Radical Islamic Movements in West Sumatra: An Early Investigation and Mapping

Novi Hendri[1*], Hardi Putra Wirman[2]

[1]State Islamic Institute of Bukittinggi, Indonesia, e-mail: novihendri@iainbukittinggi.ac.id
[2]State Islamic Institute of Bukittinggi, Indonesia, e-mail: hardiputrawirman@iainbukittinggi.ac.id
*Corresponding Author

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Abstract

This article focuses on the background of the emergence of radical Islamic movements in West Sumatra. It also discusses the strategies and media used by these movements used, as well as the implications of radical Islamic movements for social, political and diversity in the region. At the same time, this article also illustrates the steps of de-radicalization in strengthening diversity. By using a qualitative approach, this research conclusively found that the diversity of West Sumatra indicates the roots of groups that develop radical attitudes in implementing and responding to various conditions that occur. Among these groups are FPI, MMI, and KPSI. Interestingly, the attitudes and behavior of radical Islamic groups in West Sumatra received support and enthusiasm from the local MUI (Majllis Ulama Indonesia, or the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars) branch of West Sumatra. Furthermore, radical attitudes have been regularly expressed by university student organizations, such as LDK, FSI, and FPI. These groups and others have undertaken a number of strategic efforts to focus on the importance of *jihad* (holy war), for instance, by pursuing the implementation Islam law in Indonesia and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate (*khilafah Islamiyah*), as well as using the language of *hijrah* (personal "emigration" to a more Islamic lifestyle) and *jihad*.

Keywords: Radical Islamic Movement; West Sumatra; *Hijrah;* De-Radicalization.

Abstrak

Artikel ini berfokus pada latar belakang munculnya gerakan Islam radikal di Sumatra Barat, strategi dan media gerakan yang digunakan, serta implikasi gerakan Islam radikal untuk kehidupan sosial, politik dan keragaman di Sumatra Barat. Pada saat yang sama, artikel ini juga menggambarkan langkah-langkah deradikalisasi untuk memperkuat keragaman. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif, penelitian ini secara meyakinkan menemukan bahwa keanekaragaman Sumatra Barat menunjukkan akar kelompok yang mengembangkan sikap radikal dalam menerapkan dan merespons berbagai kondisi yang terjadi. Di antara kelompok-kelompok ini adalah FPI, MMI, dan KPSI. Yang menarik, sikap dan perilaku kelompok Radikalisme Islam radikal di Sumatra Barat mendapat respons positif dan mendapat dukungan dari MUI Sumatra Barat. Selanjutnya, di beberapa universitas, terutama di universitas umum, sikap radikal juga ditunjukkan oleh sejumlah organisasi mahasiswa, seperti LDK dan FSI. Sejumlah strategi yang dilakukan dalam upaya jihad menjadi fokus kelompok radikal, yaitu: gerakan menerapkan hukum Islam dengan amar makruf nahi mungkar, menegakkan khilafah Islamiyah yang dibingkai dalam slogan hijrah dan jihad.

Kata Kunci: *Gerakan Islam radikal; Sumatra Barat; Hijrah; Deradikalisasi.*

Background

Since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime (New Order),[1] radical Islamic movements has steadily grown stronger and larger in Indonesia, so much so that the socio-religious conditions of the Indonesian people have begun to shift. This is shown by the emergence of various Islamic communities at the transnational, national and local scales

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[1]Mona Abaza, 'Generasi Baru Mahasiswa Indonesia di Al-Azhar', *Islamika*, 3 (1994), 34–47.

(heretofore referred to as mass organizations).[2] These organizations hold the that Islam must be practice as strictly as during the time of the Prophet. Furthermore, a number of these new movements are now able to aggressively rival more established organization, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Tarbiyah Islamiyah Association (Perti), Persatuan Islam (Persis), Al Washliyah, and others. This is in line with Syahrin Harahap' argument that the radicals do not have a clear notion of who they consider as their opposition, because they simply regard people who disagree with them as enemies.[3]

The emergence of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia has been analyzed by many scholars through various approaches. From genealogical and historical aspects we have studies such as Anshori (2019)[4], Mubarak and Hamid (2018)[5], Temby (2010)[6], Sirozi (2005)[7], and Bruinessen (2002).[8] These studies argue that among the characteristics of radical

groups in Indonesia is the strong orientation towards Salafism, on the one hand, and the influence of Middle Eastern scholars who are believed to have the most valid Muslim worldview, on the other. The history of these movements can be traced to the *khilafah* ideology that want to realize an Islamic State in Indonesia.

Other studies that analyze the link between the emergence of the radical Islamic movements in Indonesia with political post-New Order politics are are Hasan (2018)[9], Mudhoffir (2016)[10], Jati (2013)[11], Heiduk (2012)[12], Fealy (2004)[13], Jamhari (2003)[14], and Riddell (2002)[15].

In addition to the social, political, and theological phenomenon, radical Islamic movements represents a failure in understanding and interpreting history. This is in line with Khaled Abou El Fadl[16] and Azyumardi Azra's position.[17] Islamic radical groups are unable to interpret events in terms

[2] Jamhari, 'Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, 10.3 (2003), 1–28 <https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v10i3.622>.

[3] Syahrin Harahap, *Upaya Kolektif Mencegah Radikalisme dan Terorisme* (Jakarta: PT Desindo Pura Mandiri, 2017), p. 24; see also Zulfan Taufik, 'Berebut Kuasa Rumah Tuhan: Ekspansi Ideologi Radikal Melalui Masjid di Kota Bekasi', *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic & Social Studies*, 4.1 (2018), 21–38.

[4] M. Afif Ansori, 'The Radical Islamic Movement in Indonesia: Roots and Factors', *KALAM*, 13.2 (2019), 105–24 <https://doi.org/10.24042/klm.v13i2.5251>.

[5] M. Zaki Mubarok and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 'The Rise of Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia', *RISEA: Review of Islam in Southeast Asia*, 1.1 (2018), 29–43.

[6] Quinton Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia*, 89 (2010), 1–36.

[7] Muhammad Sirozi, 'The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background*', *The Muslim World*, 95.1 (2005), 81–120 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00080.x>.

