islam di Indonesia," *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 16.2 (2011): 171–192. <<https://e-journal.metrouniv.ac.id/index.php/akademika/article/view/174>>.

³ Syamsul Rijal, "Indoctrinating Muslim Youths: Seeking Certainty Through An-Nabhanism," *Al-Jami'ab: Journal of Islamic Studies* 49, no. 2 (2011): 253–280. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2011.492.253-280>>.

⁴ John L Esposito and John Obert Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2001), p. 39.

⁵ M. Nurdin Zuhdi, "Kritik Terhadap Penafsiran Al-Qur'an Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 18.2 (2013): 1–25. <<https://e-journal.metrouniv.ac.id/index.php/akademika/article/download/397/445>>

⁶ Muḥammad bin Jarīr ath-Thabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān fī Ta'wīl Ayyi al-Qur'an*, (Beirut: Mu'assasah ar-Risālāh, 2000), vol. 10, pp. 346-358.

⁷ Laode Abdul Wahab, "Metamorfosa Radikalisme Pada Lembaga Pendidikan Di Sulawesi Tenggara," *Shautut Tarbiyah* 22.1 (2016): 69–90. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.31332/str.v22i2.492>>.

⁸ Ambar Sri Lestari and Shabrur Rijal Hamka, "Penggunaan dan Pemanfaatan Cyberspace Dalam Gerakan Pemikiran Hizbut Tahrir," *Al-Izzah: Jurnal Hasil-basil Penelitian* 13.1 (2018): 16–33. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.31332/ai.v13i1.829>>.

⁹ Andy Hadiyanto, Dewi Anggraeni, and Rizki Mutia Ningrum, "Deradikalisasi Keagamaan: Studi Kasus Lembaga Dakwah Kampus Universitas Negeri Jakarta," *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam Rabbani* 1.1 (2017): 1–20. See, Arifuddin Arifuddin, "Pandangan dan Pengalaman Dosen UIN Alauddin Makassar Dalam Upaya Mengantisipasi Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Kalangan Mahasiswa," *Al-Ulum* 16.2 (2018): 435–454.

To fill up the gaps, this study aims to determine the relationship between the acceptance of understanding (reception exegesis) on *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm* and the characteristics of revivalist ideology among academics Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi. This phenomenon is investigated by asking three main questions: (1) How is the academic community of Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi perceiving the content and context of the *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm*? (2) How is the relationship between the exegetical reception of *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm* by the academic community of Islamic higher education in Southeast Sulawesi and the characteristics of the ideology of revivalism? (3) What impact does revivalism ideology have on society, religion, and the state?

This study is significant because Islamic higher education institutes serves as a bulwark for the state's defense against all forms of religious propaganda based on revivalist and radical ideologies.¹⁰ This study can help the leaders of Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi update their learning programmes to include religious moderation, especially when studying and interpreting the Qur'an.

This research employs a qualitative approach. The research is only limited to describing the data, with no objectification.¹¹ It is important to note that the purpose of this research is not to prove whether or not the academic community's understanding of four Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi is correct. Furthermore, this research is concerned with the quality or *authoritative knowledge* rather than the quantity of information.¹² As a result, while the data presented is in percentage form, the ultimate goal of

this study is to uncover socio-religious phenomena.¹³

This study's primary data source is a collection of survey responses from respondents and in-depth interviews with informants. In this study, survey data are referred to as randomly chosen respondents, while interview data are referred to as informants chosen based on the criteria for their survey responses. Respondents and informants are the same material object in this study. They are made up of academics from four Islamic higher education institutes or universities in Southeast Sulawesi that have a curriculum base for Qur'anic studies: the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Kendari, the Universitas Muhammadiyah Kendari (UMK), the Universitas Muhammadiyah Buton (UMB) in Bau-bau, and the Institut Agama Islam (IAI) Al-Mawaddah Warrahmah in Kolaka. The four Islamic higher education institutes were chosen because the researchers thought they deserved to be evaluated as the most influential higher education institutions in Southeast Sulawesi regarding religious learning. The academic community referred to in this study is the academic community comprised of lecturers and students. There were 58 people in the total sample of data from the academic community referred to in this study. There are 9 teachers and 49 students. Furthermore, this study uses secondary data, a collection of supporting information obtained from bibliographic data or literature related to this study. These works can be accessed via offline data (printed books) or online (journal articles and news based on website services). As a

¹⁰Zulfani Sesmiarni, "Membendung Radikalisme dalam Dunia Pendidikan Melalui Pendekatan Brain Based Learning," *Kalam* 9.2 (2015): 233–252. <<https://doi.org/10.24042/klm.v9i2.330>>

¹¹Thomas Groenewald, "A Phenomenological Research Design Illustrated," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 3.1 (2004): 42–55. <<https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690400300104>>

¹²M.L. Smith, "Publishing Qualitative Research," *American Educational Research Journal* 24.2 (1987): 173–183. <<https://doi.org/10.3102/00028312024002173>>

¹³Musab A. Oun and Christian Bach, "Qualitative Research Method Summary," *Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering and Science and Technology* 1.5 (2014): 252–258. <<http://www.jmest.org/wp-content/uploads/JMESTN42350250.pdf>>

result, field studies and literature are combined concurrently.

This study uses survey and interview methods to collect data. Both were done simultaneously to get good data from respondents' and informants' responses.¹⁴ While the survey was conducted in a multiple-choice answer format. Not only is multiple choice closed, but it is also open. In other words, the researcher provides answer options and allows respondents to enter answers that aren't available in a multiple-choice format. The survey was created using the Google Forms service, and each respondent received a copy.¹⁵ In-depth interview techniques were used to follow up on the responses to the survey questions. From August 2019 to July 2021, two years were used to implement the two data collection techniques.

