



ADAPTATION OF POPULAR CULTURE IN DIGITAL FATWA ON SOCIAL MEDIA

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Abstract

The development of modern information technology and mass education does not necessarily weaken traditional religious authorities such as *Habib*. One of *Habib's* efforts to survive amidst the development of contemporary information technology is to deliver *fatwas* with popular culture. *Fatwa* is the main channel for *Habib* to establish and strengthen his authority. This article examines the adaptation of popular culture in digital *fatwas* on social media. This study uses a qualitative method. The data collection technique was carried out through *netnography*. Then, the data was analyzed using thematic analysis. The results of this research show that there are several forms of adaptation of popular culture carried out by Habib Husein Ja'far in conveying his *fatwa* on social media. First, Habib Husein Ja'far adapted slang language in conveying his *fatwa* on social media. Second, Habib Husein Ja'far adopted Japanese culture. Third, Habib Husein Ja'far visualized his *fatwa* in modern comics. Based on these findings, this study concludes that the development of modern technology has provided opportunities for *babib* to deliver their *fatwas* digitally. The form of the *fatwa* delivered by Habib adopts the form of popular culture, thereby attracting the attention of modern young Muslims.

Keywords: Popular Culture, Digital Fatwa, Social Media.

Abstrak

Perkembangan teknologi informasi modern dan pendidikan massal tidak lantas melemahkan otoritas keagamaan tradisional seperti *babib*. Salah satu upaya yang dilakukan *babib* untuk bertahan di tengah perkembangan teknologi informasi modern adalah dengan mengemas *fatwa* melalui budaya populer. *Fatwa* menjadi saluran utama bagi seorang *babib* untuk membentuk dan menguatkan otoritasnya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji adaptasi budaya populer dalam *fatwa* digital di media sosial. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif. Adapun teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui *netnografi*. Kemudian data dianalisis menggunakan analisis tematik. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa ada beberapa bentuk adaptasi budaya populer yang dilakukan Habib Husein Ja'far dalam menyampaikan *fatwanya* di media sosial yaitu: Pertama, Habib Husein Ja'far mengadaptasi bahasa slang dalam menyampaikan *fatwanya* di media sosial. Kedua, Habib Husein Ja'far mengadaptasi budaya Jepang. Ketiga, Habib Husein Ja'far memvisualisasikan *fatwanya* ke dalam komik modern. Berdasarkan temuan tersebut, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa perkembangan teknologi modern telah memberikan peluang kepada *babib* untuk menyampaikan *fatwanya* secara digital. Bentuk *fatwa* yang disampaikan oleh *babib* mengadopsi bentuk budaya populer, sehingga menarik perhatian anak muda Muslim modern.

Kata Kunci: Budaya Populer, Fatwa Digital, Media Sosial.

Background

Fatwas on social media have adopted popular culture symbols. This adaptation happens because, in the increasingly modern era of technological and information development, one cultural entity can meet another culture. Several studies have shown

how Islam meets popular culture in the daily practices of Muslim communities. For instance, the emergence of preachers who package their preaching messages with popular narratives,¹ wearing sharia and trendy Muslim clothing,² the spread of popular Islamic magazines,³ and others.

¹ Wahyudi Akmaliah, 'The Rise of Cool Ustadz: Preaching, Subcultures, and the Pemuda Hijrah Movement', in *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia* challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia, ed. by Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Najib Burhani (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2020), pp. 239–57.

² D A T Bazlin, S Y Teh, and P L Gan, 'Hijab Styling Is It Fashion or Modesty? Its' Portrayal in Three Popular

Hijab Brands in Malaysia', *International Journal of Modern Trends in Business Research (IJMTBR)*, 2.7 (2019), 58–65 <www.ijmtbr.com>; Annisa R. Beta, 'Hijabers: How Young Urban Muslim Women Redefine Themselves in Indonesia', *International Communication Gazette*, 76.4–5 (2014), 377–89 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048514524103>>.

³ Najib Kailani, 'Forum Lingkar Pena and Muslim Youth in Contemporary Indonesia', 46.1 (2012), 33–53;



This study shows that hybridization has occurred in Muslim society.⁴ According to Bamualim et al., hybridization is a new form of identity that arises due to the mixing of cultures, traditions, and values practiced by the community due to the process of interaction between a person and the environment or discourse that develops around them.⁵

This hybrid religious practice is also practiced by Habib Husein Ja'far, a popular preacher who has a lineage with the Prophet Muhammad SAW. Habib Husein Ja'far actively conveys religious *fatwas* via social media such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. In general, a *fatwa* is understood as the opinion of an Islamic jurist (*mufti*) or religious authority related to Islamic legal issues. However, in a broader context, *fatwa* also concerns the opinions of religious authorities in the form of advice (*tazkirah*), statements of attitude, appeals, and contributions of thought.⁶ These religious authorities' opinions reflect the *fatwa* typology in Islamic studies.

Previous studies have categorized *fatwas* into several typologies. Kaptein categorizes *fatwas* into four typologies: traditional *fatwa*, modern *fatwa*, collective *fatwa*, and *fatwa-like*.⁷ Then Petersen divides *fatwas* into different typologies: the ephemeral *fatwa*, the school *fatwa*, the court *fatwa*, and the public *fatwa*.⁸ Assyaukanie categorizes *fatwa* into two typologies: personal *fatwa* and institutional *fatwa*.⁹ Based on the typologies of *fatwa* above, Habib Husein Ja'far's *fatwa* is included in the typology of *fatwa-like*, personal *fatwa* and public *fatwa*.

The *fatwa* delivered by Habib Husein Ja'far that adapts popular culture is included in *fatwa-like* because it is related to religious advice that occurs in Muslim society, so that the resulting *fatwa* products are different from collective or institutional *fatwas* issued by institutions such as the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), *Bahtsul Masail* Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or *Tarjih* Council Muhammadiyah. Then Habib Husein Ja'far delivered *fatwas* personally, relying on his authority as a descendant of *hadramaut* and not based on institutions. Habib Husein Ja'far's *fatwas* are also public *fatwas* because they are disseminated publicly through social media.