[8] Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *South East Asia Research*, 10.2 (2002), 117–54 <https://doi.org/10.5367/000000002101297035>.

[9] Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto', *Journal*

of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, 1.1 (2018), 23–51 <https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v1i1.2>.

[10] Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, 'Political Islam and Religious Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia', *MASYARAKAT: Jurnal Sosiologi*, 20.1 (2016), 1–22 <https://doi.org/10.7454/mjs.v20i1.4796>.

[11] Wasisto Raharjo Jati, 'Radicalism in the Perspective of Islamic-Populism: Trajectory of Political Islam in Indonesia', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 7.2 (2013), 268–87 <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2013.7.2.268-287>.

[12] Felix Heiduk, 'Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 6.1 (2012), 26–40.

[13] Greg Fealy, 'Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?', *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2004, 104–21.

[14] Jamhari.

[15] Peter G. Riddell, 'The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, 13.1 (2002), 65–84 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410210299>.

[16] Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremism* (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), p. 131.

[17] Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), p. 185.

of their historical contexts. They simply want to restore history, without a critical understanding of the past and present. This rigidity in understanding history contributes to the rise of radical movements. According to Robert Wuthnow, the attempt to restore history that has passed is called *rediscovery*[18].

Religious social movements always use religious values (Islam) as the basis in expressing their aim and struggle. These organization has undergone rapid development in several regions of Indonesia, including in West Sumatra. This spread has caused problems for the local communities who are not familiar with this unusual expression of Islam. According to Ted Robert Gurr, all radical groups are a threat that must be feared; this includes the radicalization of Muslim communities.[19]

Several studies have examined the phenomenon of radical Islamic groups in West Sumatra: Abd A'la (2008)[20], Zainal (2014)[21], and Rozi (2015).[22] These studies see the Padri movement as the root of the Islamic radicalism in West Sumatra and Indonesia. These studies also show how the emergence of such groups in West Sumatra has had an impact on Minang diversity, which has traditionally been a pluralist society. West Sumatran society, which is famous for their pluralism and mutual respect, has been threatened and slowly replaced by an extremist and textualist approach to religion espoused by radical Islamic groups. There are a number of studies that examines the response of indigenous peoples and the Sufi fraternities (*tarekat*) in Minangkabau to these radical movements, such as Sefriono and Mukhibat (2018)[23] and Azwar (2018).[24]

The present paper focuses on the phenomenon of radical Islamic movements in West Sumatran society and the background to their emergence in the social and political scene in the late 1990s and 2000s. We examine the various radical groups that are currently developing in the region, as well as the various strategies and media they use for their propagation. We also discuss the implications of the spread of these groups on the social and political of the traditionally diverse Minang people. At the same time, it is also necessary to formulate de-radicalization strategies in order to strengthen diversity.

The informants of this research are experts of radical religious movements in West Sumatra. These consist of both observers and those directly involved in handling the problem of radicalism and terrorism in the region. The second informant is the chairman of the community organization that has been categorized as a radical group.

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[18]Robert Wuthnow, *Rediscovering the Sacred: Perspective on Religion in Contemporary Society* (Eerdmans: Michigan, 1992), p. 1–5.

[19]Ted Robert Gurr, 'Minorities, Nationalists, And Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in The Twenty-First Century', in *Leashing the Dog of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 136.

[20]Abd A'la, 'The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Roots and Characteristics of the Padri Movement', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 2.2 (2008), 267–99 <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2008.2.2.267-299>.

[21]Zainal Zainal, 'Gerakan Islamis di Sumatra Barat Pasca Orde Baru', *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman*, 38.2 (2014), 446–65 <https://doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v38i2.103>.

[22]Syafwan Rozi, 'Dari Islam Radikal ke Islam Pluralis: Geneologi Gerakan Paderi dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Islam Pluralis di Perbatasan Minangkabau', *Masyarakat Indonesia*, 41.1 (2015), 15–27 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14203/jmi.v41i1.240>.

[23] Sefriyono Sefriyono and Mukhibat Mukhibat, 'Preventing Religious Radicalism Based on Local Wisdom: Interrelation of Tarekat, Adat, and Local Authority in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatra, Indonesia', *SOSIOHUMANIKA: Jurnal Pendidikan Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan*, 11.1 (2018), 1–18 <https://doi.org/10.2121/sosiohumanika.v11i1.999>.

[24] Welhendri Azwar, 'The Resistance of Local Wisdom towards Radicalism: The Study of the Tarekat Community of West Sumatra, Indonesia', *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 26.1 (2018), 75–102.

The Emergence of Radical Islamic Movements in West Sumatra

In developing countries such as Indonesia, the emergence of radical or fundamentalist movements is a reaction to the symptoms of Western hegemony that wants to impose their worldview on their former colonies, wither subtly through ideology, or directly through violence and war. Western powers believe that they have the burden to civilize the nations that are considered backward and weak. This is the root of various forms of colonialism, whether political, economic, or socio-cultural.[25]

In pre-modern Islam, fundamentalist movements emerged due conditions internal to Muslims themselves. Therefore, it is more genuine and inward oriented. This movement first appeared in the Arabian Peninsula, under the leadership of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792 CE). The Wahhabi movement, as it came to be known, launched a holy war or *jihad* against Muslims who were seen as deviating from pure Islamic teachings. They were regarded as practicing various forms of religious innovations (*bid'ah*) and superstition. The Wahhabi movement intended not only a purification of monotheistic teachings (*tawhid*), but it also aimed at destroying historical monuments, graves, and sacred sites in Mecca and Medina that they consider to be an object of heretical and deviant worship.[26]

Fundamentalist movements like Wahhabism also emerged in Sumatra. This is known as the Padri movement in Minangkabau. However, through the vigorous opposition of moderate reformers and indigenous peoples, this radical movement was defeated. The reform movement of Tuanku Nan Tuo's students was instrumental in this effort. Among the tenets of the Padrians that are similar to Wahhabism are opposition to *bid'ah*, *khurafat*, and the prohibition of the use of tobacco and silk clothing.