This study employs an exegetical reception analysis to describe the acceptance of *Q. al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47 (*Ayāt at-Taḥkīm*) by informants and respondents based on their interpretations. It is accomplished by tracking textual and contextual comprehension based on survey responses and interviews. This understanding relationship is evaluated using three indicators: first, the consistency of responses to the three categories of questions posed to respondents; second, the respondents' knowledge employed to answer the first category of questions; and third, the orientation of their responses. The ultimate objective of this investigation is to determine whether or not their understanding of *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm* is influenced by revivalist ideology.

The Revivalism Ideology: a Theoretical

Various definitions of revivalism can be seen from the perspectives of Muslim scholars (insiders) and non-Muslims (outsiders). There are at least three classifications of general definitions that can be described here. First, revivalism is an ideology aimed at reforming societal socio-cultural norms;¹⁶ Second, revivalism is an ideology oriented toward a revolutionary movement of a political order system based on certain religious dogmas.¹⁷ They are unconcerned about the process of realizing it, whether through authoritarian or democratic means;¹⁸ Third, revivalism as an ideology that tends to legalize the dogma of violence to realize the establishment of a state based on certain religious beliefs.¹⁹

Scholars' perspectives on the long history of the emergence of the term revivalism cannot be separated from the diversity of these definitions. The emergence of Salafist groups, which advocate for the purification of the faith from all forms of local cultural assimilation in every non-Arab tradition, has influenced those who define it as a movement to purify Islamic teachings. According to Choueiri, this category is identical to the Salafī Wahhābi group founded by Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792) in Saudi Arabia. In this category, "revivalism" refers to the purification of faith from all local cultural assimilation practices; second, expressing *ijtihad* and rejecting *taqlid*; and third, necessitating *hijrah* or migration from *Dār al-Kufr* or non-Muslim majority areas to *Dār as-Salām* or Muslim majority areas. Fourth, as a *mujadid* or reformer, follow a just leader. Those

¹⁴ Edith D. de Leeuw, "Mixed-Mode Surveys and the Internet," *Survey Practice* 3.6 (2010): 1–5. <<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.674.9927&rep=rep1&type=pdf>>

¹⁵ Gi Woong Yun and Craig W. Trumbo, "Comparative Response to A Survey Executed by Post, E-Mail, & Web Form," *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 6.1 (2000): 6–13. <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2000.tb00112.x>>

¹⁶ Ahmad F. Yousif, "Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: An Islamic Response to Non-Muslim Concerns,"

American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21.4 (2004): 30–56. <<https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i4.512>>

¹⁷ Ahmad F. Yousif, "Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia:...."

¹⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism," *Political Science Quarterly* 110.2 (1995): 261–285. <<https://doi.org/10.2307/2152362>>

¹⁹ Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, (London: Palgrave, 2017), pp. 378-381.

define it as a revolutionary political movement inspired by the emergence of dakwah activists with a political genre or as “fundamentalism”.²⁰ According to Dekmejian, the Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, Hizbut Tahrir in Syria, Syia in Iran, Jama’at Islam in Afghanistan, and other groups that share their vision and mission founded this organization. These organizations have a mission and vision to change the world’s political system. Through the political propaganda of the *khilāfab ‘alā minhaj an-nubuwwah*, they are attempting to reclaim the Islamic State’s sovereignty from the European colonial movement.²¹

Outside researchers (non-Muslim) have also linked revivalism to the concepts of “radicalism, extremism, and terrorism.” They appear to be motivated by transnational Jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine, Hizbullah in Lebanon, and other organizations that share their ideology. This group is thought to be attempting to combine Salafism and Puritanism. As a result, this movement is known as Neo-Revivalism, Neo-Salafism, or Neo-Fundamentalism, and it emerged in the modern era.²² Despite their differences, these organizations are united by a common goal: to carry out a revolutionary movement against the global political system through jihad propaganda in the form of war.²³ They believe the plan will restore a country with

a predominantly Muslim population as a sovereign state capable of enforcing Islamic law. As a result, jihad or holy war discourse is the only way for them to carry out this mission.²⁴ The apocalyptic dogma, also known as *mabdism* and *messianism*, embodies the holy war.²⁵

Āyāt at-Taḥkīm Interpretation In Tafsir Literature’s

Muslim scholars associate the term *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* with Q. *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47 based on the events that led to the formation of the Khawārij sect.²⁶ This organization was formed in the context of the conflict between the troops of ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭālib and Mu‘āwiyah bin Abī Sufyān during the war of *Ṣiffīn* (37 H/657 M).²⁷ Mu‘āwiyah bin Abī Sufyān proposed arbitration or *taḥkīm* (peace offer) at the time, according to Abū al-Fataḥ Asy-Syahrastānī, by elevating the Qur’anic manuscripts as a symbol. Although ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭālib initially denied the offer because he suspected the opponent’s political ploy, he eventually accepted it due to persuasion from some of his warriors. At the same time, several of the other ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭālib warriors, the most of whom were teens, disapproved of the choice. Accepting takm, they claim, is equivalent to making peace with the bugt (rebels) who should be punished. As a result, they declare that they both break Allah’s command, and hence they ought to be claimed as *kaḥfīr* and *thāgūt*.²⁸ This is why they left

²⁰ Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boston: Massachusetts: Twayne Publishers, 1990). pp. 21-24.