Suaedy et al. argue that these personal *fatwas* and *fatwa-like* developed due to the depersonalization of religious authorities. The emergence of new religious authorities who conduct recitation patterns with a *tanya-jawab* model has positioned them like a *mufti*. The new religious authorities deliver short answers (*fatwa*) by referring to quotations from the Quran and hadith. This shows that *fatwas* are not always understood as rigid Islamic legal products issued by authorized religious institutions.¹⁰

The phenomenon of Habib Husein Ja'far in adapting popular culture in his *fatwa* makes his *da'wah* model different from other *habibs* who tend to display traditional Sufi piety.¹¹ Habib Syech bin Abdul Qodir Assegaf and Habib Luthfi, for example, are several examples of *Habibs* who have a traditional *Sufi* style of piety. Both wore traditional Islamic clothing such as robes, caps,

Dony Arung Triantoro, 'D'rise Magazine: Between The Piety, Popular Culture And Ideology', *Ulum Islamiyyah*, 25 (2018), 31–40
<<https://doi.org/10.33102/uij.vol25no0.134>>.

⁴ Graeme Turner, 'After Hybridity: Muslim-Australians and the Imagined Community', *Continuum*, 17.4 (2003), 411–18
<<https://doi.org/10.1080/1030431032000151998>>.

⁵ Chaider S. Bamualim, dkk., *Kaum Muda Muslim Milenial: Konservatisme, Hibridasi Identitas, dan Tantangan Radikalisme* (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRS) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2018), pp. 65-71.

⁶ Nico J.G. Kaptein, 'The Voice of the "Ulamā": Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia', *Archives de Sciences Sociales Des Religions*, 125.1 (2004), 115–30
<<https://doi.org/10.4000/assr.1038>>.

⁷ Nico J.G. Kaptein, 'The Voice of the "Ulamā": Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia'.

⁸ Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, 'A Typology of Fatwas', *Die Welt Des Islams*, 55 (2015), 278-285.

⁹ L. Assyaukanie, 'Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia', *Journal of Religion and Society*, 11 (2009), 1-21.

¹⁰ Ahmad Suaedy, et.al., 'Language, Authority, and Digital Media: The Impact on the Legitimacy of Fatwas', *Abkam*, 23.1 (2023), 1-24.

¹¹ Atho'illah Aly Najamudin and Irwan Abdullah, 'Habib, Islam, Dan Otoritas Keagamaan: Penerimaan Masyarakat Muslim Banyuwangi', *Farabi*, 19.1 (2022), 16–48
<<https://journal.iaingorontalo.ac.id/index.php/fa/article/view/2539%0Ahttps://journal.iaingorontalo.ac.id/index.php/fa/article/download/2539/1429>>.



turbans, and *sarongs*. It's just that their concept of preaching is different. *Habib* Syech conveyed his preaching message through the *sholawat* assembly, while *Habib* Luthfi was active in the activities of the world's *Sufi* orders. However, the model of *da'wah* for these two *Habibs* is not the only model of *da'wah* among *Habibs*.

Until now, scientific studies regarding *Habib's* preaching have focused on several categories. *First* is a study examining how *Habib* builds his authority in society.¹² *Second*, a study that looks at the style of the piety of each *Habib*.¹³ These studies have shown that *Habib* has strong authority in producing religious discourse in society. However, existing studies do not capture *Habib's* adaptation amidst developments in technology and information. There are only a few studies regarding *Habib*, which is linked to technology and information advancement. This condition becomes a gap in research. Therefore, this article contributes to this gap in research.

This article examines the adaptation of popular culture in digital *fatwas* on social media. This study is important to carry out because recent developments show that *Habibs*, as part of traditional religious authority groups, are able to adapt to developments in technology and information. This adaptation to technology and information is demonstrated through the digital *fatwa* delivered by *Habib* Husein Ja'far on social media. Thus, this article asks two questions: *First*, how does *Habib* Husein Ja'far adapt popular culture in packaging and delivering his fatwas on social media? This question is important to understand traditional authorities' position amidst new media development. *Second*, how does *Habib*

Husein Ja'far adapt popular culture in delivering his *fatwa*? This question is related to *Habib's* strategy for channeling his authority.

This article starts with two arguments. *First*, the development of technology and information has not weakened the *habib* as part of the traditional religious authority. *Habib* Husein Ja'far is able to adjust and adapt to developments in technology and information. *Second*, amidst the development of technology and information, symbols of popular culture are adapted by *Habib* to deliver his fatwas or religious advice on social media. The two arguments above show that four important components are interrelated when discussing this topic, namely *Habib*, social media, *fatwa*, and popular culture.

This article discusses the adaptation of popular culture in *Habib* Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwa* on social media. The main purpose of this study is to find out how *Habib* Husein Ja'far adapted popular culture in delivering fatwas on social media. The interconnection between digital *fatwas* and popular culture, especially among *Habibs*, has received little attention among scholars. *Habib's* preaching is always represented with a traditional *Sufi* style of piety. Therefore, this study provides another picture of *Habib's* preaching with a style of popular piety through the figure of *Habib* Husein Ja'far on social media.

This study uses a qualitative method. Qualitative methods are seen as methods that are appropriate to the topic of this article. Creswell explains that qualitative methods are research methods that aim to explore and understand social reality.¹⁴ In the context of this research, social reality is represented in social media. Studies that

¹² Ismail Fajrie Alatas, 'Dreaming Saints: Exploratory Authority and Islamic Praxes of History in Central Java', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 26.1 (2020), 67–85 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.13177>>; Najamudin and Abdullah; Syamsul Rijal, 'Kaum Muda Pecinta Habaib: Kesalehan Populer Dan Ekspresi Anak Muda Di Ibu Kota', *Afkaruna*, 14.2 (2018), 166–219 <<https://doi.org/10.18196/aijjs.2018.0086.166-189>>; Syamsul Rijal, 'Performing Arab Saints and Marketing the Prophet: Habaib and Islamic Markets in Contemporary Indonesia', *Archipel*, 99, 2020, 189–213 <<https://doi.org/10.4000/archipel.1719>>.

¹³ Sumit K. Mandal, 'An Arab Indonesian Singing Preacher, an Islamic Mass Concert, and the Historic Capture of a Public Space in Malaysia', *Asian Studies Review*, 2022, 10357823 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2022.2131734>>; Mark Woodward and others, 'Ordering What Is Right, Forbidding What Is Wrong: Two Faces of Hadhrami Dakwah in Contemporary Indonesia', *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 46.2 (2012), 105–46.