Islamic fundamentalist movements that either directly or indirectly influenced by the Wahhabi movement has appeared in several regions, such as West Africa and the Indian Subcontinent. At this time, European colonialism has already encroached upon Muslim territories. However, this was not a significant factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements at the time.[27]

The emergence of these movements are caused by the following developments. *First*, there is the internal factor having to do with the belief that Islamic teachings must be purified from the various *bid'ah*s of local cultures; fundamentalists wanted to return to a purer practice and understanding of the faith. *Second*, there are external factors, especially with respect to Western attempts at controlling the economic, cultural, and political live of Muslims. This situation led to a reaction on the part of Muslims against the West, who was blamed for the weakness and oppression of the global Muslim community. This rejection is carried out in the form of resistance through *jihad* and returning to primitive Islamic values that are considered to be the antithesis to the ideology of Western modernity.[28]

The change of the political system after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 influenced the development of various groups in Indonesia, including those with Islam as its

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[25]Martin Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', *Numen*, 47.3 (2000), 266–87.

[26]Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: President and Fellows of Havard, 1994), p. 62.

[27]Kayhan Delibas, 'Conceptualizing Islamic Movements: The Case of Turkey', *International Political Science Review*, 30.1 (2009), 89–103 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108097058>.

[28]Idhamsyah Eka Putra and Zora A. Sukabdi, 'Can Islamic Fundamentalism Relate to Nonviolent Support?, The Role of Certain Conditions in Moderating the Effect of Islamic Fundamentalism on Supporting Acts of Terrorism', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 20.4 (2014), 583–89 <https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000060>.

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central ideology. Islam is a very diverse phenomenon in Indonesia. This diversity is reflected in the large number of Islamic organizations and groups that exist in the country, a number that keeps on growing until today.

Peter G. Riddel divides four types of Indonesian Islamic groups that emerged after the collapse of the New Order, namely: *modernist, traditionalist, neo-modernist and Islamist.* Another category, *indigenized Islam,* was promoted by Woodward, though Riddel seems to have disagreed with this typology. According to Riddel, the characteristic of each group can be defined based on their response to a number of controversial issues that emerged during the first years of democratic election during the Reformasi era post-1999. These issues include returning to the Jakarta Charter, the Maluku crisis, opening trade relations with Israel, the idea of a federal state of Indonesia, a place for minorities in the Indonesian state system, women presidents, and political parties established after the collapse of the New Order.[29]

Indonesia's economic crisis in 1998 led to protests from various elements. This event was the root of religious radical movements. This is because the government was not able to deal with the complex issues that emerged during the period of crisis of the time.

Almost everyone believe that political reform is only way to recovering from the economic crisis. Generally, the aim of political reform is to create *good governance*, a clean and decisive government. The government not only is able to create rapid economic growth and material prosperity for its citizens, but also provides dignity and a pride of nation. Thus, it is impossible to increase society pride if the government is corrupt.

The increasing public distrust of the Suharto government has made it more difficult to accept the steps taken by his regime. It was this crisis of trust that ultimately led Suharto to step down from the presidency that he had occupied for 32 years. The ensuing chaos after the resignation involved all levels of society, including the government itself, the army (ABRI), political parties, and the general public.

On effect of this crisis was political disintegration. Once B. J. Habibie become President replacing Suharto, and formed the "Development Reform Cabinet," new political groups emerged, including political parties, and separatist groups, such as those who advocated for the independent of the East Timorese people, as well as separatists movements in Irian Jaya and Aceh. This situation accelerated election plans and presidential nominations.

This political crisis continued throughout 1999-2000, starting with the 1999 General Elections, the first multi-party and democratic elections. The rise of Megawati as the first Reformasi era President, who was elected to her office, her controversial dismissal, and the rise of Abdurrahman Wahid (a.k.a. Gus Dur) as Indonesia's fourth President showed the complexity of elite political struggle. The political situation flared up again when President Wahid was forced to step down from office. Thus within a relatively short period of time, the Indonesia people saw three different presidents. This chaotic political situation prevented reform agendas from being implemented at the deeper levels of society.

With this economic and political crisis, a social crisis followed suit which worsened the harmony of the nation's life. The various acts of collective violence in the form of inter-communal riots, looting, and destruction of property took place. The period also witnessed

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[29]Peter Riddel, "The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations.*, Vol. 13 (2002), 65–83.

violent religious and ethnic conflicts that resulted in much suffering for the affected people. Soeharto's fall from the presidency did not immediately end the deep and serious problems facing the Indonesian people.

During the presidency of B. J. Habibie, a lot of terrible violence occurred. For example, homicides incidents of *dukun* were widespread from the region of Banyuwangi to Tapal Kuda, from East Java to Central Java, and finally in Pangandaran, West Java. There was the Ketapang incident, Jakarta, which spread to Kupang and dramatically increased escalations in the form of religious and ethnic violence in Ambon, Maluku. There was also ethnic war in Sambas, West Kalimantan, as well as guerilla warfare in Aceh, which caused massive internal refugees. Not surprisingly, some observers saw that the Indonesian state was on the verge of collapse, and was threatened with national disintegration. In addition, there are also those who see that Indonesia was stepping towards a social revolution.

Among the mass riots and violent incidents were the May 1998 riots in Jakarta, the Ambon riots which began in early 1999, and the riots in West Kalimantan, specifically in the Sambas regency. The May 1998 riots in Jakarta damaged many large buildings in business districts. Riots in Ambon involved various groups, Christians and Muslims fought each other and local natives with migrants from the Bugis, Buton, and Makassar (BBM) groups. Many churches and mosques were damaged or destroyed by fire. The riots in West Kalimantan were a clash between local tribes, such as Dayaks and Malays and immigrant tribes, namely Madura.

There are several conditions that serve as catalysts that accelerated social crisis in Indonesia. *First,* the the economic crisis led to massive dismissals of lower- and mid-level employees in urban centers. This created social frustration at a class level that led to aggressive behavior. Considering that this frustration was endemic to the public services for a long time, the frustration became very intense.

Second, due to the economic crisis, many Indonesian people were suddenly unable to meet their basic needs, especially food needs. Here, there is a correlation between acts of violence and food needs.