²¹ R. Hrair Dekmejian, “Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences,” in *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 12.

²² John Obert Voll, *Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, Second Edi. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994), p. 53.

²³ A. N. Celso, “The ‘Caliphate’ in the Digital Age: The Islamic State’s Challenge to the Global Liberal Order,” *International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies* 10.1 (2015): 1–26. <<http://doi.org/10.18848/2324-755X/CGP>>

²⁴ Michael Chandler and Rohan Gunaratna, *Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence?* (London: Reaktion Books, 2007), p. 16.

²⁵ Jan Christoffer Andersen and Sveinung Sandberg, “Islamic State Propaganda: Between Social Movement Framing and Subcultural Provocation,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32.7 (2020): 1506–1526. <<https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1484356>>

²⁶ Zamroni Zamroni, “Konsep Kafir Menurut Khawarij” Diss, (IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 1999). <<http://digilib.uinsby.ac.id/16973/>>.

²⁷ ‘Amir An-Najar, *Fī Maḥālib al-Islāmiyyin* (Cairo: Al-Hai’ah al-Miṣriyyah al-‘Ammah li al-Kitāb, 2005), p. 66.

²⁸ Abū al-Fataḥ Asy-Syahrastānī, *Al-Milāl wa an-Nihāl*, ed. Amir ‘Alī Mahna and ‘Alī Ḥasan Fa’ur (Beirut: Dār al-Ma’rifah, 1993), vol. 1, p. 132.

(rebelled) against ‘Alī bin Abī Ṭalīb army, also known as the Khawārij in Islamic theology.²⁹

When we investigate the interpretation of Q. *al-Mā’idah* [5]:44-47 or *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm*, we see that the *Mufasssīr* (commentators) contend that *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm* revealed in the debate between Jews and Muslims in Medina. A group of Jews confirmed to the Prophet the legality of adultery in Islamic teachings to compare it to the teachings they believed in at the time. Ibn Katsīr stated this information in *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm*, quoting ‘Abdullāh Ibn ‘Umar’s history. He related how once the Jews came to the Prophet to report their adultery. They hope the Prophet can act as a mediator (*ḥakīm*) in this matter. They claimed that the Torah does not contain a provision for stoning for adultery, only for *jald* or flogging. In response, ‘Abdullāh bin Salām (one of the Jewish leaders who converted to Islam) rejected the Jewish group’s claims about the absence of stoning in their holy book. According to him, the Torah had previously established the penalty of stoning for adulterers. He also challenged the Jewish group to bring the Torah to prove his point. One of them covered the stoning verse with his hand when submitting the book. But when ‘Abdullāh bin Salām ordered him to raise the person’s hand, the verse about the punishment of stoning that they had purposefully concealed appeared.³⁰

This study discovers a dialectic of interpretation about *asbāb an-nuzūl* of *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm* in the tafsīr literature and the information on it in the exegesis literature. Beginning with al-Mawardī in his work *Tafsīr al-Mawardī*, cites three opinions on the meaning content of the phrase “*Hum al-kāfirūn...hum aẓ-ẓālimūn...hum al-fāsiqūn*” According to the first point of view, the expression is only used by Jews in Medina and not by Muslims. This viewpoint is based on narrations by

Ibn Mas‘ūd, Huẓaifah, ‘Ikrimah, and al-Barā’. According to the second opinion, the expression was explicitly derived in the context of Jews, but its legal application is widely accepted. This viewpoint is based on al-Ḥasan dan Ibrāhīm’s narrations. According to the third viewpoint, the expression “*hum al-kāfirūn*” is intended for Muslims, “*hum aẓ-ẓālimūn*” for Jews, and “*hum al-fāsiqūn*” for Christians. This viewpoint is taken from asy-Syaḥbī’s narration. According to the fourth opinion, those who do not judge according to Allah’s law because they deny it are disbelievers, whereas those who ignore the stipulation of Allah’s law are *ẓālim* and *fāsiq*. This viewpoint is taken from the narration of ‘Abdullāh Ibn ‘Abbās.³¹ Fakhruddīn ar-Rāzī in *Mafātīḥ al-Gaib* agrees with ‘Ikrimah’s point of view. He stated that anyone who defies Allah’s law with his heart and tongue after being allowed to apply Allah’s law but chooses to ignore it explicitly is a disbeliever, meaning they have abandoned Allah’s religion.³²

It contrasts with the revivalists, who take these verses to their extreme conclusion. One example of their interpretation is the *Buletin Dakwah Kaffah*, a da’wah bulletin published by the HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) group. In edition 129, the author uses a fragment of the *al-Mā’idah* [5:44] “...*Wa man lam yaḥkum bi-mā anẓal Allāh fa-‘ulā’ik hum al-kāfirūn*” as the legitimacy of the obligation to apply God’s law or Islamic syaria in a *kaffah* (all-encompassing) manner above human-made constitutional law. One of the most important aspects of this implementation is enforcing the *Khilāfah ‘alā minḥaj an-nubuwwah* on the government’s political system. Although they explicitly disagree with the Khawārij’s interpretation of the term *kāfir* as *kafir* in the context of *‘aqīdah*, they claim that this does not mean that man-made law (positive law) is permissible to use. They refuse to recognize the

²⁹ Abū Ḥasan al-Asy‘arī, *Maqālāt al-Islamiyyān wa al-Akḥḥā’ Al-Muṣallīn* (Beirut: Maktabah al-‘Asriyyah, 1990), vol. 1, p. 207. See, William Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1973), p. 15.