¹⁴ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches*, 4th edn (California: SAGE Publications, 2014).



discuss social reality on social media are called the *netnography* approach.¹⁵

The *netnographic* approach bases data collection on information available in digital media.¹⁶ In this research, the authors used data available on *Habib* Husein Ja'far's social media account. The details are as follows:

Table 1. Number of *Habib* Husein Ja'far's Social Media Posts and Followers as of October 20, 2023

No.	Social Media	Amount	
		Posts	Followers
1	TikTok	565	2,4 miliar
2	Instagram	1.829	3,9 million
3	YouTube	295	1,35 million

Data collection was carried out in several stages: *First*, the authors read *Habib* Husein Ja'far's social media account posts relating to the relevance of this research topic based on the activity and number of followers of the social media account. At this stage, the authors identified three official social media accounts belonging to *Habib* Husein Ja'far (table 1) with the highest number of posts and followers. *Second*, the authors carry out the online systematic documentation techniques by utilizing the capture feature (screenshot) via smartphone. This documentation technique aims to obtain post images that represent popular culture. Apart from that, the authors also document *Habib* Husein Ja'far's posts in written text form to capture popular terms that *Habib* Husein Ja'far often uses.

Data analysis in this research uses thematic analysis. Braun et al. explain that thematic analysis aims to determine the themes that emerge from data collection.¹⁷ The stages are as follows: *First* is the stage of organizing data systematically based on the classification of the data obtained. *Second*, the data was categorized according to the themes obtained. *Third*, the stage describes the data

obtained by presenting it in the form of text, images, and tables relevant to the discussion. *Fourth*, the stage of interpreting the data that has been obtained related to popular culture adaptation in digital fatwas on social media using relevant literature. Through these stages, the authors can provide reflective conclusions regarding the adaptation of popular culture in digital fatwas on social media.

***Habib* in Religious Authority Discourse on Social Media**

Academic discussions regarding religious authority and new media show the fragmentation of religious authority in Islam. The question of who has the right to lead islamic discussion amidst the development of modern information technology and mass education is increasingly complex and challenging to answer. Modern information technology encourages more democratic forms of religious practice so that, ultimately, Muslim communities can be directly involved in creating religious narratives or accessing religious information through new media. The implication is that the source of religious authority is no longer held and monopolized by the *ulama* (traditional religious authorities), who were born from the traditional higher education system and mastered the main Islamic books (foundational texts).¹⁸

This democratization of religious practice has encouraged the emergence of new actors involved in creating new religious discourse. These new religious actors are called religious entrepreneurs. This term refers to their ability to package religious messages with secular symbols through various means that are in line with the aspirations of young

¹⁵ Eriyanto, *Metode Netnografi: Pendekatan Kualitatif Dalam Memahami Budaya Pengguna Media Sosial* (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2021).

¹⁶ Robert V. Kozinets, *Netnography: The Essential Guide to Qualitative Social Media Research* (California: SAGE Publications, 2019).

¹⁷ Virginia Braun and others, 'Thematic Analysis', in *Handbook of Research Methods in Health Social Sciences*, ed. by

Pranee Liamputtong (Singapore: Springer, 2019), pp. 843–60 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5251-4_119>.

¹⁸ Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics, Islam, State and Society in Indonesia* (Prince: Princeton University Press, 2004) <<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315473697-3>>.



urban Muslims.¹⁹ In Indonesia, this new religious authority can be seen in the emergence of a number of *Ustaz*, such as Evie Effendy, Handy Bonny, Das'ad Latief, and others. Even though these new religious actors do not have a strong Islamic religious educational background, their popularity is very strong, especially among urban young people.

In the midst of the emergence of new actors who appear impressive and attract the enthusiasm of young urban Muslims, traditional religious authorities are required to adapt to existing developments. This is because religious discourse is contested in the public space, so their authority and popularity are determined by their ability to package religious messages in new media. Several studies show that traditional religious authority is being replaced by the presence of new actors.²⁰ However, other studies show that traditional religious authorities are able to adapt to technological developments.²¹ This is proven by the emergence of traditional religious authorities who actively use new media such as Kyai Mustofa Bisri (Gus Mus) (@gusmusgusmu), Kyai Anhar Zahid (@AnzaChannelKH.AnwarZahid), Gus Miftah (@GusMiftahOfficial), Abdul Somad (@ustazabdulsomadofficial) and other. This shows that traditional religious authorities are not left behind by the development of new media.

Habib Husein Ja'far is another example of a preacher in Indonesia who is able to adapt to developments in new media. He actively posts religious discourse through several social media accounts such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. His religious discourse represents a new

fatwa model because it adapts popular culture. In general, a *fatwa* is the opinion of a person, group, or organization regarding religious issues that arise in society, whether related to Islamic law or other Islamic discourse. In Kaptein's study, *Fatwas* are divided into four parts: *First*, traditional *fatwas*. This *fatwa* refers to the authority of the mufti in Saudi Arabia. *Second*, modern *fatwas*. This *fatwa* no longer refers to Saudi Arabian authorities. Such *fatwa* tends to refer to religious claims issued by modernist Muslim organizations during the Dutch East Indies at the beginning of the 20th century. The third is collective *fatwa*. This *fatwa* refers to religious claims issued by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). *Fourth*, *fatwa*-like texts. These *fatwas* tend to take the form of religious advice issued by a cleric. *Fatwa*-like texts is not like other *fatwas*, which tend to be rigid. *Fatwa*-like is more flexible and non-binding.²² Based on the *fatwa* categorization presented by Kaptein, Habib Husein Ja'far's *fatwa* tends to be a *fatwa*-like model. However, the novelty aspect lies in the *fatwa* packaging which uses popular culture.

In the midst of the increasingly significant development of new media, *fatwa* products have changed into lighter and more accessible forms. Information technology provides a new space for disseminating *fatwas*. *Fatwas* are no longer in printed form but can be accessed via various digital features and popular packaging.²³ Currently, the Muslim community can access MUI *fatwa* products through the official MUI website, namely: <https://dsnmmui.or.id/detik/fatwa/>. Likewise, NU *fatwas* can be accessed via the website:

¹⁹ Julia Day Howell, "Calling" and "Training": Role Innovation and Religious de-Differentiation in Commercialised Indonesian Islam', *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 28.3 (2013), 401–19 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2013.831650>>; C. W. Watson, 'A Popular Indonesian Preacher: The Significance of Aa Gymnastiar', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 11.4 (2005), 773–92 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2005.00261.x>>.

²⁰ Bryan S. Turner, 'Religious Authority and the New Media', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24.2 (2007), 117–34 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407075001>>.