Third, the riots of 13 and 14 May 1998 in Jakarta were considered a successful model by the society in solving problems that had dragged on for a long time (modeling effect). *Fourth*, riots cannot be separated from decades of weak law enforcement, which has led to a general ignorance of the law in society. The collective acts of violence seem to have been institutionalized through the process of forming a model of violence on May 13 and 1998, were worsen by the Army's (ABRI) indecisive attitude towards rioters and violations of the law.

Fifth, the public had no reliable source of information; thus, people were easily convinced to act based on circulating rumors[30].

The fall of the New Order was a momentous opportunity to enshrine freedom of thought and expression. This had direct effect on the growth of Islamic organizations.[31] However, many of othese organizations are similar to the Padri movement in terms of ideas and methods.[32] In fact, there seems to be a

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[30]Afif Muhammad, *Agama dan Konflik Sosial: Studi Pengalaman Indonesia* (Bandung: Penerbit Marja, 2013), p. 76–78.

[31] 'New Islam' groups in this context are Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Salafi, Tarbiyah Groups (which later became the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). Borrowing the term Imdadun

Rahmat, this New Islamic group is called a 'new actor' which has an agenda outside the mainstream of the previous Islamic group. See M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke-Indonesia* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005), p. x.

[32] Michael Laffan, *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalisme and the Narration of a Sufi Past* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 44.

desire to take up the cause of the movement of the Padri to deal with contemporary issues.

The new Islamic organizations of the Reformasi era display special characteristics differentiate them from pre-existing mass Islamic organizations of Islam. They are characterized by their donning of the white Islamic robe (*koko*) fitted with black pants that are cut short over their ankles, wearing turbans or caps, and maintaining beards.[33] Ideologically, they are characterized by the demand to implement Islamic law in Indonesia and to establish an Islamic caliphate. They also enjoin the active prohibition of what they consider to be "evil" or "sinful" acts in society. It is not uncommon for them to carry out violent acts; they are not usually amenable to compromise. It seems that the use of violence to attain their goals is a major characteristic of these movements. Thus, they are often referred to as radical, militant, or extreme.[34]

In West Sumatra, the following radical groups have emerged: *Hizbut-Tahrir, Salafi*, Front Pembela Islam (FPI, the Islamic Defense Front), and the Committee for the Implementation of Islamic law (Komite Penegak Syariat Islam). The presence of this group is enough to reinforce the notion that Islamic radicalism has begun to take hold in West Sumatra. While radicalism is not really a problem, as long as it is held at the level of thought (or ideology), it becomes a problem when it shifts from the realm of thought to action. This is particularly problematic when their goals are hampered by the existence an opposing power like another social, political, or ethnic group. .

In such a situation, radicalism tends to be accompanied by violence. Thus, this phenomenon has the potential to cause open conflict between the opposing groups.[35] These open conflicts often result in bloodshed for each party.

Radical Islamic Organization in West Sumatra

The growth of fundamentalist Islamic groups in West Sumatra cannot be separated from the long history of conflict between indigenous groups and the Padri. This conflict has changed the patterns of the religious life of West Sumatrans.

The Padri Movement is acknowledged as one of the pioneers of religious fundamentalism movements in West Sumatra. In fact, it is at the root of almost all religious fundamentalist movements, such as FPI, MMI, and LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, Campus Propagation Institute), all of which enforces the adherence to Islamic values.

Since the fall of the New Order government, FPI and MMI organizations in West Sumatra have been steadily developing. FPI, for instance, is one example of the new radical Islamic movements to emerge in Indonesia during the Reformasi era. The textual and the radical way by which its interpret their religion often cause anxiety in local communities. This is particularly true with respect to their slogan—taken from Islamic jurisprudence—of "enjoining the good and prohibiting the evil" (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*). This stipulation has led to violent actions carried out by FPI members on people suspected to have violated Islamic law; it has caused fear, tyranny, intolerance in the community, not to mention the violation of human rights.

The *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* principle is the famous slogan of FPI that has caused problems in Indonesian society in general and West Sumatran society in particular. In the

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[33] Jeffrey Hadler, *Sengketa Tiada Putus: Matriarkat, Reformisme Islam, dan Kolonialisme di Minangkabau* (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2008), p. 35.

[34] Jamhari & Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia,* (Jakarta: Grafindo Persada, 2004), pp. v–vi.

[35] Endang Turmudi, *et al.*, *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia'*.

implementation of this principle FPI group use various vigilante acts of violence.

FPI does not in fact meet the requirements of a true social movement, because all the institutions that lead to social movements are already owned by FPI. According to Herbert Blumer, a social movement is the collective courage to form a new order of life.[36]

In this context, FPI believes that it is a bold movement that seeks to establish a new order of life. They want to uphold Islamic law and establish a caliphate system of governance. However, this movement is always in conflict with the dominant ideology of the country in which they operate. It is not surprising, therefore, that FPI movements always begin at the underground level and are always suppressed by the authorities. This is particularly the during the New Order era.

Another similar organization, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) is quite active in applying the principle of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. The increasingly penetration of globalization through neo-liberal economic policies, as well as Western neo-imperialism, has led to stronger calls for *jihad*. MMI believes that *syariat* (Islamic law) is an alternative ideology that can free Muslims from this multidimensional crisis.

MMI believes that it is able to solve various social and political problems through the implementation of Islamic law. In practice, the MMI branch in West Sumatra four main agendas: first; unify the religious understanding of Muslim activists in a single vision based on the Qur'an and Prophetic example (Sunnah). Second, forming solidarity through internal consolidation in order to form a strong *mujahid*s (literally "strugglers", or those committed to the cause) at the national, regional and international levels.

Third, establish an institution that is able to provide for the needs of Islamic activists. Fourth, realize the formation of a community leadership council as a representative body based on *syariat*. Based on the above targets, an MMI branch is born and has broader alliance (*tansiq*) with other branches of the Movement based on a common orthodox believe and method (i.e. *aqidah* and *manhaj*) .[37]

Campuses are major hubs of radicalization. It is well-known that many radical group members are graduates of the university system. For example, the infamous Pepi Fernando's network had three members who are graduates of the State Islamic University, Jakarta (UIN-Jakarta).