³⁰ Abū al-Fida’ Imāduddīn Ismā’īl bin ‘Umar Ibn Katsīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm*, ed. Sami bin

Muḥammad Salamah, (Riyadh: Dār Ṭaybah li al-Nasyr wa al-Tawzī’, 1999), vol. 3, p. 114.

³¹ Abī al-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Mawardī, *Tafsīr al-Mawardī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kubut al-‘Imiyah, 2010), vol. 2, p. 43.

³² Fakhruddīn ar-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-Gaib* (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ at-Turās al-‘Arabī, 2000), vol. 12, pp. 367-368.

President's legality as an *ulil 'amr* (religious-political leader) in the context of a state leader because after the Prophet died, the command to obey only the government system based on the instructions of the Qur'an and Sunnah, namely the *Khilāfah 'alā minhāj an-nubuwwah*.³³ To make it easier to understand the dynamics of the interpretation, the level of interpretation mapping is described in table 1

Table 1. Interpretation Level Mapping of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*

Interpretation Level of <i>Āyāt at-Taḥkīm</i>	
Moderate	<i>Āyāt at-Taḥkīm</i> is a rebuke to those who make the law but purposefully contradict sharia values. The terms <i>kāfir</i> , <i>zālim</i> , and <i>fāsiq</i> represent God's condemnation of the use of God's law to further the subjective interests of specific individuals or groups.
Extremis	Because <i>Āyāt at-Taḥkīm</i> is widely accepted, it is also intended for Muslims. Those who do not use Sharia law as state law may be considered infidels in the sense of abandoning Allah's religion (apostasy).
Liberal	Because <i>Āyāt at-Taḥkīm</i> is historical, it only has temporal application. As a result, as the context in which these verses were revealed indicates, the verse is specifically intended for the Jews and Christians in Medina, not for Muslims throughout the ages

Mapping the level of interpretation of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* in table 1 becomes the primary reference in this study to assess the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi's acceptance of the verse. Each respondent is objectified based on these parameters using this mapping. However, it is important to note that the objectification mentioned here is not intended to justify the truth or misunderstanding of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*. Instead, it is only identification or confirmation in placing their interpretive

positions into these levels of interpretation. This research has a foundation in determining whether it contains revivalism ideology's characteristics.

Exegetical Reception

Hans Robert Jauss (1921–1997) coined the term reception to describe an approach to understanding the meaning of a text.³⁴ Heidegger's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic theory heavily influenced his thinking about this approach. It began in 1966, or when the University of Constance was established, launching research based on an interdisciplinary paradigm. This influence is one factor that leads him to believe that there is no final word when it comes to comprehending the meaning of the text.³⁵ Jauss believes that the meaning of the text can be traced through the continuity of transmission and transformation of the historical reception of the text using the reception approach. Jauss divided reception theory into exegesis or hermeneutical receptions, aesthetic receptions, and functional or cultural receptions. The three explain how the reader interacts with the scripture text in various aspects ranging from comprehension, art, and culture.³⁶

The term reception refers to the act of accepting something. Initially, it was used in literary theory as a framework to emphasize the reader's role in shaping the formulation of a literary work's meaning. When a literary work interacts with its readers, its significance is revealed. The findings show that readers' responses to the text are not monolithic but rather reflect a range of perspectives reflected in the cultural practices surrounding them (*fusion of horizons*). Although the Qur'an is not identical to a literary text in this regard, it can also be a source of reception. It is due to structural similarities between literary works.

³³ Buletin Dakwah Kaffah, "Hukum Ilahi di Atas Konstitusi," *Buletin Dakwah Kaffah Edisi 129*, 2020, <<https://www.buletinkaffah.id/edisi-129-hukum-ilahi-di-atas-konstitusi>> {accessed 25 July 2020}

³⁴ H. R. Jauss and E. Benzinger, "Literary Aistory as A Challenge to Literary Theory," *New Literary History* 2.1 (1970): 7–37. <<https://doi.org/10.2307/468585>>

³⁵ R. T. Segers, H. R. Jauss, and T. Bahti, "An Interview with Hans Robert Jauss," *New Literary History* 11.1 (1979): 83–95. <<https://doi.org/10.2307/468872>>

³⁶ Anthony C. Thiselton, "Reception Theory, HR Jauss and The Formative Power of Scripture," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 65.3 (2012): 289–308. <<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930612000129>>

On the one hand, the Qur'an text is a language formulation with textual and historical meanings. Still, its readers also have a *fusion of horizon* or horizon around them that forms meaning outside of its literal meaning. It causes readers' interpretations of the Qur'an's text to differ depending on the socio-cultural context in which they find themselves.³⁷

The description demonstrates that researchers first used the reception concept to analyze literary works. Still, as it has grown, it has also been applied to the study of the Qur'an to describe how Muslims understand (perform) the revealed text. This idea became known as the "Living Qur'an" studies.³⁸ Ahmad Rafiq then divides reception concept into three categories. First, an exegetical reception or hermeneutical idea using for comprehending Muslims' many modes of acceptance of the Qur'an's text, both informatively and performatively. Second, the Qur'an's esthetical reception or acceptance in the form of works of art, both written (*calligraphy*) and recitation (*nagham*). Third, the practical form of receiving or accepting the Qur'an in the form of practice, such as writing on a wall or reciting aloud as a prayer.³⁹ In this research, only exegetical reception is used to assess the academic community of Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi's reception of *Ayāt at-Taḥkīm*.