²¹ Najib Kailani and Sunarwoto, 'Televangelisme Islam Dalam Lanskap Otoritas Keagamaan Baru', in *Ulama*

Dan Negara Bangsa: Membaca Masa Depan Islam Politik Di Indonesia, ed. by Noorhaidi Hasan (Yogyakarta: Pusat Pengkajian Islam, Demokrasi, dan Perdamaian (PusPIDeP), 2019), pp. 179–206; Dony Arung Triantoro, *Ustaz Abdul Somad Ustaz Karismatik Dunia Digital* (Yogyakarta: Diandra Kreatif dan Omah Ilmu Publishing, 2019).

²² Nico J.G. Kaptein, 'The Voice of the "Ulamā": *Fatwas* and Religious Authority in Indonesia'.

²³ Nadirsyah Hosen, 'Online *Fatwa* in Indonesia: From *Fatwa* Shopping to Googling a Kiai', in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. by Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), pp. 159–73 <<https://doi.org/10.1355/9789812308528-017>>.



<https://nu.or.id/download>. Not to be left behind, Muhammadiyah *fatwas* can be accessed via the website: <http://tarjih.muhammadiyah.or.id>. Apart from that, several lecturers are also active in disseminating their *fatwas* through various social media. The case study for this research is that Habib Husein Ja'far actively conveys his *fatwa* via Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube with popular culture packaging. This shows that amidst the development of new media, religious authorities are required to produce and disseminate *fatwas* that are in accordance with popular culture.

Habib Husein Ja'far's religious advice (*fatwa*-like) adaptation of popular culture can be identified into three parts. First, Habib Husein Ja'far packaged his *fatwa* in slang form. Second, Habib Husein Ja'far adopted Japanese culture in packaging his *fatwa* on social media. Third, Habib Husein Ja'far visualized his *fatwa* in comic form. These three forms of popular culture adaptations in digital *fatwas* can be found on Habib Husein Ja'far's social media accounts. Then, through the identification of the three forms of popular culture adaptation, this becomes the basis for the findings of this article.

Slang in Habib Husein Ja'far's Digital Fatwa

Language plays an important role in building social relationships between someone and other people.²⁴ In this context, a preacher will be accepted among the congregation if the language of his preaching is in accordance with the congregation's preferences. This means that the more closely the language is used in the da'wah, the more likely it is that the congregation will accept the da'wah. Therefore, the language style the preacher uses will be different and adapt to the target of his preaching, as well as to the social context in which the preaching is disseminated.

Fatwa-like text as a model of *fatwa* in the form of religious advice, requires language to disseminate. *Fatwa*-likes on social media must adapt to popular language (slang) to attract the attention of netizens. Habib Husein Ja'far is one of the speakers who packages his *fatwa*-like language in slang. The slang used by Habib Husein Ja'far in conveying *fatwas* on social media can be seen in table 2 below:

Table 2. Use of Slang in Habib Husein Ja'far's Fatwa

No.	Slang	Use in Fatwas
1.	<i>Gue</i>	Sudah gue bilangan judi itu haram. Dan semua yang haram pasti merugikan.
2.	<i>Overthinking</i>	Tahu gak bedanya overthinking sama santri. Kalau overthinking susah tidur mudah bangun. Kalau santri mudah tidur susah bangun. Tapi sekali santri bangun, langsung segala hal positif dia bangun.
3.	<i>Shareloc</i>	Kata Allah dalam Surat Al Imron ayat 31 "Katakan kalau kamu mencintai Allah, maka ikuti Nabi Muhammad, sehingga Allah akan mencintai kamu dan mengampuni dosa-dosa kamu". Dan cara mengikuti Nabi Muhammad dengan minta shareloc ke Nabi Muhammad. Dan shareloc dalam bentuk sekarang adalah ajaran, sunnah dan akhlakunya Nabi Muhammad.
4.	<i>FWB</i> (<i>Friends with Benefits</i>)	FWB itu dalam Islam seperti yang dibilang Imam Ghazali. Pertemanan itu harus ada benefitnya. Benefitnya apa? Benefitnya lima hal: Pertama, ketika <i>lu</i> ngumpul sama dia, <i>lu</i> makin pinter. Yang kedua, ketika <i>lu</i> ngumpul sama dia, <i>lu</i> makin sholeh. Artinya semakin semangat beragamanya. Yang ketiga, <i>lu</i> makin sopan, makin berakhlak. Yang keempat, <i>lu</i> makin cinta, gak cinta ke dunia. Nah terus, yang kelima, sama-sama saling bisa jujur.
5.	<i>Gak bahaya ta</i>	Lupa sholat biasa aja, lupa hp luar biasa. Gak bahaya ta.
6.	<i>Cakep, doank</i>	Nah cakep ini, pada sahur, karena kata nabi dalam sahur ada keberkahan. Dan juga kata nabi, orang kuat itu bukan orang yang menang gulat doank , tapi yang mampu menahan amarahnya.
7.	<i>Flexing</i>	Flexing gaya hidup hedonis telah bikin anak muda buta & membutuhkan anak muda lainnya. Hingga kita membohongi diri dan bahkan melakukan apa saja demi flexing .

²⁴ Asif Agha, *Language and Social Relations*, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) <<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315213378-15>>.

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| 8. <i>Mabar (Main bareng)</i> | <i>Mabar gak papa</i> , tapi ibadah yang utama. Bermain game itu sesuatu yang tidak dilarang dalam Islam. Itu sesuatu yang diperbolehkan. Sayyidah Aisyah, istri tercintanya Nabi Muhammad, itu juga bermain boneka. Dan pernah ketika Sayyidah Aisyah bermain boneka bersama teman-temannya, nabi masuk dan teman-temannya lari. Ngumpet. Karena khawatir gak dibolehin sama Nabi Muhammad. Tapi Nabi Muhammad justru memanggil teman-temannya untuk tetap bermain. |
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Table 2 above shows that the slang used by *Habib* Husein Ja'far tends to be languages that are popular on social media and among young people. Some examples are: *gue* is another term for referring to me. This term is often used by urban young people. *Overthinking* is a popular term on social media that is used to describe the condition of someone who is thinking about something excessively. *Shareloc* or an extension of share location is a term used to share someone's location with others. *FWB* is a term that refers to a romantic relationship between two parties who do not have a clear commitment, like a husband and wife. *Ga bahaya ta* is a term that has recently appeared on social media. This term was initially used by supporters of football clubs in Surabaya to respond to certain things with risks. *Doank* is another term for the word 'only'. This word is generally used by young people in the capital city of Jakarta. *Flexing* is a term on social media for people who display excessive wealth. *Mabar* is also a popular term among game players. *Mabar* is an abbreviation for playing together (together). Young gamers often use this term to invite their friends to play games. According to Budiasa et al., these slang languages usually emerge through intense social interaction on social media,²⁵ so *fatwas* packaged in this language are more easily accepted by netizens, especially young people.