The increasing amount of religious activities taking place in a number of universities, especially public (i.e. religiously neutral) universities, is one of the most potent sources of exclusivist and radical modes of religious thought. Thus, Islamic revivalism did not emerge from Islamic universities, but from public universities.

In West Sumatra, university students are the target radical movements, such as FPI, MMI, HTI and LDK. It can be said that FPI, MMI, HTI and others are part of a transnational movement that fosters radical religious ideas among college students.

The fact that many students in West Sumatra are members of radical Islamic movements indicates that the region is potential swelling ground for the growth of the these organizations. The influence of these radical religious ideologies begins with Islamic propagation activities on campus or *dakwah kampus*. This study group then joins another institution located outside campus, such as LDK. From here, the group would collaborate with other similar organizations, such as FPI, MMI, HTI and others.

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[36]Herbert Blumer, 'Collective Behaviour', in *Principle Sociology*, ed. by A. M. Lee (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 49.

[37]Syawal (Leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia West Sumatra), *Interview* {11 September 2017}.

LDK branches in several West Sumatran Universities have a strong and organized network. Many LDK branches in West Sumatra have even pledged themselves into FPI, MMI, and HTI. As stated by Buya Busyra (the leader of the West Sumatran branch of FPI), FPI has entered West Sumatran universities under LDK.

The Syariah Islam Enforcement Committee (KPSI) is also a community group that are concerned in enacting *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. Recognizing the difficulty of equalizing all Muslims' understanding of Islamic law has led Islamic groups to express their views in a relatively general tone. Since the fall of the Suharto government, these groups have called for the need to implement Islamic law in all aspects of life. This was done in various ways, including through spreading ideas in the media and public forums.

Radical Islamic organizations in West Sumatra can be seen in the scheme below:


Chart 1. Radical Islamic Organization in West Sumatra

Strategies and Media of Radical Movements in West Sumatra

According to Busyra, the strategy of Radical Islamic groups in West Sumatra is to implement *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. FPI in West Sumatra aims to be at the frontlines in

eradicating disobedience. They also want to enforce the performance of Islamic.[38]

In terms of culture, West Sumatra is an area that is free from various forms of immoral acts. This is in accordance with the philosophy of *adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi Kitabullah*, which is reflected in people's lives. The principle shows that West Sumatra is a religious society that is committed to the teachings of their religion.

In order to realize and oversee these values, FPI, MMI and other radical groups would conduct raids every night on entertainment venues, especially in the city of Padang, Bukittinggi, and others. For instance, FPI and MMI has been very active in capturing young couples who are suspected of committing immoral acts around the locations of Jam Gadang, Sianok Canyon, and around the coast of Padang and hotels.

In carrying out the principle of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, FPI and MMI involve other local mass organizations, such as the Paga Nagari, the Libas and so on. They have similar goals as FPI and MMI. They apply Islamic law according to the principle of *syara' mangato, adat mamakai*. The movement is often accompanied by vigilante acts committed against people who they think are performing disobedient or immoral actions.

FPI and MMI has also succeeded in encouraging regional governments to support their *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* agenda. This was proven by the passing of local regulation No. 11/2001 regarding "deviant behavior" such as gambling, prostitution, drug abuse and others. This local regulation however has more of a symbolic value than being a substantial piece of legislation.

Another *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* strategy carried out by FPI and MMI is the rejection of the building of the Grand Kartini Hotel in Bukittinggi Siloam Hospital and a church

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[38] Busyra (Leader of Front Pembela Islam/FPI West Sumatra), *Interview* {10 September 2017}.

beside it. The construction was terminated by various ways: installing banners, holding demonstrations and urging the city government of Bukittinggi and Padang to stop the construction plan.[39]

In their political aspirations, FPI, MMI and HTI have the same mission of running a government based on Islamic law. This involves the establishment of an Islamic state, where the law and the wheels of government are based on Islamic law. The various strategies and media carried out by radical groups can be seen in the scheme below:


Chart 2. Strategy and Media of Radical Islamic Organizations in West Sumatra

MUI and Radicalism in West Sumatra

The legitimacy of the monopoly on the truth of interpretations of Islam by MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama) has implications for the MUI's confidence to impose views or fatwas and demands for enforcement of those decisions or fatwas through elements of government apparatus, including regional government and law enforcement and the courts. Thus, the

government seems to be giving MUI a monopoly over the truth claims of Islam[40].

Only religious groups that are approved by MUI are allowed to exist, while those that are considered deviant can be excluded. As an organization that claims to represent a certain religious community, it is actually common for MUI, as well other religious organizations, to have views that are different from others, even if this is accompanied by accusations of heresy and infidelity. However, this should only apply within the group itself without being accompanied by state enforcement. And it should be legitimized by the government with the formation of institutions, official regulations and omission by law enforcement officials for threats and violence.

The MUI's position regarding the monopoly religious authority they enjoy and their ability to force government enforcement of their decisions is a major development from the previous MUI. In the New Order era, MUI has been called as government servants because their views and religious opinions (*fatwa*) were issued in accordance with government policy. This is consistent with Suharto's authoritarianism. This policy continued with the presidency of B. J. Habibie, because MUI was involved in mobilizing political support for his presidency.[41]

The role of MUI seems to be geared towards politics than to protect and take care of the people. There has been a real shift in the role and function of MUI. From being an umbrella for the people, it is now spreading threats and hatred in the midst of a pluralist society. *Fatwa*s issued by MUI have more political tendencies and has caused tension between religious communities in Indonesia.

This strengthening of the role of MUI deserves special attention because it is also

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[39]Syawal (Leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia West Sumatra), *Interview* {11 September 2017}.

[40]Moch. Nur Ichwan, *Ulama, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia after Suharto* (Koninklijke Brill NV, Lieden: Islamic Law Society, 2005), p. 56–62.

[41] Ichwan.

parallel with this tendency. What makes MUI stronger than other mass organizations is generally due to prestige this institution enjoyed under Suharto's New Order regime. At that time, it was used as an instrument of authoritarian power to support the government and quell anti-government religious movements. As a result, it has enjoyed extensive facilities. It has branches throughout Indonesia, from the district to the province levels and has an informal structure at the sub-district level.