Exegetical Reception on *Āyāt Taḥkīm*

According to the survey results, *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* (Q. *al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47) is a popular verse among academics in Southeast Sulawesi. Even though 96.5 % have read or heard the Indonesian translation and 80.7 % have read or heard the interpretation. An intriguing finding from the survey results is that the majority of respondents' sources of knowledge about *Āyāt*

at-Taḥkīm are obtained through access to religious studies on social media, accounting for up to 49 %, while learning in class accounts for 32 %, and sources other than the two accounts for only 19 %. It demonstrates that religious understanding information, particularly the explanation of such polemical verses, has not been adequately taught in the classroom.

According to respondents' textual understanding of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*, as many as 84 % believe these verses contain an obligation for every Muslim to enforce Islamic law in a *kaḥfah* manner, both in the context of religion, society, and state. Only about 11% understand that these verses do not indicate the meaning of the obligation but rather a suggestion for a better life. 5% have no idea what the legal position of the verse is. According to 40.3 % of respondents, there was command diction, which was explicitly mentioned in *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*. It is reflected in the fact that people who refuse to enforce Islamic law are classified as *kaḥfir*, *fāsiq*, and *ẓālim*. As many as 5.1 % of respondents believed it was not mandatory. They reasoned that the verses could only be partially understood in the legal context because they were complex. They would instead defer to the authority of religious figures or ulama.

Furthermore, the findings show that as many as 30% of respondents believe that people who oppose Islamic law enforcement can be punished as *thāgūt*, compared to 35% who judge not *thāgūt* and 35% who do not respond. It contrasts their attitude toward the label of *kaḥfir* towards this attitude. 51% of respondents said those who rejected the discourse were *kaḥfir*, 32% said they were not, and 17% said they didn't know. These findings

³⁷ Ahmad Rafiq, "The Reception of the Qur'an in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Place of the Qur'an in a Non-Arabic Speaking Community," *Dissertations and Theses*, 2014, pp. 144-147. <<https://scholarshare.temple.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.12613/3439/TETDEDXRafiq-temple-0225E-11898.pdf>>

³⁸ Ahmad Rafiq, *Living Qur'an: Teks, Praktik dan Idealitas dalam Performasi Al-Qur'an* (Bantul: Lembaga Ladang Kata, 2020).

³⁹ Rafiq, "The Reception of the Qur'an in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Place of the Qur'an in a Non-Arabic Speaking Community."

suggest that the labels *thāgūt* and *kāfir* have different implications for claims made by people who reject the discourse of applying Islamic law based on their interpretation of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*. For them, the label of *kāfir*, rather than *thāgūt*, is more appropriate for those who reject it. It can be seen explicitly in the findings of field interviews, where they state that:

“*al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47 deals with the legal context, which has ramifications for the status of a Muslim's creed. It is evident in the verses that directly mention the term *kāfir*. As a result, the *kāfir* status is more authentically used than the tagged *thāgūt* status” (Interview: SRL/20 years old/Student).

This oppositional attitude was not accompanied by a desire to take extreme measures. It is demonstrated by their attitude toward people who refuse to enforce Islamic law to continue preaching or who prefer to leave the matter to the government and ulama. According to the findings, 43.9 % of respondents chose to continue preaching and inviting Muslims to enforce Islamic law, while 42.1 % chose to leave the matter to the government and the ulama. Nonetheless, 3.5 % of respondents choose *jibadi* attitudes in the sense of fighting people who oppose the discourse of enforcing Islamic law. It implies that only a few have an extremist interpretation of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*. Aside from the data findings, it is also important to understand how respondents responded to the enforcement of Islamic law in the discourse on the political system used in Indonesia. As a result, the data description further explains this phenomenon within the scope of the academic community's reception of the exegesis in contextual understanding of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm*.

The survey findings show that 55.2 % of respondents chose the answer to the importance of applying Islamic law in Indonesia, while 39.7 % chose the answer as

unimportant, and only 5.8 % did not respond. According to these findings, most respondents value the discussion of Islamic law enforcement in Indonesia. Those who believe it is significant to point out that Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, so it is natural that the discourse is popular. This information can be gleaned from interview data derived from one of the lecturers' perceptions, which state:

“Because Indonesia has a Muslim majority, it is preferable that Islamic law be applied to protect all of their activities from disobedience. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, can adapt to Islamic law that does not contradict their beliefs and beliefs. If they disagree, they can apply positive law accepted by all religious adherents other than Muslims” (Interview: Jml/40 years old/lecturer).

Quotes from interviewees' responses show that the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi is more supportive of the discourse on enforcing Islamic law in religion, society, and the state in Indonesia. This discourse can also be seen in the wide range of comments obtained during the research via in-depth interviews. Here are some of their reactions to it:

“Gradually apply Islamic law to the *kehilafan* state” (Interview: MN/22 years/student);

“In my opinion, the best solution is to reaffirm Islamic Sharia law” (Interview: SO/20 years/student);

“My advice is to follow the way the Prophet Muhammad gave the provisions of his time because the best way is the way that the Prophet Muhammad exemplified.” (Interview: SN/23 years/student);

“In deciding cases, every legal product refers to and follows what is outlined in the Qur'an.” (Interview: MAZ/30 years/lecturer).