Slang language represents the speaker's self-identity. A preacher's identity can easily be identified through the language he uses in his preaching. This is because language has an ideological side. According to Millie, the speaker's language or oratory style reflects a certain identity.²⁶

The use of certain language has the power of an ideology that targets a specific audience.²⁷ In the context of this research, *Habib* Husein Ja'far's use of slang reflects his identity as a young lecturer. Instead of succeeding in distinguishing himself from other *Habibs* as a young *Habib*, his use of slang is also able to mobilize his audience on social media, which is dominated by young people.

The use of this slang language elicits various responses from his followers. Some of his followers say that in the slang language, there is an important moral message for them. For example, one Instagram account responded to *Habib* Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwa* by saying: "*In your joke, there is a slap for me.*" Then another account said that *Habib* Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwa* was very impressive. The account said: "*Habib, why is it so damaging, Masya Allah.*" Damage is a popular term that has developed among youth, which means impressive, cool, and extraordinary achievements. In addition, one of *Habib* Husein Ja'far's followers on Instagram said that he bought internet quota just to see *Habib* Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwas*. "*You are my reason for buying an internet quota.*" In contrast to some of the responses above, some of his followers made *Habib* Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwa* a source of new questions, prompting *Habib* Husein Ja'far to issue another *fatwa*. One of his followers asked about the law of creating Instagram content using music. "*Habib, what is the law of creating content using music? I am seriously asking you so that I am not confused.*" This question actually became a means for other followers of *Habib* Husein Ja'far to provide opinions regarding the law of music. This shows that by using slang language,

²⁵ I Gede Budiasa, 'Slang Language in Indonesian Social Media', *Lingual: Journal of Language and Culture*, 11.1 (2021), 30
<<https://doi.org/10.24843/ljlc.2021.v11.i01.p06>>.

²⁶ Julian Millie, 'Oratorical Innovation and Audience Heterogeneity in Islamic West Java', *Indonesia*, 93 (2012), 123–

45; Julian Millie, 'The Languages of Preaching: Code Selection in Sundanese Islamic Oratory, West Java', *Australian Journal of Anthropology (The)*, 23.3 (2012), 379–97
<<https://doi.org/10.1111/taja.12006>>.

²⁷ Millie, 'Oratorical Innovation and Audience Heterogeneity in Islamic West Java'.



digital *fatwas* in the online space could become more interactive.

The use of slang in digital *fatwa* has implications for a shift in the form of *fatwa* dissemination from rigid and stiff to more popular forms. In the digital era, *fatwas* are no longer relevant if they are packaged in formal language. Even though the *fatwa* is produced through formal religious institutions such as MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah, the results of the *fatwa* must be packaged in a more popular form. So far, the *fatwas* issued by several of these institutions tend to be in the form of official letters. *Fatwa* dissemination in this form is unable to target young people who are active in popular culture on social media. Therefore, *Habib* Husein Ja'far's use of slang in disseminating *fatwa*-like language is very appropriate to the context of young people in contemporary Indonesia.

Japanese Culture in *Habib* Husein Ja'far's Digital *Fatwa*

Globalization has encouraged cultural exchange in all countries, including Indonesia. As a consequence, Indonesian people can advantage several transnational products facilitated by modern technological infrastructure. A striking phenomenon in recent years is the consumption of products from East Asia, such as Japan and Korea. The emergence of *Hallyu*, fans of Korean Pop (K-Pop) culture, both music, Korean dramas or films, and food affect Indonesian popular culture. The development of Japanese culture in Indonesia also has a similar condition to Indonesian pop culture. This condition can be seen from the rise in cafes

that provide typical Japanese food menus such as *sushi*, *ramen*, *takoyaki*, and others. These several cases show that Indonesian society is open to foreign cultures.

The openness of Indonesian society to transnational popular culture has given rise to two arguments in scholarly discourse. Some scholars argue that consumption of popular culture has eroded people's local identity. Society is considered as passive consumers who do not have the power to protect the values brought by popular culture.²⁸ Meanwhile, other scholars argue that Indonesian society is an active consumer group, so they negotiate what values are appropriate to their culture and what values they should abandon.²⁹ Through these two opinions, this research's position strengthens the second scholar's opinion.

As active consumers, Indonesian people not only negotiate in consuming popular culture but also reproduce popular cultural identities to carry out religious missions. Several emerging phenomena include the use of slang and modern clothing in preaching among young Indonesian *Ustadz*.³⁰ Then, in the context of this research case study, *Habib* Husein Ja'far reproduces Japanese and Korean cultural symbols as a strategy in delivering his *fatwa* and religious advices on social media. This shows that *Habib* Husein Ja'far is an active consumer.

In *Habib* Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwa*, Japanese culture is depicted in an Instagram post entitled *Da'wah Wibu*. In this post, *Habib* Husein Ja'far quoted a statement from Yuji Itadori, one of the anime characters in the *Jujutsu Kaisen* Anime Series, a Japanese series.



²⁸ Jae Seon Jeong, Seul Hi Lee, and Sang Gil Lee, 'When Indonesians Routinely Consume Korean Pop Culture: Revisiting Jakartan Fans of the Korean Drama *Dae Jang Geum*', *International Journal of Communication*, 11 (2017), 2288–2307; Vandani Kencana Putri and Matthias Reese, 'The Impact of "Korean Wave" on Young Indonesian Females and Indonesia Culture in Jabodetabek Area', *Business and Management Studies Journal*, 3.2 (2016), 35–53.

²⁹ Tuen Man Ng and Chung Shing Chan, 'Investigating Film-Induced Tourism Potential: The Influence of Korean TV Dramas on Hong Kong Young Adults', *Asian Geographer*, 37.1 (2020), 53–73 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/10225706.2019.1701506>>; Imron Rosidi, *Being Active Consumers: Indonesian Muslim Youth*

Engaging with Korean Television Dramas (Gadong, 2016); Imron Rosidi and Khotimah, 'Negotiating Representation of Islamic Values on Korean TV Dramas Among Indonesian Muslim Youth', *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 36.4 (2020), 230–42 <<https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2020-3604-14>>.

³⁰ Ahmad Najib Burhani, 'Muslim Televangelists in the Making: Conversion Narratives and the Construction of Religious Authority', *The Muslim World*, 110.2 (2020), 154–75 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/muw.12327>>; Muhamad Ibtiissam Han, 'Anak Muda, Dakwah Jalanan Dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan: Studi Atas Gerakan Dakwah Pemuda Hijrah Dan Pemuda Hidayah' (UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2018).