Currently, MUI in West Sumatra is undergoing an unstable and vulnerable period, because it has been used by religious and political communities that espouse radical religious ideologies. As explained before, MUI membership does not occur through a strict selection process based on merit and level of religious learning. Rather, but it consists of selecting members of groups that are radical, such as FPI and MMI. MUI now seems to legalize the violence acts carried out by radical organizations in West Sumatra. They seem to have given religious permission to these kinds of acts.

Higher Education and Radicalism in West Sumatra

As discussed before, the process of radicalization has also reached universities, especially among college students. We have mentioned the case of the Pepi Fernando network, three of whose members are students at the State Islamic University, Jakarta (UIN-Jakarta).[42]

Previously, a student of UIN-Jakarta's Faculty of Science and Technology was also involved in a terrorism act that was successfully prevented by the Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror Police Department. This was really surprising because the chancellor of the university regularly speaks publicly about the importance of pluralism in Islamic teachings. Studies have shown that that radical network recruitment among students is usually aimed at general (i.e., religiously neutral) tertiary institutions and more specifically students in certain faculties. In other words, most students recruited are from a background of minimal religious knowledge, and for this reason they are easier to be indoctrinated.[43]

Public (non-denominational) universities are more easily targeted by recruitment, while Islamic universities are considered more difficult. Undeniably, radical movements are also emerging on Islam universities. This shows two things. First, there has been a change in Islam universities. Second, there has been a development in the forms and strategies of radical movements in infiltrating these campuses.

Regarding the first, the conversion of Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN) into full fledge universities (UIN) opened up registration to students who did not come from a learned Islamic background, who came from non-religious high schools and vocational schools. In the past most of the IAIN student candidates came from *madrasa*s or *pesantren*, traditional Islamic boarding schools. When they went to college, the lessons taught there were familiar to their curriculum at the *pesantren*. By specializing at a higher education institution, they were able to gain deeper mastery and become academics,

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[42]Zulfan Taufik, 'The Youth and The Primacy against Religious Radicalism through the Organization of Mahasiswa Ahlith Thariqah Al Mu'tabarah an Nahdliyyah (MATAN) in Indonesia', *TEOSOFI: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam*, 9.1 (2019), 109–30 <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2019.9.1.109-130>.

[43]Muhammad Najib Azca, 'Yang Muda, Yang Radikal: Refleksi Sosiologis terhadap Fenomena

Radikalisme Kaum Muda Muslim di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru', *Maarif: Arus Pemikiran Islam dan Sosial*, 8.1 (2013), 14–44; Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, 'Struktur Politik dan Deradikalisasi Pendidikan Agama bagi Anak Muda di Indonesia', *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 2.1 (2015), 153 <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpi.2013.21.153-171>.

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teachers, and researchers. Therefore, they prefer to read books on philosophy, sociology, political science, and so on.

This situation with UIN campuses is further exacerbated by campus policies that do not provide space for students to express critical and creative ideas. Students are crammed with a series of systematic programs that are repetitive and causes stress. Students' critical ideas are well received. Yet younger generations need the space to express ideas and be critical of received knowledge. When students' criticism and creativity are deliberately blocked, it is very possible that students will look for radical movements that they believe will provide them with the freedom of expression.

The aforementioned LDK was developed at Andalas University and several other tertiary institutions, including tertiary religious institutions. They belong to a category of organizations that participate in various school organizations while maintaining a radical attitude. The success of the LDK at the student level by inculcating exclusivist attitudes in everyday thinking and actions has shown that radical organizations have gained control of campuses.

In the case of West Sumatra, the Padang State University developed a religious organization FSI (Forum Studi Islam or Islamic Study Forum). This organization has seen a growth of membership from year to year.[44]

This organization holds activities that are not limited to routine recitation of the Qur'an in campus mosques. They also contributing to student activities such as tutoring. They have study groups to help other students complete their studies. They even live and rent a special place for fellow members of the organization.

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[44] Azzuri Illan Tinasar (Leader of Forum Studi Islam Universitas Negeri Padang), *Interview* {12 September 2017}.

Radical Movements as a Threat

Radical Islamic movements in West Sumatra are represented in particular by groups such as FPI and MMI. They are a problem in West Sumatra society. The existence of FPI in is considered as a threat. The rapid growth of FPI mass organizations in the region indicates that this mass organization is able to win the hearts of some of the local people. Despite this they remain as a threat to West Sumatran society.

The religious interpretations advocated by these groups threatens the diversity of Indonesia. Their narrow interpretation of Islam, which is focused on the implementation of Islamic law in the midst of a pluralistic society is a real threat to the integrity of the Indonesian nation.

Radical groups of Islam are more likely to carry out violent and vigilante actions when social interactions occur that are not in accordance with their ideology. Anarchism and even terrorist acts carried out by radical groups endanger the spirit of pluralism that has lonig been maintained in West Sumatra.

The Unified State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) was formed by the struggle founding fathers during the independence movement. They fought wholeheartedly and sacrifice their lives to realize the unity and integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Many national heroes who have been martyred in in the fight for these noble ideals of the nation.

Unfortunately, many young people do not know or do not want to know the struggle of the nation's founders. Therefore, many radical groups secretly or openly want to replace the founding principles of the Republic, which has been instrumental in safeguarding the unity and integrity of the nation.

These groups are affiliated to Islam radical groups. Those who wanted to replace the

Pancasila (the Five Principles of the Nation) and the 1945 Constitution joined hands and formed a bloc that was wrapped in religious notions. This made their cause seem attractive to ordinary people who do not understand politics and history. They felt that their ideas are accommodated by the radical groups and their cause as a marginalized class taken up by them.

Religion, the economy, and politics play important roles in a country's development. Understanding the radicalism activities can be categorized as terrorism, if there is a threat, violence and take human rights.

De-radicalization in West Sumatra
Multiculturalism Education

Multiculturalism can be defined as an acknowledgment that a country or society is diverse. Multiculturalism can also be understood as the belief in the normal acceptance of diversity.[45] This is the starting point and foundation for a civilized country. Multicultural education is necessary in order to understand the differences that exist in society and to eliminate social conflict that results on account of the lack of this understanding.