However, some informants responded moderately to the discourse. They even believe that the Indonesian political system is following

the values of Islamic teachings. It is clear from their various comments, which are as follows:

“Just follow what is already there because this system has also been approved by the scholars so that the Pancasila born and we just *Sami'nā wa atba'nā*” (Interview: MR/30 years/Lecturer);

“In my opinion, we must understand our situation in Indonesia, what is needed. Do not let because of their arrogance in applying Islamic law, some people are oppressed. If it's best to be together, then go for it, but keep looking for the best solution” (Interview: AJN/21 years/student);

“In this context, spiritually (*maqāshid*) Islamic law is justifying the good, forbidding the bad, and taking advantage to reject harm. In other words, we consider that this form of state is the best form for the Indonesian people because with this form of state, national unity and progress can be realized” (Interview: AR/33th/Lecturer);

“In the circle of *Mufassirīn* scholars of *Ablussunnah wal Jamā'ah*, the interpretation of *al-Mā'idah: 44* is very diverse. This means it will be a very disputed thing. Therefore, to maintain the integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, we must think moderately and accept each other's opinions” (Interview: MAZ/29th/Lecturer).

“The important thing is that it does not conflict with Indonesian culture and does not conflict with the Qur'an and Sunnah. That would have been the ideal system.” (FAA/19 years/Student); “Following what has been stated in the constitution and Pancasila” (Interview: IK/20 years/student).

According to the interview data excerpt, most informants interpret *al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47 as verses that legitimize Muslims'

obligation to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia. However, the attitude they have chosen has not yet reached a high level of comprehension. However, it cannot be denied that some of them adopt an extreme attitude, albeit in relatively small numbers compared to those who adopt a moderate attitude. It demonstrates that the academic community in Southeast Sulawesi is still open to deradicalization efforts or the socialization of religious moderation. As a result, it is critical to understand the historical context of the discourse on enforcing Islamic law in Southeast Sulawesi to identify aspects of its transmission and transformation. This information can be used to formulate preventive measures to prevent the massive growth of revivalism ideology in Southeast Sulawesi, particularly within the religious understanding of the academic community in higher education.

Revivalism in the Construction of *Āyāt at-Taḥkīm* Understanding among Academicians of Islamic Higher Education Institutes in Southeast Sulawesi

When the terms “*thāgūṭ*” and “*kaḥīr*” are articulated in *muḥjam al-lugawī* of linguistic literature and commentary books, it is discovered that both have a substantial meaning distinction. The name *thāgūṭ* is derived from the word *thagā*, which means transcendental attitude. The *Mufassir*, on the other hand, like to use this term in a sociopolitical context.⁴⁰ According to Sayyid Quthb, the term *thāgūṭ* refers to anything beyond Allah's decreed laws. He also believes that individuals who do not follow monotheistic or Islamic law's principles, conventions, customs, and ethics are *thāgūṭ*.⁴¹ Meanwhile, according to Quraish Shihab, the phrase refers to anything that goes beyond the bounds of evil and violates social, political, and religious principles.⁴² According to the opinions of these experts, the term *thāgūṭ* denotes the

⁴⁰ Imām Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī, *Tafsīr an-Nabr al-Mādd* (Dubai: Dār al-Ḥail, 1995), p. 373.

⁴¹ Sayyid Quthb, *Fī Zilāl al-Qur'ān* (Cairo: Dār asy-Syuruq, 2003), p. 220-221.

⁴² Quraish Shihab, *Tafsīr al-Misbab; Pesan, Kesan dan Keserasian al-Qur'an* (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2002), p. 220-221.

socio-political dimensions of society, religion, and the state in general.

The term *kaḥfīr*, on the other hand, is more closely associated with a religious or theological context. In general, *Mufasssirs* define the phrase as something that is opposed to God's belief or "*naqīd al-īmān*" (the opposite of faith) and "*qṣamū wa imtana'ū*" (immorality and prohibition).⁴³ Muqātil bin Sulaimān al-Bālikhī mentions four Qur'anic derivations of the meaning of *al-kufr*: First, "*al-Kufr bi at-tauhīd Allāh*" (denying monotheism to Allah) as seen in Q. *al-Baqarah*/2:6; second, "*al-Kufr bi al-juḥūd*" (denial of truth) as seen in Q. *Āli Imrān*/3:97; third, "*al-Kufr bi an-ni'mah*" (denied favors) as seen in Q. *al-Baqarah*/2:152; and fourth, "*al-barā'ah*" (freedom) as seen *al-Ankabūt*/29:25.⁴⁴

Imam ath-Thabarī interprets the word "*al-kaḥfīrūn*" in Q. *al-Mā'idah*/5:44 as individuals who change Allah's law, as the occurrences that underpin (*asbāb an-nuzūl*) of the verse.⁴⁵ According to Imām ar-Rāzī, it is the attitude of Jews and Christians who oppose God's law, who do not deserve to be labeled disbelievers in the truth revealed in the Torah, Bible, and Qur'an. The term *kaḥfīr* in this passage is a status for individuals who make laws that are against religious principles, especially for Muslims.⁴⁶ Imām al-Qurṭubī further stated that the term *kaḥfīr* only applies if it meets three criteria: lust-based law, law that is detrimental to the benefit of humanity, and law obtained through buying and selling transactions. The *mufasssīr*'s statement demonstrates that term *kaḥfīr* in the Quran is those who construct regulations that are antithetical to the spirit of benefit and humanity based on Islamic teachings.

Suppose the *Mufasssīr*'s statement is related to the survey data. In that case, respondents who choose the label *thāqūt* for those who do not support the application of

Islamic law in the state are the result of scripturalistic understanding. Those who choose the label of *kaḥfīr* as a claim against those who do not apply Islamic law in the state ignore the historical context of the verse's revelation. The elaboration of the two data shows that, despite having been exposed to the doctrine of revivalism ideology, they are still at a low level.