**Table 3.** Japanese Culture in *Habib Husein Ja'far's Digital Fatwa*

Video Visualization	Video Visualization
	<p><i>Satu quote lagi dari serial anime, Jujutsu Kaisen. Dari satu karakter bernama Yuji Itadori. Dia pernah berkata: aku tidak tahu bagaimana perasaanku ketika aku mati nanti, tetapi setidaknya aku tidak ingin menyesali cara hidupku. Quote ini menurut gue keren, karena dalam Islam gue juga diajari bagaimana kita mati itu tidak perlu dipikirkan, karena dia bergantung pada bagaimana kita hidup. Siapa yang hidup untuk berjihad, yakni bersungguh-sungguh melakukan kebaikan bagi Tuhan dan seluruh makhluknya, maka ia akan mati dalam keadaan syahid, yakni kematian yang paling mulia dalam Islam."</i></p> <p>[<i>"One more quote from the anime series, Jujutsu Kaisen. From a character named Yuji Itadori. He once said: I don't know how I'll feel when I die, but at least I don't want to regret the way I lived. I think this quote is cool, because in Islam, I was also taught that death is nothing to think about, because it depends on how we live. Whoever lives for jihad, which is to strive to do good for God and all His creatures, then he will die as a martyr, which is the noblest death in Islam."</i>]</p>
	<p><i>Ramen Ya! Sudah tersertifikasi halal oleh BPOM MUI dan BPJPH (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Produk Halal). Jadi sudah terjamin kehalalannya. Kalau gak percaya bisa dicek itu logo halalnya. Memang kita itu harus menjaga status kehalalan apa yang kita makan dan kita minum. Karena kata nabi dalam hadis riwayat Imam Muslim kalau kita gak makan yang halal, maka itu akan membuat doa kita gak diijabah sama Allah. Seperti kita makan makanan sehat, biar tubuh kita sehat, kita juga harus makan makanan halal biar batin kita sehat.</i></p> <p>[<i>Ramen Ya! It has been certified halal by BPOM MUI and BPJPH (Halal Product Guarantee Agency). So the halalness is guaranteed. If you don't believe me, you can check the <i>halal</i> logo. Indeed, we must maintain the <i>halal</i> status of what we eat and drink. Because the prophet said in the hadith narrated by Imam Muslim that if we do not eat halal, it will make our prayers not accepted by Allah. Just as we eat healthy food, so that our bodies are healthy, we must also eat halal food so that our hearts are healthy.</i>]</p>

Habib Husein Ja'far's statements in Table 3 above include fatwas. In a narrow sense, a *fatwa* is understood as a legal opinion or decision issued by an expert in Islamic law that answers problems related to Islamic law. However, in a broader context, *fatwas* are not always related to issues of Islamic law but are related to the opinion or advice of a *mufti* or religious authority regarding various issues in Muslim society.³¹

This loose concept of *fatwa* is what Kaptein calls *fatwa-like*.³² Bunt and Fitrianyah argue the same as Kaptein that religious advice can be referred to as *fatwa* in a broader and more flexible context.³³ Then Masud further explains that *fatwa*

is also related to explaining information about history and interpreting difficult verses in the Quran and hadith.

"Fatwas not only answer questions about law and morals but also about the meaning of difficult passages in the Qur'an and the hadith, and they can provide information about history and other such matters as well (Masud, pp.339)."³⁴

Table 3 above shows that *Habib Husein Ja'far* wrote a *fatwa* about the importance of doing good in life. In fact, he said that people who strive for jihad will be rewarded in the form of martyrdom.

³¹ Nico Kaptein, 'Fatwas as a unifying Factor in Indonesian History', in *Islam in the Era of Globalization* ed. by Johan Meuleman (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 72-78

³² Nico J.G. Kaptein, 'The Voice of the "Ulamā": Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia'.

³³ Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments* (London: Pluto Press,

2003); Nuzul Fitrianyah, 'Cultivating Online Fun Fatwa in Contemporary Indonesia: Millennial, Piety, and New Religious Authority', *Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama*, 13.1 (2023), pp. 117-135.

³⁴ Muhammad Khalid Masud, 'Fatwa Advice on Proper Muslim Names', in *Islam in South Asia: In Practice*, ed. by Barbara D. Metcalf (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 339-351.



This *fatwa* is packaged through character stories in the anime Yujitsu Kaisen. In another post, *Habib* Husein Ja'far expressed his *fatwa* through Ramen, a typical Japanese popular food in Indonesia. According to him, a person must eat halal food so that his prayers will be accepted by Allah SWT. However, it should be noted that in this *fatwa*, which is packaged through the Ramen food story, *Habib* Husein Ja'far acts not only as a fatwa giver but also as a religious entrepreneur. He was able to package Islamic messages through the Japanese food products he was promoting.

Habib Husein Ja'far calls the *fatwas* above the term *wibu* da'wah. This term represents two words that are opposite to each other. Da'wah is identified as an Islamic symbol which means inviting someone to practice goodness, while *wibu* is a term used to describe people outside Japan who are obsessed with Japanese popular culture. This phenomenon shows that the digital *fatwa* carried out by *Habib* Husein Ja'far represents a post-Islamist discourse that is increasingly strengthening in Indonesia. Post-Islamism is an attempt to combine Islamic values with individual choice and freedom as a form of democracy that is appropriate to the development of modernization.³⁵

Habib Husein Ja'far's digital *fatwa* packaged with Japanese cultural symbols above has caused various comments from his followers. One of his followers nicknamed *Habib* Husein Ja'far as *Habib Wibu Indonesia* (*Habusa*). At the same time, other followers give the nickname *Habu* (*Habib Wibu*). Then, one of his other followers felt very impressed with the fatwa packaging delivered by

Habib Husein Ja'far. He said it was the first time in his life that he had come across a preacher who took quotes from anime series to convey religious messages. In addition, other followers of *Habib* Husein Ja'far respond to this digital fatwa packaged through Japanese anime stories as a justification for them to watch anime movies. They feel that they have a religious figure who is in line with their hobbies. This phenomenon shows that by using cultural symbols, digital *fatwas* indirectly justify their followers to consume other cultural symbols such as Japanese anime films.