However, some people seem to understand multiculturalism as a kind of culture. However, there seems to be agreement that to see culture as language, history, beliefs, moral values, geographical origins and everything that is shared and used as a sense of belonging to a particular group. This seems to be what people have in mind when talking about multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism refers to three things, first, it refers to a certain culture; second, it refers to cultural diversity; and third, it refers to specific actions related to the fact of diversity.

In the context of a country, multiculturalism loses its effectiveness when it it comes into contact with government authorities and identity politics. The government has dominant authority as a regulator of culture. Finally, what emerged in Indonesia during the New Order era was a monoculture. With regional autonomy, multiculturalism is very strong because it prioritizes local interests and diversity.

Multicultural education is a way of respecting life, being sincere and tolerant of the cultural diversity in the plural society. In the context of Indonesia, which is known for being pluralistic, multicultural education is important in order to manage pluralism creatively. In multiculturalist discourse, multicultural education is based on the meaningfulness of differences that are unique to each person and society. This idea is based on the assumption that every human being has a unique and different identity, history, and life experience. Difference is the most important and most authentic identity of every human being. Multicultural education presupposes schools and classrooms as simulations of a real-life plurality, constantly changing and developing. School and classroom institutions are a vehicle, in which the student is the main character while the teacher and education personnel act as facilitators. Learning is managed as a dialogue and enrichment of a unique life experiences, in a way that fosters the growth and collective awareness of each citizen and student.

In the learning process, it is not the quantity of knowledge learned, but *how* students experience the learning process in the classroom and school environment. The teacher is not a single actor, who masters and knows everything. Productive teachers are those who can create situations where students can learn by themselves. Classes are arranged in such a way as to not bury personal identities, but to actualize each other's personality. Learning activities are not a tool for teacher's

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[45] Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Millenium Baru* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999), p. 7.

socialization or indoctrination, but a vehicle for dialogue and learning, whether this is about "science and technology" or social studies.[46] Thus, there should be cooperation between the school as an institution and the environment that supports the existence of the school.

De-radicalization of Pesantren Education

One factor that has helped to people understand radicalism in Indonesia is education. Akbar S. Ahmed concluded that Islamic education is facing a crisis. Islamic education is often too narrow and encourages the growth of religious chauvinism.[47] One form of religious education in Indonesia that has received attention after the occurrence of several violent acts of extremism is the *pesantren*.

Since the disclosure that the perpetrators of the Bali bombings were alumni of the Al-Islam Islamic Boarding School, Lamongan, radicalism has often been linked to religious education in the *pesantren*. There seems to be a link between religious education in the *pesantren* and radicalism.

The phenomenon of *pesantren* radicalism is actually something strange and is a recent development. Islamic boarding schools as religious institutions are not actually the root of the radicalism. The *pesantren* is aimed at producing knowledgeable candidates of Islamic scholarship (*tafaqquh fi al-din*[48]). Therefore, the *pesantren* teaches all things that exist in religion, include theology, Islamic Law, and morality.

However, through the diversity of *pesantren* patterns in the archipelago, from the *salaf* or the traditional *pesantren* (i.e., *pesantren*s that only teach religious knowledge, especially classical Islam) to the *khalaf* or the modern

boarding schools, which also teachings general subjects, the *pesantren* has been slowly changing.

The *pesantren* is no longer an agent of social change with their ability to adapt to local traditions, but rather is able to perform extraordinary purification. In fact, in some cases, the *pesantren* actually fosters radicalization. This is what later helped to bury the symptoms of radicalism among *Pesantren*.[49] Therefore, radicalism in Indonesia has always been associated with religious education patterns in the *pesantren*, namely the teaching of exclusive and dogmatic religion which has given rise to hatred against outside groups.

Radical actions that occur in Islam are mostly caused by the Muslim's interpretation of the scriptures and the exemplary practice (Sunnah) of the Prophet that are textualist, literalist, and rigid. The Qur'an and Sunnah are not interpreted contextually, which involves understanding the historicity of the text. The verses that tend to lead to violence acts are often interpreted as they are, regardless of their sociological and historical context.

What might be implied behind the letteris almost neglected, if not forgotten. In extreme examples, this tendency has temporarily prevented Muslims from being able to clearly understand the message of the Qur'an as a divine instrument that provides guidance on true moral and ethical values for human life.[50]

The spread of Islamic radicalism in West Sumatran *pesantren*s is not an impossibility, even when there has been a transformation of the traditional *pesantren* into modern *pesantren*. The education system, the quality of the teaching staff, the curriculum and teaching materials from one *pesantren* to another varies. Teachers have a strong influence over the students. The

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[46] Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Millenium Baru.*

[47]Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam Sebagai Tertuduh* (Bandung: Arasy Mizan, 2004), p. 244.

[48]Abdurrahman Wahid, *"Pondok Pesantren Masa Depan", dalam Marzuki Wahid, dkk. (Ed.), Pesantren Masa Depan,* (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999), p. 16.

[49]Zainuddin Fananie, et.al., *Radikalisme Keagamaan dan Perubahan Sosial* (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2002), p. 15.

[50]Bahtiar Effendy, 'Agama dan Politik: Mencari Keterkaitan Yang Memungkinkan Antara Doktrin dan Kenyataan Empirik', in *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, ed. by M. Dien Syamsuddin (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. xvii.

teacher is seen as living book and sources to ask questions, whose answers must be followed. The teacher has the authority to expound the meaning of traditional texts.

In addition, the experiences of social and political life in the *pesantren* leaders are also very diverse. Each *pesantren* leader has different social, political and cultural experiences. This influences the orientation and vision of the *pesantren*, and some become supporters of radical Islamic movements. This has occurred in several *pesantren*s in West Sumatra.

Da'wah and Religious Understanding

The term of *da'wah*, can be defined as inviting people to believe in God and worship Him. This means making people aware of the reality of life that they must face and establishing a society that is prosperous and peaceful, based on the guidance of Allah and His Messenger.