The Revivalism Ideology's Impact on Society, Religion, and the State

Although the findings indicate that fanaticism among the academic community of Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi is still relatively low, its impact must be monitored. In light of these considerations, previous research findings indicate that similar phenomena have been observed in many parts of the world. M. A. Muqtedar Khan stated that the emergence of revivalism movement groups impacted de-normativizing the concept of Islamic teaching. They tend to lead to worldly interests rather than afterlife interests, indicating a reduction.⁴⁷ It proved significant in Asian countries where Muslims make up most of the population. Bangladesh is one example of this phenomenon, where people are becoming more aware of the importance of following religious teachings. However, certain groups' political interests and socio-religious movements were the primary drivers of this awareness. Bob Oliver describes in his research that raising awareness of the practice of Islamization was not directly proportional to peace between the Muslim Malay population and non-Muslims of Chinese and Indian descent. Islamization has created barriers between them, limiting the space for social interaction.⁴⁸

⁴³ Manzūr, *Lisān Al-'Arab*, vol. 5, h. 144.

⁴⁴ Muqātil bin Sulaimān al-Bālikhī, *Al-Wujūh wa an-Naẓā'ir fī al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm*, ed. Hātim Šāliḥ ad-Dāman, (Dubai: Markaz Jāmi'ah al-Mājid li Siqāfah wa al-Turās, 2006), p. 25-27.

⁴⁵ Ath-Thabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān fī Ta'wīl Aḥī al-Qur'ān*, vol. 10, p. 346.

⁴⁶ Muḥammad bin 'Umar ar-Rāzī, *Mafāḥiḥ al-Gaib* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turās al-'Arabī, 2000), vol. 12, p. 368.

⁴⁷ MA Muqtedar Khan, "Islam as Identity: After a Century of Islamic Revivalism," in *Islam and Good Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 43–76. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54832-0_3>

⁴⁸ Bob Olivier, *Islamic Revivalism and Politics in Malaysia* (Singapore: Springer International Publishing,

Similar symptoms have been observed in West African countries (Nigeria). Despite the growing development of Islam in the country, this situation has contributed to the growth of the revolutionary political movement mobilized by religious groups with revivalism.⁴⁹ A similar phenomenon can be found in East Africa (Tanzania), which is grappling with the development of its Muslim population. The emergence of preachers instills fear in people about government policies suspected of violating Muslims' rights. This condition directly impacts the social interaction of its residents in developing harmonious relationships between communities.⁵⁰ To pique the interest of their supporters, revivalism activists have even engaged in various patterns of religious mediatization. This is how Yasmin Moll describes her research on developing revivalism groups in Egypt. He described the lecture method used by the missionaries, who wore sad expressions as if the chaos that had occurred there resulted from the Islamophobic movement's influence.⁵¹ Furthermore, theological debate activities broadcast via television are becoming increasingly intense there, triggering the emergence of revivalism, which is prone to causing inter-religious riots.

The various symptoms of discordant social relations between religion, society, and the state that appear in various parts of the world due to the influence of revivalism's religious ideology are concrete evidence of the threat's existence. Tenriwaru revealed the

phenomenon of a massive ideological revivalism movement from the Middle East to Indonesia, particularly through Islamic mass organizations.⁵² It does not rule out the possibility of Indonesian territory experiencing sociopolitical and economic turmoil similar to Middle Eastern countries, especially if the government cannot handle the pace of development as soon as possible. As a result, here are some descriptions of the symptoms that have surfaced to this concern.

Since the Reformation era in Indonesia, the emergence of freedom of speech or democracy has grown and developed. A critical moment to mark this is the space for negotiating information for each group of mass organizations to voice their ideas in the public sphere. Furthermore, the distribution negotiation space is becoming more flexible due to digitization.⁵³ This momentum is being exploited by at least four major ideologies: the Islamic ideologies of revivalism, reformism, traditionalism, and fundamentalism. HTI and Wahdah Islamiyah mobilized the ideology of revivalism, Liberal Islam groups mobilized reformism, mainstream mass organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah) mobilized the ideology of fundamentalism, and the Salafi Wahabiyah Islamiyah group mobilized the ideology of fundamentalism. Each of these groups uses various strategies to negotiate their latent ideology through the digital space, particularly in the form of religious studies on social media.⁵⁴

2020), pp. 1-7. <<https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-981-15-0882-0>>

⁴⁹ Usman Abubakar Daniya and Umar Muhammad Jabbi, "A Reinterpretation of Islamic Foundation of Jihadist Movements in West Africa," *EAS Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies* 2.1 (2020): 1-5. <<https://doi.org/10.36349/easjhcs.2020.v02i01.00>>

⁵⁰ Frans Wijssen and Peter Tumainimungu Mosha, "Bakwata Is Like A Dead Spirit To Oppress Muslims: Islamic Revivalism And Modes of Governance In Tanzania," *Utafiti* 14.2 (2020): 223-241. <https://brill.com/view/journals/utaf/14/2/article-p223_3.xml>

⁵¹ Yasmin Moll, "Televised Tears: Artifice and Ambivalence in Islamic Preaching," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 41.2 (2021): 153-165. <<https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-9127024>>

⁵² Andi Tenriwaru, *Pergerakan Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke Indonesia* (Gowa: Jariah Publishing Intermedia, 2020).