Digital Fatwa Visualization in *Habib* Comics

From the 1970s until the early 1990s, comics have become an alternative medium for preaching among *tarbiyah* activists.³⁶ The use of comics in da'wah is driven by the discourse of moral panic among young Muslims. The rise of Western culture spread through books, comics, films, and clothing is considered to endanger the morals of young Muslims. Therefore, *tarbiyah* da'wah activists use comics as a medium for da'wah to fight Western culture. This condition is also driven by the discourse of democratization, which allows every individual to promote a moral vision through various platforms.³⁷

The form of da'wah narrative in comics has experienced significant development. This development cannot be separated from the ability of missionary activists to package Islamic values in comics. Soenarto noted that the initial narrative of da'wah comics in Indonesia began with a narrative about the story of the afterlife.³⁸ Then it developed into a narrative about missionary warriors. This is shown through comics about *walisongo*. The story

³⁵ Asef Bayat, 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society, Critique', *Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East*, 5.9 (1996), 43–52; Muhammad Abzar Duraesa and Muzayyin Ahyar, 'Millennial Islamic Proselytizing Movement and Post-Islamism Discourse in Indonesia', in *Millennial Islamic Proselytizing Movement and Post-Islamism Discourse in Indonesia* (Mataram, 2021) <<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3767251>>; Ariel Heryanto, *Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture* (Japan: Kyoto University Press, 2014).

³⁶ Najib Kailani, 'Muslimising Indonesian Youths: The Tarbiyah Moral and Cultural Movement in Contemporary Indonesia', in *Islam and the 2009 Indonesian Elections, Political and Cultural Issues: The Case of Prosperous Justice*

Party, ed. by Remy Madinier (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2010), pp. 71–96; Novi Pradhana Putra, Bambang Sunarto, and Dharsono, 'Indonesian Islamic Comic Development', *5th Bandung Creative Movement International Conference on Creative Industries 2018 (5th BCM 2018)*, 197 (2019), 346–54.

³⁷ Suzanne Brenner, 'Private Moralities in the Public Sphere: Democratization, Islam, and Gender in Indonesia', *American Anthropologist*, 113.3 (2011), 478–90 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2010.01355.x>>.

³⁸ Ermita Soenarto, 'Making Sense of the Past & Present: Islamic Comic Books in Indonesia, 1965 - 2007' (NUS, 2009) <<https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/15945>>.

about Walisongo as a *Sufi* was repackaged into a group of *da'wah* fighters with a more popular narrative.³⁹ Recently, comics have been packaged using Korean and Japanese cultural symbols.⁴⁰

The development of comics with Korean and Japanese cultural packaging cannot be separated from the film industry's progress in Indonesia. At least this phenomenon began with the popularity of Japanese anime series such as Doraemon which aired on RCTI and Dragonball anime on SCTV.⁴¹ The spread of comics in Japanese and Korean culture increased when in the 2000s, South Korea launched Webtoon, a digital comic. The increasing development of digital technology drove the emergence of this webtoon.

The comic created by *Habib* Husein Ja'far in disseminating his *fatwa* on social media cannot be separated from the context of the above technological developments. *Habib* Husein Ja'far creates comics to answer religious issues in society. The *da'wah* comics created by *Habib* Husein Ja'far generally discuss three themes, namely: monotheism, fiqh, and *da'wah*. The *fatwa* regarding monotheism can be seen in the Instagram post dated September 23, 2023.



Figure 1. *Habib's* comic about Tauhid

Figure 1 above is *Habib* Husein Ja'far's *fatwa* regarding the issue of multiplying money by the

number of shamans in Indonesia. In Indonesia, there have been many cases of money duplication carried out by shamanic individuals in the last few years. This started with the revelation of the case of Dimas Kanjeng, a shaman from East Java who had deceived many people because he thought he was able to double their money.⁴² Another case is the revelation of the case of Slamet Tohari, a shaman from Central Java, who had deceived the public regarding his ability to double money. This fraud culminated in Tohari's murder of 12 victims because he always kept his promises without fulfilling their money.⁴³

Habib Husein Ja'far also responded to the issues that emerged through his preaching comics on social media. According to *Habib* Husein Ja'far, the law of asking a shaman for wealth is *haram*. This *fatwa* is packaged in the form of a conversation in a comic. *Habib* Husein Ja'far even gave another example. Not only asking for help from a shaman but also asking for financing from a moneylender is usury. Finally, *Habib* Husein Ja'far provided solutions to the questions in the comic. *Habib* Husein said that a Muslim must give alms through the charity box at the mosque to achieve prosperity. By giving alms, it will be multiplied by Allah.

The digital *fatwa* that is packaged through comics is responded positively by his followers. Some of his followers say that *da'wah* through comics is very relevant to the current era. According to him that the *fatwa* through comics is in accordance with his character, who likes to read comics. In addition, another of his followers actually strengthened *Habib* Husein Ja'far's *fatwa* by giving the opinion that if someone wants to get a lot of money, then they must work diligently,

³⁹ Ermita Soenarto, 'From Saints to Superheroes: The Wali Songo Myth in Contemporary Indonesia's Popular Genres', *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 2005, 33–82.

⁴⁰ Woongjae Ryoo, 'Globalization, or the Logic of Cultural Hybridization: The Case of the Korean Wave', *Asian Journal of Communication*, 19.2 (2009), 137–51 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/01292980902826427>>.

⁴¹ Najib Kailani, 'Kepanikan Moral Dan Dakwah Islam Populer (Membaca Fenomena "Rohis" Di Indonesia)', *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 11.1 (2011), 1–16

<<http://ejournal.radenintan.ac.id/index.php/analisis/article/view/604>>.

⁴² CNN Indonesia, 'Deret Kasus Dukun Penggandaan Uang, Dimas Kanjeng Hingga Mbah Slamet', *CNN Indonesia*, 2022 <<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230405163310-12-934041/deret-kasus-dukun-penggandaan-uang-dimas-kanjeng-hingga-mbah-slamet>> [accessed 13 October 2023].

⁴³ Kompas.id, 'Tak Masuk Akal, Tetapi Kasus Penggandaan Uang Berulang', *Kompas.Id*, 2022.



expand their horizons and networks. This shows that digital *fatwas* are more interactive and flexible, meaning that at the same time followers can also position themselves as *fatwa* givers. This is due to the freedom of virtual democracy that allows anyone to convey Islamic discourse in the online space.