However, the problem is how the process of *da'wah* is to be properly done. Thus, the doctrine of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* should not be used by Muslims to justify intolerant and especially violent acts against others. In the Qur'an, Ali Imron; 104: "*and let there be among you a group of people who cry out to kindness, command to the good (*ma'ruf*) and prevent the evil (*munkar*), they are the lucky ones*". If this verse is understood literally it will foster an intolerant attitude which leads to the violence act.[51]

Term of *amar ma'ruf* is an order to do all things that are good according to Islamic law; meanwhile, *nahi munkar* is to prevent every crime that is considered inappropriate by Islamic law. The scope of its application is very broad and covers all aspects of human life. Therefore, there is a need for collective work from all elements of the Muslim community to carry it out.

Thus, in *da'wah* it is better to avoid the practice of justifying any means available to achieve noble goals. This is because, doing so would mean that the privacy of people's lives and their God-given dignity as human beings would be violated. Thus, to find the relevant way of doing *da'wah*, certain things must be followed.

First, the redefinition of the concept of *da'wah*: the concept of *da'wah* should be changed from its true understanding. It should not be in conflict with the main task of becoming first and foremost *rahmatan lil alamin* ("a mercy to the world"). This requires that Muslims uphold human dignity.

Understanding *da'wah* as an attempt to prioritize people who are already religious must be excluded, because it is not in accordance with human dignity. In fact, this kind of *da'wah* can be said to be contrary to the main duty of upholding human dignity.

Second, achieving the goal of *da'wah* (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) should be done by prioritizing the wise and gentle method through a number of steps: using wise words, giving *mau'idzah hasanah* (good advice), and to discuss the matter in the best way (Qs. An-Nahl: 125).

Whereas in carrying out *nahi munkar*, one should prioritize a firm attitude through a number of steps: only using force when every other alternative has failed. At the very least, when all have failed, it can be done by using the heart.

Moreover, *da'wah* should not be pursued with a defensive approach, i.e., emphasizing the prohibiting of evil, but by promoting an offensive approach, i.e., prioritizing the enjoining of good, which is the way used by the prophets and his companions who successfully established Islam during the early days.[52]

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[51] Ilyas Supena, *Filsafat Ilmu Dakwah Perspektif Filsafat Ilmu Sosial* (Semarang: Abshor, 2007), p. 145.

[52] Ali Yafie, *Teologi Sosial Telaah Kritis Persoalan Agama dan Kemanusiaan,* (Yogyakarta: LKPSM, 1997), p. 88.

A more humanistic approach is needed, in order to create an anti-violent movement. This is achieved by actively striving to spread peace for the sake of upholding human rights. Indeed, living in peace is a basic human need.

Third, *da'wah* activities should emphasize more on substantial issues than prioritizing symbolic acts.[53] There is no need to prioritize Islam symbols and jargon in *da'wah*. The symbols are only expressions of a substance that is not always understood by many people.[54]

Revitalizing Local Wisdom

Recently, the fading of the local identity is considered as one of the factors triggering radicalism. It causes a void of values that is filled by radical ideas. Nowadays, the local culture of our own country has changed a lot, which gives more space for radicalism to grow.

Today's modern society has forgotten the local values and wisdom inherited from our predecessors. Many *petatah petitih* (proverbs) of Minangkabau can be used as a reference in developing the nation's character. For example, "self-introspection keeps you away from contention, which keeps you away from bad traits."

It is important to consider that the local wisdom of Minang culture contains truth values, good values, and the values that can foster a sense of justice, and the ability to be responsible, independent, and harmonious with others. These values are extracted from local Minangkabau culture, but they are universal, so they can be used as general values by anyone, anywhere, and anytime.

The rise of radicalism in Indonesia, especially in West Sumatra is considered to be an increasingly widespread phenomenon. Concrete efforts need to be made, one of which is to revitalize local wisdom so that the roots of radicalism and terrorism do not take hold of the younger generation. Every year the Youth Oath is commemorated, but we also need to take an oath reduce the influence of radicalism and terrorism.

In using local wisdom to counter act radicalism, there are several steps we can take: first, it is important to revive community institutions and even local rituals that have strong cultural roots in the community.

This step should be used to strengthen the shared cultural cords as well as to revive social capital in society. This would allow for the growth of mutual trust in society and social mechanisms that give sanction for people who violate these traditions. Thus, the traditions that live in a community have strong control over changes that come from outside. These outside influences, when left unchecked, can eventually gain control of local traditions and even eliminate them.

Local traditions and rituals in Indonesia always contain a high degree of tolerance for other understandings, including new ideas that come from outside. This way, society remains open. The steps of de-radicalization can be seen from the scheme below:

Chart 3. Steps of De-radicalization

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[53]Cliford Geertz, *Abangan, Santri, Priyayi dalam Masyarakat Jawa, Terjemahaan Aswab Mahasin,* (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1983), p. 276.

[54] Nazar Nurdin, 'Perda Syari'at dan Ketertiban Sosial: Sebuah Perbandingan, dalam Islam Politik di Panggung Kuasa,' *Jurnal Justisia*, 38 (2012), 78.

Conclusion

Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that: *First*; that radicalism can occur in all religions, but so far Muslim radicals are better known in the media. We must always be alert to the invitations to violent *jihad*. We should also be wary of invitations to a better life and require women to use the veil. Member recruitment of radical organizations target people who are economically weak and have a lack of religious education. They search for people who live in militant villages and share stories of *jihad*.

Second, the diversity of the West Sumatra lies at the root of groups that develop radical attitudes in implementing and responding to various conditions that occur. Among these groups are FPI, MMI, and KPSI. Interestingly, the attitudes and behavior of radical Islamic groups in West Sumatra has received a positive response and support from the local MUI branch of West Sumatra. Furthermore, in several universities, especially in non-denominational universities, radical attitudes are also shown by a number of student organizations, such as LDK and FSI.

Third, a number of strategies are used in efforts to make violent *jihad* as the center of radical groups, namely: the movement to implement Islam law through *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* and to establish the Islamic caliphate framed in the slogan *hijrah* and *jihad*. This is often done through violence, vigilantism and violation of law.

Fourth, in the context of counteracting Islamic radicalism in West Sumatra and in Indonesia, guidance is needed, especially in terms of the education and de-radicalization movement at every level, including universities. Optimizing *da'wah* is also an important step in countering radical propaganda, as well as gaining a deeper understanding of society and reviving local wisdom and values.

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