⁵³ Moh Nurhakim, "Gerakan Revivalisme Islam dan Wacana Penerapan Syariah Di Indonesia: Telaah Pengalaman PKS Dan Salafi," *Ulul Albab: Jurnal Studi Islam* 12.1 (2011): 1-14. <<https://doi.org/10.18860/ua.v0i0.2393>>

⁵⁴ Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas, "Membela Islam? Dakwah, Konstruksi Moralitas dan Ruang Publik

These groups also have different reactions to Pancasila as the democratic system in Indonesia. At the very least, there are three major groups involved in this matter: those who accept democracy as a whole, those who reject it entirely, and those who accept it partially while rejecting it entirely. Islamists, both reformist, and traditionalist, fully support the group that accepts it. They believe that the democratic system implemented in Indonesia has accommodated the values of Islamic teachings, either directly or indirectly. They believe that the *founding fathers* of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) attempted to internalize Islamic teachings and local traditions as the foundation for Pancasila and the Constitution. The fundamentalist group believes that, while Indonesia's democracy has adequately accommodated the values of Islamic teachings, some of its regulations still require revitalization to accommodate the values of Islamic teachings in a *kaffah* manner.⁵⁵ Unlike revivalist groups, which oppose the democratic system entirely. They believe that the system is, after all, a cultural product of Western colonialism. They are adamant about carrying out a *kaffah*, or comprehensive revolution, by enforcing the *kebilājah 'alā minhāj an-nubuwah* government system as the foundation for Indonesia's political government system.⁵⁶

One of the strategies used by revivalist groups to spread their ideology is through education. Students can continue their education in the Middle East through a scholarship program. When they finish their studies, they are encouraged to return to Indonesia and spread this ideology.⁵⁷ They

encourage more excellent distribution through media publications, both in the form of lectures at the mosque pulpit, social media, bulletins, and da'wah writings via the internet based on blogs or websites, so that they are more easily accessible to Indonesia's Muslim community.⁵⁸ This phenomenon demonstrates how widespread they spread religious ideas based on the revivalist ideology. In fact, they are very creative in utilizing all of the digital-based da'wah mediatization services that traditional Islamic groups have not fully utilized. As a result, their reach in the post-reform era is broader and more massive than traditionalist Islamic groups. The chaos that occurred in the Middle East may occur in Indonesia if it continues to grow and is allowed to continue.

Conclusion

The learning curriculum for studying the Qur'an's interpretation is insufficient in comprehensively distributing learning materials for the academic community of Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi. It can be seen from those who tend to get information related to the interpretation of *Āyāt at-Tabkīm* (Q. *al-Mā'idah* [5]:44-47) through social media access. Most of the interpretive information comes from a scriptural understanding, so it still seems like a crisis from their historical contextual understanding.

The implications of revivalism ideology propaganda on normative aspects of Islamic teachings and aspects of nationalism have been seen in various regions of the world. The indicator from the first aspect shows signs of increased religious awareness among its adherents. Still, they also have an excellent

Muslim Dalam Sejarah Media Islam Di Indonesia," in *Agama dan Negara Di Indonesia: Pergulatan Pemikiran Dan Ketokohan*, ed. Sri Margana, Siti Utami Dewi Ningrum, and Abmi Handayani (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2017), pp. 9–31.

⁵⁵ Rofhani Rofhani, "Melacak Gerakan Radikal Islam dari Wahabisme ke Global Salafisme," *Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama* 5.1 (2015): 66–91. <<https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v5i1.589>>.

⁵⁶ Karman Karman, "Dominasi Wacana Anti-Politik Barat Pada Media-Muslim Revivalis (Analisis Wacana Model

Teun Van Dijk Tabloid Media Umat Edisi Pemilu 2014)," *Jurnal Studi Komunikasi dan Media* 18.2 (2014): 229–245. <<http://dx.doi.org/10.31445/jskm.2014.180208>>

⁵⁷ Ubaidillah, "Global Salafism Dan Pengaruhnya Di Indonesia," *Thaqafiyat: Jurnal Bahasa, Peradaban dan Informasi Islam* 13.1 (2012): 35–48. <<http://ejournal.uin-suka.ac.id/adab/thaqafiyat/article/view/8>>

⁵⁸ Muhammad Ali Chozin, "Strategi Dakwah Salafi Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Dakwah* 14.1 (2013): 1–25. <<https://doi.org/10.14421/jd.2013.14101>>

opportunity to create an intolerant, racist, and extreme socio-religious situation that is exclusive and extreme. The indicators from the second aspect demonstrate signs of political instability due to skeptical and paranoid propaganda against government policies. They argue that only a religiously based political system (*Khilāfah Islāmiyyah*) is appropriate for applications in the state and that other state principles (democracy and monarchy) have failed to create justice and prosperity in the state. A similar threat does not rule out the possibility of it occurring in Indonesia if the ideology of revivalism is allowed to spread, particularly among educated youth or students in Islamic higher education institutes.

The findings of this study have ramifications for the importance of revitalizing the learning curriculum for learning materials in Ilmu Al-Qur'an dan Tafsir programs, particularly at Islamic higher education institutes in Southeast Sulawesi. This revitalization necessitates the adoption of a scientific discipline integration paradigm, at the very least in the form of an interdisciplinary approach. It could be a substantial effort to convey a comprehensive understanding of Islamic teachings to the academic community based on the concept of religious moderation. Therefore, the researcher realizes that one aspect that has not been addressed is the relationship between the level of revivalism's ideology and the dynamics and dialectics of the political and economic aspects. As a result, future researchers must investigate these limitations to obtain comprehensive and holistic information. As a result, they can determine whether the revivalism ideology they espouse threatens social, political, and economic stability in society, religion, and state.

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