Figure 2. Habib's comic about Jurisprudence

Figure 2 above is one of Habib Husein Ja'far's *fatwas* regarding the law of wayang, a traditional game originating from Java. In Indonesia, wayang has become an issue that has emerged in public spaces. This issue started with the opinion of one of the *Salafi* lecturers, *Ustaz* Khalid Basalamah, who said that the law of playing wayang is *haram*.⁴⁴ Habib Husein Ja'far also responded to this phenomenon through his *fatwa* in comic form. According to Habib Husein Ja'far, there are two laws for playing wayang, namely *halal* and *haram*. Puppets are *halal* if they are used for preaching or art. Meanwhile, to explain the *haram* law of wayang, Habib Husein Ja'far packaged it in a popular argument, namely through the dating relationship of a pair of lovers. According to him, wayang is likened to a partner who becomes a 'puppet' (*wayang*) for his partner based on lust.

The digital *fatwa* packaged through comics that discuss the law of wayang was responded to by Habib Husein Ja'far's followers. In general, his followers responded positively. They say that the moral message in the comic is very enlightening,

moderate and contemporary. However, the limited space in the digital *fatwa* packaged through this comic raises new questions for his followers. One of his followers asked about the specific law of wayang, namely wayang golek. Wayang Golek is a wayang from West Java, which is made to resemble a living creature. Therefore, according to his followers, this kind of wayang tends to be *haram*. Although digital *fatwas* are delivered in comics style which is appropriated with modern society, it has limitations on the *fatwa* space, so it sometimes raises new *fatwa* questions.



Figure 3. Habib Comic about Worship

Figure 3 above is one of Habib Husein Ja'far's *fatwas* regarding the metaverse pilgrimage. This *fatwa* is a response to the emergence of the virtual Hajj phenomenon initiated by the Saudi Arabian government in 2021. Based on information spread on social media, the Saudi Arabian government has incorporated the Kaaba (*Ka'bah*) and Black Stone (*hajar aswad*) into virtual reality (VR) technology. The goal is to establish communication with everyone through technological means.⁴⁵ This issue received a number of responses from various parties, both the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and other religious figures, including Habib Husein Ja'far. According to Habib Husein Ja'far, the metaverse Hajj is invalid for those who do it. This is because according to him the Hajj is a worship that has a determined time and place. Habib Husein

⁴⁴ CNN Indonesia, 'MUI Respons Khalid: Dulu Sunan Kalijaga Sebarkan Islam Pakai Wayang', CNN Indonesia, 2022 <<https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220215133936-20-759394/mui-respons-khalid-dulu-sunan-kalijaga-sebarkan-islam-pakai-wayang>> [accessed 13 October 2023]; detik.com, 'Duduk Perkara Video "Wayang Haram" Khalid

Basalamah Dan Kontroversinya', Detik.Com, 2022 <<https://www.detik.com/jateng/berita/d-5943054/duduk-perkara-video-wayang-haram-khalid-basalamah-dan-kontroversinya>>.

⁴⁵ Kompas.com, 'Suara Para Ulama Soal Polemik Haji Metaverse', Kompas.Com, 2022.



Ja'far made a parable that the metaverse pilgrimage will be rewarded also with a metaverse paradise.

The digital *fatwa* about the metaverse hajj packaged through this comic is more simple, light and flexible. Some followers of *Habib* Husein Ja'far said that the delivery of fatwas does not always have to use rigid *halal* or *haram* labels. Therefore, with simple, light, and flexible packaging, the content of the *fatwa* can be well absorbed by the Muslim community. "I like it when the statement is made like this, so I'm not afraid." Then, another follower added an argument from *Habib* Husein Ja'far's *fatwa*. According to him, the metaverse hajj can be done, but it is limited to training or what is known as the hajj rituals. "Metaverse Hajj is fine if it is only used as a tutorial." Some of the followers' responses above show that *fatwas*, through comics, have the advantage of being light and flexible, allowing followers to provide opinions or feedback on the *fatwa*. In addition, social media facilities that provide hypertextual space (linking to other followers' accounts in the comments) allow the dissemination of fatwas to be wider and faster.]

The *fatwas* above show several things: First, the *fatwa* delivered by *Habib* Husein Ja'far fulfills the elements of *fatwas* in general. According to Esposito and Masud, Messick, & Powers, the important elements in forming a *fatwa* are the *fatwa* requester (*mustafii*) or discourse that needs to be discussed, legal interpretation, and the *fatwa* giver (*mufti*).⁴⁶ In this context, *Habib* Husein Ja'far became a mufti who interpreted a number of religious discourses and disseminated them on social media. Second, *Habib* comics are a continuation of previous Islamic comics. Previous Islamic comics echoed Islamic narratives related to stories of the afterlife and missionary warriors, while *Habib* comics focused on religious *fatwas*. Third, the existence of *Habib* comics shows that the *tarbiyah* activist model of preaching is still relevant and adopted today by traditional religious authorities. Fourth, the *fatwa* visualization, which is

designed in a modern way with contrasting colors and animated images of young people, shows that the target of this comic is young people who are actively involved in using social media.

Conclusion

This research shows that the development of modern information technology and mass education does not weaken *Habib* authority. *Habib* Husein Ja'far remains popular amidst the development of modern information technology. *Habib* Husein Ja'far responded to this development by changing the concept of the *fatwa*, which is generally rigid and stiff, into a *lighter and more modern fatwa*. *Habib* Husein Ja'far packaged the *fatwa* with popular cultural symbols. As has been shown in this research, *fatwas* are delivered with popular culture, such as using slang, adapting Japanese culture, and visualizing *fatwas* in comic form.

This research recommends that there is no need for policies that limit the development of popular culture in Indonesia. This is because Indonesian people are active consumers who are able to adapt popular culture for good purposes. Apart from that, the development of popular culture in Indonesia has become an alternative medium for preachers to spread their preaching messages to young Muslims in Indonesia. Modern young Muslims more easily accept Da'wah or fatwas which are delivered with popular culture style because they fit their youth identity.

This research has a weakness in its dependence on data on social media. Therefore, further research is needed to examine the adaptation of popular culture on a wider scale through direct interview data with *Habib* Husein Ja'far. In this way, we will find the complex reasons behind *Habib* Husein Ja'far's adaptation of popular culture. It is hoped that further research can further explore netizens' acceptance (response) of digital *fatwas*. This is to find out the position of the *fatwa* on social media.

⁴⁶ J. L. Esposito, *Ensiklopedi Oxford Dunia Islam Modern* (Bandung: Mizan, 2001); Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, 'Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation', in *Islamic Legal Interpretation:*

Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers (London: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 3–32 <<https://doi.org/10.2307/2654817>>.

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